



eCOMMONS

Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons

Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2011

Introducing the Common Good Index and a Common Good Immigration Ethic

Ana Bedard

Loyola University Chicago

Recommended Citation

Bedard, Ana, "Introducing the Common Good Index and a Common Good Immigration Ethic" (2011). *Dissertations*. Paper 278.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/278

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Copyright © 2011 Ana Bedard

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

INTRODUCING THE COMMON GOOD INDEX
AND A COMMON GOOD IMMIGRATION ETHIC

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY

BY

ANA T. BEDARD

CHICAGO, IL

MAY 2011

Copyright by Ana T. Morua Bedard, 2011
All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all of the people who made this dissertation possible, especially my dissertation director Dr. Michael Schuck for his support and sage advice, and my committee members Dr. Aana Vigen and Daniel Hartnett, S.J. for their careful reading and feedback. Thanks also to all my parents, who have always believed in me and supported me in pursuing my dreams, and to my friends who have supported me through the process, especially Jocelyn Azada, who got me through the long haul, and all my Facebook friends who regularly cheered me on, turning an otherwise lonely pursuit into a communal goal.

I would also like to thank the State of Illinois and the Hispanic Theological Initiative for providing the funds with which to complete my research and writing. And lastly, I would like to thank Catherine Wolf, Theology Department Office Coordinator, without whom I may not have even been registered on a timely basis, much less completed my dissertation.

PREFACE

This dissertation was born from two desires. The first was a desire to help in some small way to alleviate the suffering of the many undocumented immigrants I have had the privilege to know and work with in my fifteen-year career as a community organizer in Chicago. The undocumented immigrants I worked with expressed over and over again how unjust it was that society was fine with them working here but refused to grant them the basic rights that should pertain to all people in society. I have seen the fear of deportation and the frustration at the daily injustices and difficulties stemming from their lack of legal residency.

The second desire was to live in solidarity with African Americans. As a community organizer in Chicago, I worked in multi-racial coalitions most of my fifteen-year career, and through those organizations I developed close relationships with a few African American leaders, through whom I had the opportunity to learn about the daily crushing effects of racism on African American individuals and the whole African American community. Through my work in these coalitions and elsewhere, I have become convinced that racism against Blacks will leave them forever at the bottom of the social ladder, unless people from all races actively work to undo racist policies and practices.

The father of liberation theology Gustavo Gutierrez has said that theology “must be a love letter to God, the Church and the people we serve.” This dissertation, with its

often very technical bent, is my love letter to God, the Church, and the Black, Latino and undocumented immigrant communities. My prayer is that this work will in some way foster understanding, solidarity, and yes love between our communities, so that we may prevail together against sin and suffering.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
PREFACE	iv
LIST OF TABLES	ix
ABSTRACT	xi
INTRODUCTION	1
Outline of Dissertation	2
Mexican Migration to the United States	6
Who are Undocumented Mexican Immigrants?	7
A Brief History of Mexican Immigration and U.S. Policy Responses	9
CHAPTER ONE: ANALYSIS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON IMMIGRATION	15
Key Catholic Texts on Immigration	16
Exsul Familia Nazarethana	16
Gaudium et Spes	17
Pastoralis Migratorum Cura	18
Ecclesia in America	21
Strangers No Longer	25
Campaign for Immigration Reform: Justice for Immigrants	34
Summary	40
CHAPTER TWO: DEFENDING AND DEFINING THE COMMON GOOD	42
The Roots and Elaboration of the Common Good in CST	46
Thomistic Roots of CST's Understanding of the Human Person and the Common Good	47
Human Flourishing and the Common Good in Catholic Social Thought	51
Need for Further Specification of the Common Good in CST	58
The Common Good and Human Functioning Capabilities	61
Human Functioning Capabilities and CST	64
Summary and Next Steps	70
CHAPTER THREE: A COMMON GOOD INDEX	73
Quantifying Catholic Social Principles: John A. Ryan	75
Ryan's Use of Natural Law	77
Ryan's Quantification of the Right to a Living Wage	79
Proposal for Quantifying the Common Good	82
Context for a Common Good Index: Other Indicator Projects	85

Critiques of Composite Indexes	89
Constructing the Common Good Index	91
CGI Indicator Criteria	93
Overview to Methodology for Choosing CGI Indicators	96
Life Indicators	97
Physical Health Indicators	98
Bodily Integrity Indicators	99
Senses, Imagination and Thought Indicators	100
Emotions Indicators	101
Practical Reason Indicators	102
Affiliation Indicators	102
Other Species and Nature Indicators	104
Control over Environment Indicators	104
Work Indicators	106
Raising Children in a Stable, Supportive Environment Indicators	107
Relatedness to the Transcendent Indicators	108
Play Indicators	108
Summary of Indicators	109
Calculating the Common Good Index Scores	112
Summary	114
 CHAPTER FOUR: APPLYING THE SPECIFIED COMMON GOOD APPROACH TO THE U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUE	115
International, National, and Community Common Good Index Scores	118
International and National CGI(P) Scores	119
African American and Latino Common Good Index Scores: 2006	127
Relative Capability Levels and the Preferential Option for the Poor	132
Effects of Recent Immigration Trends on the Common Good	134
Immigration's Effects on Undocumented Mexican Immigrants	137
Immigration's Effects on Mexican Residents	144
Immigration's Effects on U.S. Residents	148
A Common Good Response	158
Solutions through Solidarity	161
Next Steps	171
 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION	173
Evaluation of Immigration through a Specified Common Good Approach	177
Technical Evaluation of the Common Good Index	180
Moving Forward	184
 APPENDIX A: INDICATOR STATISTICS	187
Definitions	188
Sources of Real Indicator Statistics	189
Mexico	189

United States	190
African Americans	191
Latinos	192
Undocumented Mexican Immigrants	192
Hypothetical Indicator Statistics (2006), Without Undocumented Mexican Immigration: “Worst Case Scenario” (Highest Wage Effect)	194
Calculations and Definitions	194
Sources of Hypothetical Indicator Statistics	196
 APPENDIX B: CGI(P) SCORES	198
Calculations and Definitions	199
 APPENDIX C: MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM SCORES USED FOR CGI(P) CALCULATIONS	203
Definitions	204
Sources of Minimum and Maximum Scores Used for CGI(P) Calculations	206
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	207
 VITA	223

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Table 1. Human Functioning Capabilities with Attendant Indicators	109
2. Table 2. Common Good Indicators	110
3. Table 3. Indicators: Correspondence to Age Groups	111
4. Table 4. CGI(P) Indicators and Corresponding Measurements	120
5. Table 5. CGI(P) Scores: International and National	121
6. Table 6. Human Functioning Indicators: National	122
7. Table 7. CGI(P) Scores	128
8. Table 8. Human Functioning Indicators: National and Minority Populations	129
9. Table 9. Changes to International CGI(P) Scores Resulting from Immigration	137
10. Table 10. Effects of Immigration on Mexican/Immigrant CGI(P) Scores	139
11. Table 11. Changes to U.S. CGI(P) Scores Resulting from Immigration	150
12. Table 12. Real Indicator Statistics (2006), With Undocumented Mexican Immigration	189
13. Table 13. Hypothetical Indicator Statistics (2006)	195
14. Table 14. Correspondence of CGI(P) Indicator Names with Indicators Used	200
15. Table 15. Real CGI(P) Scores (2006), With Undocumented Mexican Immigration	201
16. Table 16. Hypothetical CGI(P) Scores (2006), Without Undocumented Mexican Immigration	202

17. Table 17. Minimum and Maximum Scores Used for CGI(P) Calculations	205
---	-----

ABSTRACT

The U.S. and Mexican bishops, in their influential pastoral letter *Strangers No Longer*, frame immigration ethics through the lens of solidarity with the immigrant. This frame leads them to erroneously interpret the preferential option for the poor and ignore potential harm to poor U.S. citizens caused by recent undocumented immigration from Mexico and other countries. A better framework to immigration ethics is a specified common good approach, which is created in this dissertation. This approach uses the definition of the common good found in Catholic social thought and concretizes it through using a theological anthropology based in Martha Nussbaum's human functioning capabilities approach and through developing a Common Good Index (CGI). This CGI is a set of twelve sociological indicators that measures the common good through measuring to what extent basic levels of human capabilities are ensured for all people in society.

Using the specified common good approach, the ethical focus becomes more balanced and true to original Catholic intent, attending to the needs of poor U.S. citizens as well as poor immigrants. The bishops' policy recommendations are affirmed through the specified common good approach, but additional policies are advocated – ones that aim to promote the capabilities of poor U.S. citizens that are threatened by immigration. Solidarity thus becomes a two-way street.

INTRODUCTION

Immigration has been an important public issue worldwide for centuries, and it has been the subject of religious ethical rules and reflection since God commanded Israel to treat the stranger as a native-born. Recently in the United States, the most widely distributed Catholic reflection on immigration has been the U.S. and Mexican bishops' pastoral letter, *Strangers No Longer*. This letter presents a summary of Catholic social thought (CST) on immigration and makes specific policy recommendations concerning U.S. immigration policy. In this dissertation, I challenge the bishops' ethical methodology and conclusions and present an alternate framework for Catholic immigration ethics that I call the "specified common good approach."

This approach evaluates social conditions through the lens of a specified common good. In order to do so, it develops CST's definition of the common good (the sum total of those social conditions that promote human flourishing) by defining human flourishing through a set of "human functioning capabilities" – universal human capacities for love, good health, thought, and other activities. I then numerically quantify what percentage of the population has secured a minimum level of ability in all areas of human functioning through an index of sociological indicators measuring those capabilities. I call this index the Common Good Index. The information provided in it, coupled with the principles of solidarity and the preferential option for the poor, direct the use toward ethical evaluations and solutions that foster the common good.

Outline of Dissertation

I begin this dissertation with an analysis of Catholic social thought concerning immigration. I review the primary source documents, including *Exsul Familia Nazarethana*, *Gaudium et Spes*, *Pastoralis Migratorum Cura*, and *Ecclesia in America*, and I examine the U.S. and Mexican bishops' treatment of these documents in their pastoral letter *Strangers No Longer*, which is a key text promulgated widely to U.S. Catholic parishes as part of the U.S. bishops' Justice for Immigrants campaign. I demonstrate that the bishops' immigration ethic is above all centered in solidarity with the immigrant, aimed toward protecting immigrant rights and wellbeing. This ethic aligns with the many primary themes in the source documents, such as the right to subsistence, human rights and dignity, solidarity, and the preferential option for the poor. However, it is unsatisfying practically because it fails to offer proper guidance to those who are trying to sort out conflicting claims about immigrant versus U.S. wellbeing, and theologically because it leads to a misconstrual of the preferential option for the poor: one that equates the option for the poor with an option for immigrants. This narrow focus has led the bishops to ignore potential harms to other vulnerable communities, in this case poor U.S. workers and their families, which result from immigration.

Instead of focusing its attention solely on immigrants, a Catholic social immigration ethic should be framed through the lens of the common good. Such a framework includes a preferential option for the poor, but it balances out concern for immigrants with concern for other vulnerable groups. In this way, the common

good enables a more balanced, complete and truly Catholic response to the complexities of this issue.

There is a problem with using the common good as a primary moral framework, however: its lack of specificity. The common good is defined in Catholic social thought as the sum of social conditions that promote the flourishing of individuals and their groups. This definition, while shedding some light on the concept, is nonetheless imprecise. A survey of the common good as delineated in Catholic social teaching has found it to suffer from “a lack of tight conceptual definition” and describes it as “embarrassingly fuzzy.”¹

I undertake, therefore, in Chapter Two, to bring greater specificity to the common good. My understanding of the common good, like the bishops’, is grounded in Aquinas and is informed by CST. I use CST’s definition of the common good (the sum of social conditions that promote the flourishing of individuals and groups)² and define human flourishing through an amended set of Martha Nussbaum’s human functioning capabilities. These capabilities comprise a broad spectrum of human abilities shared by all people, such as the capacity for love, self-determination, and being in good health. Human wellbeing relies on opportunities to realize each and every capability. Human functioning capabilities give substance to the aim of the common good, namely human wellbeing. The common good, with its attendant preferential option for the poor, requires

¹ Dennis P. McCann, “The Common Good in Catholic Social Teaching: A Case Study in Modernization,” in *In Search of the Common Good*, ed. Dennis P. McCann and Patrick D. Miller (New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 122.

² Vatican Council II, *Gaudium et Spes*, (Rome: The Vatican, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html (accessed December 16, 2010).

that every person have access to realizing at least some minimum level of functioning in each capability.

Rather than stopping the process of specification of the common good there, in Chapter Three I present a proposal for quantifying the common good. I model my effort off of the work of one of the most prominent Catholic theologians of the early twentieth century, Mgr. John A. Ryan, who sought to apply Catholic social teaching to the practical issues of his day, and in so doing he took the Catholic doctrine of subsistence and turned it into a proposal for a living wage, arriving at an actual dollar figure of how much money a family needed in order to live in dignity. I then develop a proposal for a Common Good Index that measures the common good. The Common Good Index is modeled after the Index of Social Health developed by Marc and Marque-Luisa Miringoff, which quantifies social wellbeing through 16 sociological indicators such as infant mortality, violent crime, poverty and teenage drug use. The Common Good Index itself contains twelve indicators that measure human functioning capabilities. These indicators are: voter turnout, high school drop-outs, homicide, household median income, infant mortality, suicide, teen birthrate, uninsurance, carbon dioxide emissions, poverty, unemployment, and the importance of religion. This index evaluates on a scale of 1 – 100 the extent to which the common good is being realized in society. A higher score means that more of the population is closer to achieving minimum levels of functioning in all human capabilities. A lower score means that the population as a whole is further from realizing those basic levels of human functioning.

One can use the Common Good Index to evaluate whether a given social dynamic or policy affects the common good positively or negatively. In Chapter Four I apply the Index in such a way to the current immigration situation. I ask the question, “How have recent undocumented Mexican immigration and U.S. immigration policies affected the common good?” Note that this question differs from the more frequently-asked question, “How has recent undocumented Mexican immigration affected the common good?” I include U.S. immigration policies under the microscope, because people’s capability levels are affected not only by changes owing to the migration of individuals, but also by laws and policies that form the political context within which they are seeking to realize those capabilities. I find, briefly, that immigration overall positively affects Mexican immigrants and residents, but that it negatively affects United States residents, and that the international common good declines slightly in the presence of these recent immigration trends. I then present some policy proposals and directions for addressing the declines in human capabilities. These proposals are guided by the aim of increasing people’s abilities to meet a basic level of human functioning in all areas.

In the Conclusion, I reflect on the significance of the specified common good approach for Catholic immigration ethics. I also address the limitations of the Common Good Index and make suggestions for its further development. The specified common good, as I demonstrate in this dissertation, is a rigorous tool for Catholic social ethics that falls within the Catholic tradition of the common good. In addition, it offers several advantages over the bishops’ ethical framework, in that it fosters a more comprehensive application of solidarity and the preferential option for the poor, offers a more precise

social analysis and provides a clear aim: the assurance of human functioning capabilities for all.

Mexican Migration to the United States

Before beginning the analysis of Catholic immigration ethics, it is necessary to provide some context. I offer in this section a brief overview of who undocumented Mexican immigrants are, and I also provide a short history of U.S. immigration policy vis-à-vis undocumented Mexican migration to the United States. First, however, I offer clarification of key terms used in this dissertation.

Migrants, most simply, are people who migrate, i.e. who move from one country or region to another. Migrants are commonly people who move for work.³ An emigrant is one who emigrates, or who leaves her country or region of origin, and an immigrant is one who immigrates, or who enters into and establishes permanent residence in a new country. In this dissertation, the terms migrants, immigrants and emigrants all refer to Mexicans who have moved to the United States from Mexico.⁴

When qualified by generation, the term immigrant may refer to someone born in the receiving country (in this case, the United States), but who has recent immigrant ancestry. Specifically, in this dissertation “second generation” immigrants refer to the U.S.-born sons and daughters of immigrants. “Third generation” immigrants are the U.S.-born children of second generation immigrants.

³ "Migrant," in *Merriam Webster* (2010), <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/migrant> (accessed March 7, 2011).

⁴ Mexican migration shifted from a circular, temporary pattern to a pattern of permanent residence after the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act law. Douglas S. Massey et al., *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 131.

Some immigrants reside legally in the United States; others do not. This dissertation concerns Mexican immigrants who live, i.e. reside, in the U.S. without legal permission. I use the terms undocumented Mexican immigrants, unauthorized Mexican immigrants, and undocumented Mexicans interchangeably to refer to this group of people.

I use the term Mexicans to refer to Mexican residents, i.e. Mexican nationals residing in Mexico. The term Latino, on the other hand, refers to people of Latin American descent living in the United States. Latinos may or may not be immigrants, and Latinos may be of any race. I use the terms African American and Black interchangeably to refer to U.S. residents of African descent.

Who are Undocumented Mexican Immigrants?

There are an estimated 11.1 million undocumented immigrants residing in the United States today. I examine specifically undocumented Mexican immigration in this work, because this is the group that has been the topic of most concern in immigration debates. Indeed, Mexicans are the single largest immigrant group in the United States, comprising 59 percent of all undocumented immigrants and 18% of the total foreign born population in the U.S.⁵

Mexican immigrants are actually not the poorest or least educated Mexicans. They come from average economic backgrounds, and their education levels are higher

⁵ Jeffery S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009), 21, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf> (accessed March 9, 2010).

than the Mexican average.⁶ That being said, their average income falls far below the U.S.' : they come from families with average incomes under \$15,000 per year,⁷ compared to the U.S. average of \$48,000 per year. They are also considerably less educated than the U.S. public 64% of unauthorized Mexican residents between the ages of 25 and 64 did not graduate from high school, versus 8% of the native-born population of the same age.⁸

Undocumented immigrants represent approximately 4% of the U.S. population. A relatively young population, they represent 5.4% of workers.⁹ Unauthorized workers come from agricultural or blue-collar professions, and once in the United States they are largely focused in low-skilled work, comprising a disproportionate number of workers in low-skilled industries.¹⁰ They represent 25% of farm workers, 19% of building, grounds-keeping and maintenance workers and 17% of construction workers.¹¹ While undocumented Mexican workers represent a high portion of agricultural workers, the share of Mexican workers who work on farms has declined over time; in 2000 only 15 percent of Mexicans worked in agriculture.¹² Others are concentrated in the blue-collar professions mentioned above.

⁶ Daniel Chiquiar and Gordon H. Hanson, "International Migration, Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States," *The Journal of Political Economy* 113, no. 2 (2005).

⁷ In Purchasing Power Parity, which reflects purchasing power in the United States.

⁸ Passel and Cohn, *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*, 12.

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., 5.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² David Card and Ethan G. Lewis, "The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990s: Explanations and Impacts.," in *Mexican Immigration*, ed. George Borjas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

Compared to other undocumented immigrants, undocumented Mexican immigrants have much lower educational and income levels.¹³ Sixty-four percent of unauthorized adult Mexican immigrants did not complete secondary school, versus twenty-five percent of all other unauthorized immigrants.¹⁴ And their median household income in 2007 was \$32,000, versus \$45,000 for all other unauthorized immigrants.¹⁵

A Brief History of Mexican Immigration and U.S. Policy Responses.

Mexican migration to the United States has been a subject of public policy since the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ceded Mexican territories to the United States (now the states of Texas, California, Arizona and New Mexico), ending the Mexican-American war. Since then, U.S. response to Mexican migration has been inconsistent, at times permitting or encouraging immigration for the sake of providing low-cost workers, and at other times hand pursuing policies to close the border and deport immigrants. For example, Mexican workers were imported after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to help build the railroads. Also, throughout the 1920s the U.S. had no numerical restrictions on Mexican immigration, even though it had established caps to European immigration in 1921.¹⁶ In the 1930s during the Great Depression,

¹³ Passel and Cohn, *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*, 21.

¹⁴ Ibid., 22.

¹⁵ This is due in part to the lower labor force participation of female undocumented Mexican immigrants; the labor force participation for male undocumented Mexican immigrants is approximately the same as other undocumented immigrants (95 percent, versus 91 percent). Ibid.

¹⁶ Massey et al., *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*, 29.

however, the U.S. reversed course and mounted a series of deportation campaigns that reduced the Mexican population by 41% by the end of the decade.¹⁷

Following the same give- and take- dynamic, in 1942 the United States created the Bracero program, offering temporary work visas to Mexicans to work in the fields – at its peak 450,000 Mexicans worked in the United States under this program per year.¹⁸ And yet, in the midst of this program, the United States deported close to one million undocumented Mexicans in 1954 under an initiative known as Operation Wetback.¹⁹ The Bracero program ended in 1965 under pressure from civil rights organizations, unions and religious organizations who viewed it as an “exploitative and discriminatory system” that impeded efforts to raise wages for native-born farm workers, and under non-compliance from growers, who under the bureaucratization of the program turned to hiring workers illegally instead.²⁰

After this program ended, Mexican migration to the United States continued. The bracero program had created linkages between Mexico and the United States, which continued after its end.²¹ Because the avenues for legal migration became severely restricted, Mexican migration became increasingly illegal. In 1976 the number of legal

¹⁷ Ibid., 34.

¹⁸ Ibid., 37.

¹⁹ Juan Ramon García, *Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1980).

²⁰ Massey et al., *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*, 41.

²¹ Eighty-seven percent of the Mexican hometown associations in the United States in 2002 were from sending states associated with the bracero program. Gordon H. Hanson, "Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States," *Journal of Economic Literature* 44, no. 4 (2006): 879.

visas for Mexicans was reduced to 20,000 per year (from 450,000 in the late 1950s).²²

The rate of Mexican migration remained essentially unchanged, however, from 1976 through 1985.²³

In 1986 the United States government passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which combined both the liberal and restrictionist tendencies into one law. It increased border security and made it illegal to knowingly hire an unauthorized worker, but it also granted legal amnesty to undocumented immigrants who had resided in the country since 1982.²⁴ Three million immigrants were granted amnesty under this program. Since 1986, the number of undocumented immigrants in the country has grown to 11.1 million, 6.7 million of whom are Mexican.²⁵ As a result, over half of all Mexican immigrants residing in the United States are undocumented (55%).²⁶ If the three million IRCA immigrants are included in those totals, nearly 80% of all foreign-born Mexican U.S. residents are either currently unauthorized or were at one time.

Since the mid-1980s, national policy has largely swung toward preventing undocumented immigration and limiting the rights and privileges of undocumented

²² This number was brought into alignment with caps for other countries in the Western Hemisphere under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Massey et al., *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*, 43.

²³ Ibid., 44.

²⁴ The terms unauthorized and undocumented immigrants are used interchangeably in this dissertation.

²⁵ The total number of undocumented immigrants peaked at about 12 million in 2007, but has declined in the wake of the recession. Jeffery S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, *U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010), <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf>.

²⁶ *Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), 1, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/47.pdf>.

immigrants. The Immigration Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IRRIRA) of 1996 dramatically increased the number of border patrol agents, established a fence along the U.S. border at San Diego, and created a bar for immigrants found illegally residing in the country. Those who are determined to have been illegally in the country for six to twelve months are barred for three years. Those who have been here longer are barred for ten years.²⁷ The 1996 Welfare reform act restricted legal immigrants from receiving federally subsidized services such as Medicare or welfare within five years of arrival (undocumented immigrants are never eligible).

However, the nation is far from united on immigration policy. Numerous “pro-immigrant” laws have been attempted at the national level, although not passed, including efforts to legalize current undocumented immigrants and to allow undocumented students access to federal student loans. Furthermore, in recent years many states and municipalities have passed laws supportive of immigrants. As many as 32 municipalities have been identified as “sanctuary cities,” having passed laws indicating that they will not report undocumented immigrants to the federal authorities.²⁸ Furthermore, eleven states have passed laws allowing undocumented students to pay in-state tuition at public colleges and universities.²⁹

²⁷ Jessica Vaughan, "Bar None: An Evaluation of the 3/10-Year Bar," Center for Immigration Studies, <http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1003.html>.

²⁸ Stephen Dinan and Kara Rowland, "Justice: Sanctuary Cities Safe from Law," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/14/justice-sanctuary-cities-are-no-arizona/> (accessed January 23, 2011).

²⁹ Alan Gathright, "Senators Push In-State Tuition For Undocumented Students," *TheDenverChannel.com*, January 19, 2011, <http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/26540925/detail.html> (accessed January 17, 2011).

The divide between the two sides of the issue is apparent in Arizona's recent immigration law and national responses to it. The "nation's toughest bill on illegal immigration," passed in April 2010, required among other things that police detain people they reasonably expect to be undocumented residents and made it a state misdemeanor for an immigrant to not carry proof of legal residency at all times.³⁰ While there was broad public support for this measure in Arizona and elsewhere, there was large public outcry elsewhere in the nation.³¹ Boycotts were called by major cities, musicians and sports organizations, and President Obama criticized the law as being unfair and promoting mistrust between citizens and law enforcement personnel.³² The day before the law was to go into effect a federal judge blocked the provisions listed above, although her ruling left intact other provisions such as prohibitions on day labor street pick-ups or on sanctuary cities.

The issue of undocumented Mexican immigration is contentious and polarized, and the public policy proposals outlined above demonstrate the lack of common ground. This dissertation enters into this debate through examining undocumented Mexican immigration and U.S. responses to it through the lens of the common good. In so doing it seeks to provide a place for people from both sides to meet in the middle and to address the issues brought forward by all. This balanced emphasis distinguishes a common good

³⁰ Randal C. Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration," *New York Times*, April 24, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html> (accessed January 2, 2011).

³¹ Sean Alfano, "Arizona Immigration Law SB 1070 Has Support of 55% of Americans, New Poll Shows," *NYDailyNews.com*, July 28, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/07/28/2010-07-28_arizona_immigration_law_sb_1070_has_support_of_55_of_americans_new_poll_shows.html (accessed January 30, 2011).

³² Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration."

framework from the U.S. Catholic bishops' framework on immigration, which emphasizes solidarity with the immigrant. In Chapter One, I review Catholic social teaching on immigration and examine the U.S. and Mexican Bishops' theological framework on immigration ethics, finding it inadequate.

CHAPTER ONE

ANALYSIS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON IMMIGRATION

In the introduction I presented some basic information about undocumented Mexican immigrants and immigration, and about responses in the United States. I move now to a discussion of the Catholic Church's immigration ethic, which responds to this context but is grounded in a history of Catholic social teaching. I begin this chapter with a review of Catholic social teaching on immigration and then examine the U.S. and Mexican bishops' 2003 pastoral letter on immigration, *Stranger No Longer*, the most comprehensive, accessible and widely published statement of Catholic social teaching on immigration as it concerns the United States. *Strangers No Longer* is the orienting document for thousands of Catholics involved in the USCCB's Justice for Immigrants Campaign; hence, it is highly influential and important document.

I demonstrate in my analysis that the overarching ethical framework conveyed in *Strangers No Longer* is solidarity with the immigrant. While this framework maintains continuity with Christianity's centuries old tradition of concern for the immigrant, I argue that it is insufficient as a social immigration ethic, because it creates an ethical tunnel vision preventing the bishops from attending adequately to the concerns of other vulnerable populations. The stress on immigrant solidarity trumps concern for the common good and leads to a breach of the preferential option for the poor, creating an incoherence with these central principles of Catholic social teaching.

Key Catholic Texts on Immigration Ethics

Strangers No Longer is best understood in the context of Catholic social teaching on immigration, and so I turn first to a review of key Catholic texts concerning immigration ethics. The modern era of the Church's theological reflection on immigration ethics began with Pius XII's *Exsul Familia Nazarethana* in 1954. Central texts since then include Paul VI's *motu proprio Pastoralis Migratorum Cura* issued in 1969 and the Instruction *Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi*, published in 2004 by the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People.¹ Other documents in Catholic social teaching that also provide theological underpinnings for the immigration ethics in the Church include *Gaudium et Spes* and, in the Americas, *Ecclesia in America*. These documents form the primary body of work from which *Strangers No Longer* draws its five principles of Catholic social thought.

Exsul Familia Nazarethana

Exsul Familia is the first document in the modern era of Catholic reflection on immigration ethics.² It provides a comprehensive history of the Church's activities, associations and proclamations concerning immigration, establishes the Office of Delegate of Migration Affairs, whose function is to oversee the work of the Church in promoting the spiritual development of migrants, and institutes rules and regulations for attending to the spiritual needs of migrants. In terms of immigration ethics, its main

¹ Elizabeth W. Collier, "Who Is My Neighbor? Negotiating the Tension between the Local and the Global in Catholic Social Teaching to More Adequately Address United States Immigration Policy" (Loyola University Chicago, 2007), 84.

² Pope Pius XII, *Exsul Familia Nazarethana*, (Rome: Vatican, 1952), <http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius12/p12exsul.htm> (accessed January 23, 2011).

contribution lies in tying the right to emigrate to the right to subsistence and property.

“We did speak of the right of people to migrate, which right is founded in the very nature of land.”³ Pius XII references *Rerum Novarum* in using a natural law argument to contend that the land is meant to sustain people in their physical and social needs. By natural law, the head of the family has the right and obligation to provide for his family and ensure his family’s future wellbeing. These rights precede the state and therefore should not be removed by the state. Whereas Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* uses the primacy of the family as a social unit to argue that human beings have a right to private property, however, Pius XII uses it here to argue for the right to migration. Based on the right to sustain his family, every person has a right to land, and if such land cannot be acquired in one’s original homeland, one has the right to emigrate to find it.⁴

Gaudium et Spes

Gaudium et Spes stands outside of and above the “immigration documents” of the church, because it is one of the constituting documents of the Roman Catholic Church resulting from the Second Vatican Council. It visits the issue of immigration on several occasions, however, and forwards a number of principles that orient successive works on immigration.⁵ Included is an affirmation of the right to emigrate.⁶ Furthermore, the

³ Ibid., 15.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ These principles are lifted up in *Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi*, (Vatican City: Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, 2004), 21, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/migrants/documents/rc_pc_migrants_doc_20040514_erga-migrantes-caritas-christi_en.html (accessed January 10, 2011).

⁶ Vatican Council II, "Gaudium et Spes," in *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), par. 65.

document emphasizes the dignity of the migrant, insisting that they be treated in accordance with that dignity and not just as “tools of production.”⁷ It calls for economic and social development and for reforms that ensure equality between nations, in order to advance the “total vocation” and development of the whole human person, body and soul, i.e. physical, mental and social needs such as food, shelter, education, health and employment, in addition to spiritual needs.⁸ And it calls on all people to be good neighbors to immigrants.⁹

Pastoralis Migratorum Cura

In 1969, Pope Paul VI updated the norms for the Church’s immigration work through his motu proprio *Pastoralis Migratorum Cura*. Using *Gaudium et Spes* as a foundation, he expanded the theological underpinning the Church’s defense of migration through bringing in the themes of *Gaudium et Spes*. He recognizes that the right to migrate is based not just in the right to subsistence, but in the right of people to obtain the means to pursue their own perfection.

Man [sic] has the natural right to use material and spiritual goods in order to more fully and easily reach his own perfection. When a State, affected by lack of resources or an excess of inhabitants, cannot provide these good to its inhabitants, or when it imposes conditions that are harmful to human dignity, man[sic] has the right to choose a new home in another country, in order to attain the conditions for a more dignified life.¹⁰

⁷ Ibid., par. 66.

⁸ Ibid., par. 63, 14 and 84.

⁹ Ibid., par. 27.

¹⁰ Pope Paul VI, *Pastoralis Migratorum Cura*, (1969), par. 7, <http://www.migracionesfccam.org.ar/magisterio/pmc.html> (accessed January 10, 2011).

Furthermore, he grounds migration in human rights. He echoes Leo XIII in recognizing the rights to dignified working conditions and social security, but he also borrows from Vatican II in acknowledging rights to housing and education.¹¹ In grounding migration in human rights and the right to pursue one's own perfection, Paul VI broadens the basis for the right to migration. Paul VI also brings in the themes of Vatican II into this discussion through emphasizing the dignity of the immigrant, insisting on the right of that immigrant to be treated not as a "tool of production," but as a human being endowed with dignity and able of entering into community with people in her new society.¹²

In addition, Paul VI emphasizes the right *not* to migrate, which comes from natural rights pertaining to the social nature of human beings. People have a right to be assured of social conditions that will enable them to live with dignity in their own community. However, if migration is necessary, families have the right to migrate together, so as not to suffer family disunity.¹³

Pastoralis Migratorum does put some limits on migration, using the common good as a principle to limit migration. First of all, it uses the common good to ground the right of a nation to control its borders.¹⁴ "Public authorities unjustly deny the rights of human persons if they block or impede emigration or immigration except where grave

¹¹ Ibid, Pope John XXIII, "Pacem in Terris," in *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), Vatican Council II, *Gaudium et Spes*, par. 26.

¹² Pope Paul VI, *Pastoralis Migratorum Cura*, par. 57.

¹³ Ibid., par. 6-7.

¹⁴ Ibid., par. 7.

requirement of the common good, considered objectively, demand it.”¹⁵ While the primary purpose of this statement is to emphasize the obligation of countries to accept immigrants, the latter half of the statement recognizes that immigration may be limited if it harms the common good. This statement is left in the abstract, however; the document does not define what those grave requirements may be.

Pastoralis Migratorum invokes the principle of the common good to limit immigration again through exhorting professionals *not* to emigrate if they are needed by their country:

Although they have the right to migrate, citizens should also keep in mind that they have the right and the responsibility to contribute to the true progress of their own community to the extent possible. Especially in regions of lower economic development, where all resources are urgently needed, those who succumb to the desire and temptation to migrate threaten the common good. Technically developed regions should keep in mind the responsibility of promoting the common good of less developed regions; they would do well to prepare and repatriate professionals and young students after they have completed their studies.¹⁶

Here the letter is addressing the problem of “brain drain.” The common good of individual countries depends on having an educated, professional class. Less developed nations face difficulties when highly educated members leave for school or work and fail to return. This statement is more specific than the one discussed above, but once again it lacks precision, in that it is unclear what constitutes the standard of “the extent possible” to which people should be held.

¹⁵ Ibid. Translation mine.

¹⁶ Ibid., par. 8. Translation mine.

In another development of immigration ethics, this document updates the anthropology used in the Catholic body of work on immigration, bringing it in line with Vatican II's understanding of the human person. Underscoring that persons possess both bodies and souls, and that it is the Christian's duty to promote the wellbeing of the whole person, *Pastoralis Migratorum* promotes actions on concrete social issues, not just on pastoral concerns. This point is underscored in Paul VI's instruction to laity to work with immigrants to resolve problem concerning housing, work, social security and to resolve issues arising from differences in race, culture and language.¹⁷

Lastly, Paul VI urges Episcopal Conferences to establish offices and initiatives for the care of migrants. It charges the Sacred Congregation of Bishops to review and renew the structure for immigrant ministry, which was later recorded in the Instruction *The Pastoral Care of People Who Migrate*.

Ecclesia in America

Ecclesia in America is not an immigration text per se. However, it is an important source for theological themes in *Strangers No Longer*, and it does touch briefly but specifically on the topic of immigration. This apostolic exhortation of John Paul II was written to the Church in the Americas, following the 1997 Special Assembly for America of the Synod of Bishops convened in Rome. With regard to immigrants, John Paul II urges churches in receiving nations to have an open and welcoming attitude toward migrants, and foster this attitude among the general population. He also urges the Church

¹⁷ Ibid., par. 57.

in America to advocate for the right to migration and for the rights and dignity of migrants, even in the case of illegal immigration.

These exhortations are written within the theological context of evangelization, conversion and communion in Jesus Christ. The theme of the letter is “Encounter with the Living Jesus Christ: The Way to Conversion, Communion and Solidarity in America.”¹⁸ John Paul II first recognizes the multitude of contexts where Christ’s presence is explored today, including America’s Christian identity, popular piety, the Eastern Catholic tradition, the growing respect for human rights, and globalization. Threats to that presence are the drug trade, urbanization, external debt, and environmental degradation. One of the central places that Christ is encountered is in face of the neighbor, especially in our poorest and most needy neighbor.¹⁹

Conversion, according to John Paul II, is a total, personal transformation that prompts one to change one’s actions in light of the Gospel.²⁰ Conversion is fostered through reading scripture, praying, participating in liturgy and learning the Christian tradition.²¹ Conversion to Christ also has a social dimension: “conversion urges solidarity, because it makes us aware that whatever we do for others, especially for the poorest, we do for Christ himself.”²² Conversion is incomplete if it is not realized in

¹⁸ Pope John Paul II, *Ecclesia in America*, (Rome: Vatican, 1999), par. 3, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_22011999_ecclesia-in-america_en.html (accessed January 8, 2010).

¹⁹ Ibid., par. 12.

²⁰ Ibid., par. 26.

²¹ Ibid., par. 24-28.

²² Ibid., par. 26.

concrete charitable actions that attend to the neighbor's needs and foster the common good and those social conditions that sustain human dignity.²³

Solidarity is “expressed in Christian love, which seeks the good of others, especially of those most in need.”²⁴ For John Paul II, solidarity must be understood in light of the preferential option for the poor. The option for the poor takes as its model Jesus Christ, who “during his earthly time devoted himself with special compassion to all those in spiritual and material need.”²⁵

While John Paul II incorporates the spiritually needy into the preferential option for the poor, in *Ecclesia in America* he emphasizes solidarity with victims of social or material poverty. This is apparent his introduction to Chapter V, The Path to Solidarity, where he urges the Churches of the Americas to “[take] the Gospel as its starting-point[.] [A] culture of solidarity needs to be promoted, capable of inspiring timely initiatives in support of the poor and the outcast, especially refugees forced to leave their villages and lands in order to flee violence.”²⁶ He continues this emphasis on the materially and socially poor in the rest of his treatment on solidarity.

As another example, John Paul II lifts up the right to work and decries high unemployment rates and poor working conditions.²⁷ He calls for the universalization of solidarity, emphasizing the need to reduce the negative effects of globalization, especially

²³ Ibid., par. 27.

²⁴ Ibid., par. 52.

²⁵ Ibid., par. 58.

²⁶ Ibid., par. 52.

²⁷ Ibid., par. 54.

“the domination of the powerful over the weak, especially in the economic sphere, and the loss of the values of local cultures in favor of a misconstrued homogenization.”²⁸ In this passage, John Paul II denounces economic domination of poor people and the cultural domination of minority ethnic and racial groups, once again emphasizing the social and economic dimension of the preferential option. In addition, he decries social sins: corruption, foreign debt, drugs, the arms race and discrimination, highlighting their effects on vulnerable populations.²⁹ He furthermore lifts up the problem of immigration and calls on the Church to defend their right to migrate, to welcome them, provide for their needs, and defend their rights, and protect their human dignity, even in cases of illegal immigration.³⁰

Although John Paul II appeals often in *Ecclesia in America* to the common good, he does not use it like *Pastoralis Migratorum* to limit immigration. Rather, he uses it to call on nations to ensure the requirements of human dignity.³¹ Furthermore, in keeping with the letter’s emphasis on solidarity and the preferential option for the poor, he focuses on ensuring human dignity for the poor.

The globalized economy must be analyzed in the light of the principles of social justice, respecting the preferential option for the poor who must be allowed to take their place in such an economy, and the requirements of the international common good. For “the Church’s social doctrine is a moral vision which aims to encourage governments, institutions and private organizations to shape a future consonant with the dignity of every person.”³²

²⁸ Ibid., par. 55.

²⁹ Ibid., par. 56-64.

³⁰ Ibid., par. 65.

³¹ Ibid., par. 27.

³² Ibid., par. 55.

While John Paul II uses the common good to make a different point than *Pastoralis Migratorum*, this passage reflects the close correlation between human rights and the common good found in *Pacem in Terris*.

Strangers No Longer

The U.S. and Mexican bishops' letter on immigration, *Strangers No Longer: Together on the Journey of Hope*, was published in 2003. This letter comes within the context of a historical U.S. Catholic ministry to migrants. As far back as the 1920s, the Catholic Church helped people migrate through the National Catholic Welfare Conference's Department of Immigration. The United States Catholic Conference established a department of Migration and Refugee Services in 1965, and in 1998 this department established four offices: the Office for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Refugees, the Office of Migration and Refugee Policy, the Office of Refugee Programs, and the Office of the Executive Director.³³

Strangers No Longer was written in response to Pope John Paul II's *Ecclesia in America*, and in response to the suffering of immigrants and refugees in the United States, especially the undocumented. *Strangers No Longer* takes up the prominent themes of *Ecclesia in America*, challenging the Americas to unite in solidarity, communion and conversion to Jesus Christ through doing justice to immigrants and refugees. Calling on *Ecclesia in America*'s tripartite themes of conversion, communion and solidarity, the

³³ *Migration and Refugee Services: A Brief History*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2010), <http://www.nccbuscc.org/mrs/history.shtml>.

bishops emphasize the overarching importance of solidarity. In the beginning of the declaration they say,

In the spirit of ecclesial solidarity begun in that synod and promoted in *Ecclesia in America*, and aware of the migration reality our two nations live, we the bishops of Mexico and the United States seek to awaken our peoples to the mysterious presence of the crucified and risen Lord in the person of the migrant and to renew in them the values of the Kingdom of God that he proclaimed.³⁴

In this statement, the bishops affirm a commitment to ecclesial solidarity and extend that commitment to solidarity with immigrants. The bishops further reinforce the centrality of solidarity when they say, “We reiterate our appreciation for and our encouragement of manifestations of commitment to solidarity according to the vision inspired by *Ecclesia in America* (EA).”³⁵

The vision of solidarity the bishops evoke is that of all peoples standing with the poor and the immigrant, welcoming them with open arms and ensure that their human rights are protected.³⁶ Connecting solidarity to social justice, the bishops announce,

We speak to the migrants who are forced to leave their lands to provide for their families or to escape persecution. We stand in solidarity with you. We commit ourselves to your pastoral care and to work toward changes in church and societal structures that impede your exercising your dignity and living as children of God.³⁷

Here, the bishops correlate solidarity with structural change, reminiscent of *Ecclesia in America*’s treatment of social sin.

³⁴ United States Catholic Conference of Bishops and Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano, *Strangers No Longer: Together on a Journey of Hope*, (United States Catholic Conference of Bishops 2003), par. 3, <http://www.usccb.org/mrs/stranger.shtml#7> (accessed February 3, 2004).

³⁵ Ibid., par. 8.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., par. 9.

While the bishops do not explicitly declare solidarity with migrants as their overarching moral framework, the theme is the implicit normal “control” throughout their letter. To begin to illustrate the embeddedness of this theme, starting with the introduction the bishops stress in almost every single paragraph the suffering and dignity of migrants and/or emphasize the importance of ensuring their rights and meeting their needs. Beginning in the second paragraph, the bishops denounce migrant experiences that “are far from the vision of the Kingdom of God that Jesus proclaimed: many persons who seek to migrate are suffering, and, in some cases, tragically dying; human rights are abused; families are kept apart; and racist and xenophobic attitudes remain.”³⁸ In the third paragraph, the bishops announce their intent to “awaken our peoples to the mysterious presence of the crucified and risen Lord in the person of the migrant...,”³⁹ a statement that stresses both the suffering and dignity of migrants.

Immediately following, the bishops discuss the human costs of migration.

We witness the vulnerability of our people involved in all sides of the migration phenomenon, including families devastated by the loss of loved ones who have undertaken the migration journey and children left alone when parents are removed from them. We observe the struggles of landowners and enforcement personnel who seek to preserve the common good without violating the dignity of the migrant. And we share in the concern of religious and social service providers who, without violating civil law, attempt to respond to the migrant knocking at the door.⁴⁰

In this passage, the bishops begin with focus on the migrant. They then appear to begin moving toward a discussion of the hardships that immigration poses to native-born

³⁸ Ibid., par. 2.

³⁹ Ibid., par. 3.

⁴⁰ Ibid., par. 4.

residents in observing “the struggles of landowners and enforcement personnel.”

However, they focus not on the harmful effects of immigration on the residents of the host country but on the wellbeing of immigrants, who are protected through the landowners and enforcement personnel who “seek to preserve the common good without violating the dignity of the migrant.” Even though the bishops provide a vague recognition of difficulties that immigration might visit upon the host country, that concern is quickly overridden by the returned focus to the immigrant, and the bishops fail to mention any threats to other vulnerable populations resulting from immigration, which is a grave oversight, as I argue later. Rather, the residents of the host country are portrayed as people with resources at their disposal (landowners) or as agents of the powerful state (enforcement personnel).

In the paragraph that follows, the bishops point to the need to change political and ecclesial structures in order to repair the “injustice and violence against [migrants and immigrants] and much suffering and despair among them because civil and church structures are still inadequate to accommodate their basic needs.”⁴¹ Once again, the focus is on the immigrant, as it is in the following passage, in which they establish that the main standard of assessment for Christian action is how the most vulnerable members of society are treated.

We judge ourselves as a community of faith by the way we treat the most vulnerable among us. The treatment of migrants challenges the consciences of elected officials, policymakers, enforcement officers, residents of border

⁴¹ Ibid., par. 5.

communities, and providers of legal aid and social services, many of whom share our Catholic faith.⁴²

In this passage, not only do they challenge U.S. residents to ensure the wellbeing migrants (whom they equate with the most vulnerable members of society), they also paint the residents of the receiving country as people with resources and agents of the state, as they did earlier. In reinforcing the images of immigrants as the vulnerable and residents of the host country as the powerful, the bishops reinforce the concept that in questions of immigration ethics, solidarity means solidarity with migrants.

The bishops' commitment to solidarity with migrants is apparent in the letter's theological reflection as well as in its introduction. This section starts with a scriptural reflection that reveals an emphasis on treating strangers with justice and kindness. In this section, the bishops highlight Abraham's welcoming of three strangers who were manifestations of God. They point to Joseph who was sold into slavery in a foreign land but later saved his family from starvation. They recall that Jesus, Mary and Joseph were themselves refugees in Egypt.⁴³ They emphasize Judaic laws mandating justice for the stranger.⁴⁴ And the bishops find Christ in the face of migrants who are hungry and imprisoned (Mt 25:40).⁴⁵

⁴² Ibid., par. 6.

⁴³ Ibid., par. 24, 26.

⁴⁴ Ibid., par. 25.

⁴⁵ Ibid., par. 26.

This scriptural reflection is accompanied by a summary of Catholic social teaching concerning migration. Reviewing key documents in the tradition, the bishops identify five principles of Catholic social thought that relate directly to immigration:

- I. Persons have the right to find opportunities in their homeland.
- II. Persons have the right to migrate to support themselves and their families.
- III. Sovereign nations have the right to control their borders.
- IV. Refugees and asylum seekers should be afforded protection.
- V. The human dignity and human rights of undocumented migrants should be respected.⁴⁶

Through this list, the bishops present ethical principles that have been reached in the various social documents regarding immigration. The bishops flesh out some of the foundational theological principles underlying these principles in the accompanying narrative. In it, they highlight the principles of subsistence (grounding the right to migrate and to find opportunities in ones own land), human rights (based in the demands of human dignity), and the common good (from which arises the right of sovereign nations to control their borders).⁴⁷

Considering these principles in the aggregate, the primary ethical framework that arises is solidarity with the immigrant. Four of the five principles (I, II, IV, and V) articulate rights pertaining specifically to migrants. The third principle on the list is the one principle that concerns itself with the rights of the receiving nation. It states that nations have the right to control their borders. However, in its elaboration even this principle emphasizes migrant wellbeing. The text reads:

⁴⁶ Ibid., par. 34-38.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

The Church recognizes the right of sovereign nations to control their territories but rejects such control when it is exerted merely for the purpose of acquiring additional wealth. More powerful economic nations, which have the ability to protect and feed their residents, have a stronger obligation to accommodate migration flows.⁴⁸

Even though this principle is ostensibly focused on the rights of a sovereign nation, the bishops ultimately stress a nation's obligation toward migrants, thus expressing solidarity with migrants.

This emphasis on solidarity with the immigrant is carried through the letter's pastoral and policy responses. In this chapter, the bishops follow *Ecclesia in America* in calling for conversion, communion and solidarity with immigrants, and they call Christians to a conversion of mind and heart that will lead to communion between native-born people and immigrants. Such a communion is characterized by hospitality to and welcoming of Christ in the person of the migrant. The growing communion between native-born people and immigrants in turn leads to a growing solidarity with immigrants.⁴⁹

The bishops point out that church communities demonstrate solidarity through public policy responses as well as pastoral responses, mirroring *Ecclesia in America*'s emphasis on social sin and the need for social justice. They begin their public policy discussion by promoting solidarity across borders, urging the two countries to work together to address the root causes of migration, such as low wages and unemployment in Mexico and economic inequalities between the two nations, which have been exacerbated

⁴⁸ Ibid., par. 36.

⁴⁹ Ibid., par. 41-43.

by factors such as NAFTA.⁵⁰ They urge Mexican policies that will create jobs with a living wage, and they advocate international agreements to promote the economic wellbeing of small businesspeople and individuals as well as big business. They also advocate that immigration laws in both countries be reformed to reflect the reality of the considerable social, economic and cultural integration between the two countries.⁵¹

The bishops' subsequent recommendations reveal a bias for a generous immigration policy that favors immigrants. For example, they recommend that U.S. immigration policy and resource allocation be changed so that families separated by immigration can be united. The bishops suggest that the way to do so is through increasing the number of visas for legal entry. They also advocate a broad legalization of undocumented immigrants.

In addition to broad-based legalization, the bishops promote additional employment-based visas. They are open to these work opportunities being facilitated through both temporary visas and permanent resident cards, but they are clear that any temporary work programs must be structured so as to avoid abuse of migrant workers. The temporary work program envisioned in the letter includes the following elements: a living wage, job portability, labor protections, mechanisms and resources for enforcing worker's rights, family unity, mobility within U.S. and between U.S. and homeland, a path to permanent residency, and ability to accrue and use Social Security benefits while

⁵⁰ Ibid., par. 57.

⁵¹ Ibid., par. 63.

in the program. It also includes provision for labor market tests to ensure that U.S. workers are not harmed.

The bishops' final recommendation entails the creation of border enforcement mechanisms and policies that will protect the human rights of immigrants. They advocate policy changes to will reestablish immigrants' due process rights, which were gutted in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Lastly, they encourage enforcement policies that will protect migrants' right to asylum.

The bishops' overarching moral framework – solidarity with the immigrant – seemingly aligns with the preferential option for the poor, which mandates special concern for the most vulnerable among us. However, as a framework for immigration ethics, solidarity with the immigrant paradoxically contradicts the preferential option for the poor, which mandates special concern for *all* vulnerable groups among us, without favor. With such a heavy emphasis on immigrants, other vulnerable groups become invisible, and the ethicist working out of this framework risks violating the principle of the preferential option for the poor.

I do not argue with the bishops' conclusion that immigrants are the most vulnerable population. Nor do I disagree with the majority of the bishops' policy recommendations (discussed in Chapter Four). However, the bishops ignore the fact that the United States contains other vulnerable populations, which John Paul II recognized in *Ecclesia in America* in lifting up the concerns of communities of African descent, whom he describes as victims of ongoing discrimination and marginalization and deserving of

special attention.⁵² The bishops also ignore the fact that undocumented Mexican immigration negatively affects poor U.S. populations: low-skilled workers suffer reductions in wages, and peers suffer declines in high school graduation rates.⁵³ In ignoring these issues, the bishops allow injustices to poor communities in the United States to remain unchallenged, and they disable true solidarity, which is intended for and between all poor and marginalized people without preference.

Campaign for Immigration Reform: Justice for Immigrants

The lack of reciprocal solidarity becomes quite apparent in documents of the Catholic campaign for immigration reform. The campaign, *Justice for Immigrants: A Journey of Hope*, is the U.S. Bishops' effort to educate and mobilize parishes in support of immigrant-friendly public policies. The campaign maintains the ethical focus on solidarity with immigrants and puts some "meat on the bones" of the policy recommendations forwarded in their pastoral letter. It also buttresses the bishops' claim that the United States can afford to welcome current numbers of immigrants, through providing social and economic data on the economic effects of immigration.⁵⁴ Less positively, the campaign's selective use of data reveals the weakness of putting solidarity with immigrants at the heart of immigration ethics.

Theologically, the campaign is rooted in the principles and biblical reflection summarized in *Strangers No Longer*. The campaign thus emphasizes solidarity with

⁵² Pope John Paul II, *Ecclesia in America*, par. 64.

⁵³ Research on this will be discussed in Chapter Four.

⁵⁴ United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on Migration, *Justice for Immigrants: A Journey of Hope, Parish Resource Kit*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006).

immigrants. In case there were any doubt that this is the ethical focus, the campaign's name, *Justice for Immigrants*, indicates clearly that it is.

The campaign's policy recommendations reflect those found in *Strangers No Longer*, although they bring more detail. Addressing family separation, for example, the *Justice for Immigrants' Parish Resource Kit* calls for more family-based visas and for a reduction in the current backlog of cases waiting to be processed by the Bureau of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. They explicate the broad-based legalization called for in *Strangers No Longer* as earned legalization, in which undocumented immigrants may legalize their status if they can demonstrate that they have paid taxes and possess good moral character.⁵⁵ The bishops clarify their just border enforcement recommendation by specifying and applying three principles: (1) border enforcement needs to target dangerous migrants such as smugglers, human traffickers and terrorists, (2) border enforcement methods should be proportional to the situation, neither using excessive force nor being carried out by non-immigration officials, and (3) humane border enforcement mechanisms respect immigrants' human rights.⁵⁶

Even while solidarity with immigrants remains firmly established as the chosen foundation for immigration ethics, the bishops must show that current immigration patterns do not unduly harm the United States and thus do not violate the principle of national sovereignty, which serves to protect the common good. They do so through

⁵⁵ *Catholic Bishops' Call for Comprehensive Immigration Reform*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006).

⁵⁶ *Enforcement of Immigration Laws: Important Principles*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006).

citing studies substantiating the position that immigrants provide a net positive economic benefit to U.S. workers and taxpayers.

For example, the bishops point to one study showing that immigrants pay more in taxes than they use in benefits.⁵⁷ They reference another study that estimates that undocumented workers pay \$20 billion into the Social Security system each year – money those workers will never retrieve.⁵⁸ Challenging the claims that immigrant workers take jobs from and depress the wages of native-born workers, the bishops quote studies that show that immigrants create new jobs and fill jobs that are going unfilled by native-born workers,⁵⁹ They also argue that undocumented immigrants do not depress wages of native-born workers, citing the 2005 *Economic Report of the President*.

The Justice for Immigrants campaign creates a compelling case that the United States benefits from immigration. However, the bishops' focus on solidarity with immigrants leads them to use data selectively, ignoring or minimizing evidence that immigration has a deleterious effect on wages and employment of low-wage U.S.-born U.S. workers. The *Parish Resource Kit's* economic fact sheet, for example, ignores evidence that immigration may have a negative impact on some U.S. workers, notably, unskilled workers who are most vulnerable in the job market, citing studies that find that

⁵⁷ *Economics and Migration: The Facts*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006). The bishops' citations are inexact, including only the names of the authoring organizations. In this case, the data comes from the National Research Council.

⁵⁸ Ibid. Cit. National Immigration Forum.

⁵⁹ Justice for Immigrants Campaign, *Economics and Migration: The Facts*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006).

immigrant workers supplement, rather than displace, native workers.⁶⁰ However, it ignores another study not cited by the campaign that found that a ten percent increase in immigrant labor leads to a decline in employment among black men.⁶¹

The economic fact sheet likewise cites findings that immigration has virtually no effect on wages of low-skilled native-born workers, while ignoring opposing research. It states that a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor lowers native-born wages by only 1 percent.⁶² However, opposing research finds up to a 9 percent decrease in wages resulting from immigration.⁶³ The Catholic bishops dismiss studies that show results that are inconvenient for the bishops' conclusions, and so they choose not to present them. However, opposing studies were performed by credible scholars, they are part of a body of work over time that has found that immigration depresses wages and raises unemployment for unskilled U.S. born workers, and the economic community has not yet reached consensus on fundamental assumptions regarding the substitutability between immigrant and native-born workers. In the absence of such a consensus, a Catholic ethicist committed to solidarity with all people is compelled to at least take the negative studies into account.

⁶⁰ United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on Migration, *Economics and Migration: The Facts*.

⁶¹ George Borjas et al., *Immigration and African-American Employment Opportunities: The Response of Wages, Employment, and Incarceration to Labor Supply Shocks*, (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12518> (accessed November 15, 2007).

⁶² United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on Migration, *Economics and Migration: The Facts*.

⁶³ George Borjas, "The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no. 4 (2003).

Not only do the bishops pick and choose which studies they will present, they selectively present material from reports they cite, doing a disservice to the original work. For example, while the cited *2005 Economic Report of the President* observes that research generally indicates a one percent decrease in overall U.S. wages, the same report also notes that the wage impact is greater for unskilled workers than for workers as a whole, and also that economic studies founded on different assumptions find a larger impact. The president's report explains:

Generally, estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of foreign-born workers reduces native wages by less than one percent. Recent studies that look at wage effects by skill levels typically find larger negative effects on less-skilled than medium or high-skilled native workers. Adverse wage effects on previous immigrants have been found to be on the order of 2 to 4 percent. It should be noted that these studies typically identify the effect of immigration on natives by comparing labor market outcomes of natives in response to differences in immigration across regions and over time. Analysis done at the national level relies primarily on variation in immigration over time and finds larger adverse effects.⁶⁴

While this report discusses varied conclusions reached by different methods and acknowledges that low skilled U.S. workers suffer declines in wages that exceed the one percent figure forwarded by the bishops, the bishops selectively cite it to support the claim that undocumented immigration has no significant impact on U.S. wages. The economic fact sheet uses the president's report to buttress its argument that the impact of immigration on native workers is negligible, but the report itself provides a more nuanced account of the effects, one that acknowledges a range of findings.

⁶⁴ *Economic Report of the President*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2005), 105, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2005/2005_erp.pdf.

Furthermore, where the bishops do recognize contradictory research, they downplay its conclusions. In a sentence that is particularly shocking in light of the preferential option for the poor, the bishops minimize the negative consequences of undocumented immigration on wages of low-skilled U.S. workers by saying, “A recent report concludes that low-skilled immigrant workers negatively impact only high school dropouts, which represent only 9 percent of the population.”⁶⁵ This is a cavalier dismissal of 27 million of the United States’ most vulnerable citizens (over four times the number of undocumented immigrants), on the basis that they comprise only a small percentage of the population. Such exclusion is unacceptable in light of the preferential option for the poor, which insists on inclusion and justice for all marginalized groups. The bishops renege on solidarity with vulnerable U.S. workers.

There is a lack of consensus concerning the economic effect of undocumented immigration on U.S. workers, and even though a majority of economic studies find only a small negative effect on low-skilled native-born U.S. workers, reputable scholars using different assumptions have over time found a larger effect. In selectively choosing data that supports their position, the bishops overlook some of this country’s most vulnerable citizens: unskilled workers, who are disproportionately Black and Latino. (The economic debate will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Four.) Workers earning \$7.50 an hour (which is above minimum wage) will earn \$15,000 a year, or \$3,000 less than the poverty threshold for a family of four.⁶⁶ These workers do not have enough to feed and

⁶⁵ Justice for Immigrants Campaign, *Economics and Migration: The Facts*.

⁶⁶ *Changes in Low-Wage Labor Markets between 1979 and 2005*, (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, 2006), 19.

clothe their families and keep them in decent housing. Although immigration does not cause poverty in the United States, it may exacerbate an already threatening situation for some. It behooves the Catholic Church to take seriously evidence that immigration negatively affects low-skilled U.S. born workers, so that the Church can stand for justice for *all* people.

Summary

The bishops' overarching emphasis on solidarity with immigrants is prophetic and necessary in that it challenges a wealthy nation's unwillingness to welcome immigrants. Furthermore, it aligns with the scriptural emphasis on hospitality and the emphasis on human rights in Catholic social thought. However, the bishops' ethical focus on solidarity with immigrants is problematic, because it leads to selective use of empirical and economic data that leads them, ironically, to violate the preferential option for all poor and marginalized people. The preferential option requires concern for all vulnerable groups, and solidarity requires systemic solutions that further the wellbeing of these groups. In the interest of solidarity with immigrants, the bishops hinder themselves from attending to all of the pertinent dynamics in the arena of immigration, and they disable themselves from developing recommendations for U.S. immigration policy that reflect solidarity with all affected poor and marginalized groups.

In overlooking the needs of low-skilled U.S. born workers in their analysis and recommendations, the bishops also breach the principle of the common good, which requires that the wellbeing of all parties be considered, especially of the poor and marginalized. This is a serious shortcoming, given that the common good is considered in

Catholic social thought to be the very purpose of the law. While the bishops undertake to show that current immigration patterns do not harm and they even promote the wellbeing of United States citizens and society, I show in Chapter Four that the most vulnerable U.S. workers are harmed by current immigration patterns. This fact needs to be addressed in any immigration policy that seeks to be aligned with the common good.

In the next chapter, I argue that the common good should replace solidarity with immigrants as the center of moral reasoning in immigration ethics. However, in order for the common good to serve as the central principle, it needs to be more precisely delineated than it currently is in Catholic social thought. I propose a treatment of the common good based in a feminist retrieval of the common good performed by Suzanne DeCrane.

CHAPTER TWO

DEFENDING AND DEFINING THE COMMON GOOD

In the last chapter, I demonstrated that the U.S. and Mexican bishops' framework for immigration ethics is solidarity with the immigrant. This framework is rooted in documents of Catholic social teaching (hereafter CST) ranging from immigration documents such as *Exsul Familia* and *Pastoralis Migratorum* to broader documents such as *Gaudium et Spes* and *Ecclesia in America*. I also argued that the framework of solidarity with the immigrant is insufficient for an evaluation of immigration issues because it hinders a comprehensive moral analysis that takes into account all marginalized populations. This framework erroneously biases the preferential option for the poor toward only one vulnerable population, immigrants, and ignores other at risk populations affected by immigration, such as the African American and Latino communities.

In this chapter, I propose using the common good as the central moral framework for immigration ethics, and I begin a process of specifying the common good so as to capitalize on its benefits as an ethical approach. The common good holds several advantages over solidarity with immigrants. As mentioned above, it ensures a balance of concern for all affected parties, especially of poor and marginalized people and communities. Doing so militates against partiality for one vulnerable group over another and helps the analysis stay true to the preferential option for the poor. Concretely,

with the common good at the center of immigration ethics, it is harder to gloss over negative consequences of immigration for poor U.S. workers. Solutions based on the common good will integrate proposals that benefit all vulnerable populations rather than aiming solely at benefiting immigrants.

The common good is a more fitting framework for immigration ethics in addition because immigration ethics today largely concerns law and public policy, and according to CST the very purpose of law is to uphold the common good.¹ CST recognizes that because people live in society, the many competing individual needs and interests must be harmonized for the sake of all.² It is the State's role to do so, guiding its efforts according to justice and the common good.

The importance of law in U.S. immigration questions is apparent in the multiplicity of immigration laws at local, state and national levels. Federal legislative proposals in 2010, for example, included the Southern Border Security Act that intended to hire, train and deploy more Border Patrol agents along Arizona's border and the DREAM Act, which sought legalization for children brought to the United States illegally by their parents.³ On the state level, in 2010 Arizona passed the most stringent

¹ "The attainment of the common good is the sole reason for the existence of civil authorities." Vatican Council II, *Gaudium et Spes*, par. 54. In this Catholic thought follows Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the Dominican Province, 5 vols., vol. 2 (New York, NY: Benzinger Brothers, 1948), I-II., 90.2.

² Pope John XXIII, "Pacem in Terris," par. 53.

³ "Southern Border Security Act of 2010," in *H.R. 5256*, ed. Govtrack.us (2010), <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-5256> (accessed January 17, 2011). The DREAM Act intended legalization for who those who join the military or attend college. Associated Press, "DREAM or Nightmare? Immigration Bill Clears House, but Appears Doomed," *FoxNews.com*, December 9, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/12/08/dream-act-clears-house-appears-doomed/> (accessed January 6, 2011).

anti-immigrant law in the nation, which mandates that police check the immigration status of detainees and criminalizes the failure to carry immigration papers.⁴ On the local level, the town of Fremont, Nebraska voted to prohibit landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants.⁵ These pieces of legislation are but representative samples of recent legislative activity around immigration. In 2009, 48 states enacted 222 laws and 131 resolutions concerning immigration.⁶ And since 2006, almost 40 towns in 18 states have attempted legislation similar to Fremont's.⁷

A further advantage of a common good approach is that it can be a vehicle for moving beyond the polarizations of the current U.S. debate. Presently, pro-immigration voices in the debate name only benefits of immigration for the U.S., while anti-immigration voices document only negative consequences. Both sides bear witness to some truth, but the truth in its entirety is complex than either extreme would suggest. This complexity, however, leads to confusion. The common good can provide citizens with the ethical resources they need to chart a path through contradictory and confusing economic and moral claims and help the United States move past simplistic and antagonistic analyses and solutions toward those that embody solidarity with all affected parties.

⁴ Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration."

⁵ CNN Wire Staff, "Nebraska Immigration Law Passes," *CNN.com*, June 22, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-22/us/nebraska.immigration_1_immigration-policy-farmers-branch-ordinance?s=PM:US (accessed January 2, 2011).

⁶ Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration."

⁷ Almost none of these proposals were enacted, due to concerns over legal costs stemming from civil rights challenges. Diane Diamond, "Fighting Illegal Immigration at the Local Level," <http://dianediamond.net/contact/> (accessed January 12, 2010).

Two additional advantages of a common good immigration ethic become apparent through its application. When the common good is specified according to my proposal in this dissertation, it leads to more comprehensive strategies for promoting human wellbeing in the face of immigration – strategies that address threats to human flourishing of all vulnerable populations, not only immigrants. Furthermore, in addressing a broader range of issues for a broader range of people, a common good approach will lead to greater solidarity between poor communities of differing legal status, race and ethnicity.

In order to fully realize the benefits of a common good framework, it is first necessary to develop the common good beyond its current delineation in CST. The common good is a key moral category in Catholic social thought, and yet its elaboration in CST is so broad that it has been called not only “resistant to tight conceptual definition” but also “embarrassingly fuzzy.”⁸ This need not be so. Catholic social thought provides a path for making the common good more specific. This path begins with *Gaudium et Spes*’ succinct, if still vague, definition of the common good as “the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.”⁹ This definition directs the common good toward human flourishing. If the common good correlates to human flourishing and human flourishing can be well defined, then the common good can likewise be brought into clearer focus.

⁸ This is not to say that the common good has not served a useful function or that it has no content. Dennis McCann demonstrates that the common good in CST is equated with such values as human rights and economic justice. This is discussed at further length in this chapter. McCann, “The Common Good in Catholic Social Teaching: A Case Study in Modernization,” 122.

⁹ This definition will be explored at greater length below. Vatican Council II, *Gaudium et Spes*, par. 26.

I now turn to the task of specifying the common good. I investigate the definition of the common good in Catholic social thought and propose a first step in making the common good more tangible: providing a more exact definition of human flourishing than currently supplied in CST.¹⁰ A definition of human flourishing must be grounded in an understanding of the human person. The anthropology I propose is based in Martha Nussbaum's human capabilities approach, first used in relationship to the common good by Suzanne DeCrane in her feminist retrieval of Thomas Aquinas' common good.¹¹ This anthropology defines human beings in terms of a common set of physical, intellectual, emotional, and moral capabilities. A person finds fulfillment, then, through realizing the broad range of human capabilities with which she has been endowed.

The Roots and Elaboration of the Common Good in CST

The common good was first succinctly defined in Catholic social teaching in the 1961 encyclical *Mater et Magistra*. In this letter, Pope John XXIII distinguished that the common good “embraces the sum total of those conditions of social living, whereby men [sic] are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection.”¹² This definition was later updated in Vatican II's *Gaudium et Spes*: “[The common good is] the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual

¹⁰ The second step in concretizing the common good will be delineated in Chapter Three; this step consists of developing a Common Good Index to measure the realization of human functioning capabilities and therefore the common good in society.

¹¹ Aquinas' work on the common good is the foundation of CST's elaboration of it. Suzanne M. DeCrane, *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004).

¹² Pope John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra," in *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), par. 65.

members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment.”¹³ This definition highlights the relationship between the common good and the individual and indicates that the aim of the common good is the wellbeing of human persons. In this declaration, *Gaudium et Spes* asserts that people and groups must be afforded opportunities for self-realization, and that these opportunities must be assured through social institutions and dynamics. This statement does not promote any particular social arrangement, but it does designate the standard through which human society should be judged: the wellbeing of its population.

This definition leaves open the question: in what does human fulfillment exist? To answer this question, one must posit a shared set of human characteristics, an understanding of who we are as human beings, in other words, an anthropology. I explore CST’s anthropology and understanding of the common good below. While CST illuminates some aspects of human nature and provides some guidance on the content of the common good, I find both its anthropology and its exposition of the common good incomplete. In order to further develop CST’s thought in these moral categories, I first return the roots of these categories, found in Thomas Aquinas. These roots will ultimately form the basis of their further development.

Thomistic Roots of CST’s Understanding of the Human Person and the Common Good

Thomas Aquinas is the central foundation for CST on the common good, and his reflections on human nature coupled with his theological methodology of natural law thinking have formed the basis for CST’s anthropology. Aquinas’ anthropology and

¹³ Vatican Council II, *Gaudium et Spes*, par. 26.

account of human flourishing begin with his general theory of goodness. In the *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian premise that all beings tend toward an end, a *telos*, which they understand to be a good. Because Aquinas equates goodness with perfection,¹⁴ and God alone is perfect and completely good,¹⁵ the final end that all creation seeks is God, or union with God.¹⁶

Beings not only seek the ultimate good, they also seek the proximate good of self-perfection. Because goodness is equated with perfection, the good of creation is maximized when beings seek their own actualization or perfection.¹⁷ This good is not at odds with the pursuit of God but rather forms part of that pursuit; the quest for self-perfection is not the ultimate end of any thing's existence but is ultimately directed toward God.¹⁸

Beings pursue their own perfection through following their natural inclinations in accordance with the type of being they are.¹⁹ Consequently, all of creation seeks its own perfection simply through existing in its proper form and function. For Aquinas, the ideal form to which a being aspires can be induced through observation and reflection on its nature. He reaches the following conclusions about natural human inclinations through such observation and reasoning, known as natural law reasoning. First, human beings share an inclination toward survival with all substances and creatures. Secondly, human

¹⁴ Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.5.1.

¹⁵ Ibid., I.6.3.

¹⁶ Ibid., I.II.3.1.

¹⁷ Ibid., I.5.5.

¹⁸ Ibid., I.65.2.

¹⁹ Ibid., I.5.3.

beings share other inclinations with all animals, including procreation and the education of offspring. The third group of inclinations is common only to rational beings. These inclinations include seeking the truth about God and living in society.²⁰ As rational beings, human beings attain God through own intellect and will, rather than through mere existence or instinct.²¹ They do so through exercising right judgment and actions, specifically through knowing and loving God.²²

Although Aquinas recognizes the capacity of human beings to err in their moral judgment and practice, he is optimistic of human beings' capability to understand what is required of them and to act on it. Unlike Luther and Calvin, for whom reason was completely clouded and flesh completely fallen, Aquinas maintains that human beings can understand what God's will is and act in accordance with it – through the development of virtues, or habits, that incline one's intellect and will properly to God.

As rational, embodied beings ordained to God, human beings have both rational and physical elements. Human flourishing includes these different components. As rational beings, people seek God through knowing and loving God. As physical beings they seek to fully realize their material wellbeing. Aquinas does not advocate that each individual seek her own material good indiscriminately. Rather, she must seek it in proper relation to the good of one's soul; true human flourishing requires proper ordering

²⁰ Ibid., I.65.2.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

of goods. Because the rational faculty is of a higher order than the other faculties, one's bodily good is subordinate to the good of one's spirit.²³

Another element of Aquinas' anthropology is human beings' inherently social nature. According to Aquinas, people live in society for three reasons. First, they depend on each other to meet their material needs. Secondly, they depend on a web of relationships for their own development, both intellectual and moral. Lastly, human beings need each other in order to fulfill their vocations as human beings formed for love. The human person has an "inner urge to the communications of knowledge and love which require relationship with other persons."²⁴

Because the human being is a social being, "the highest natural good of the individual consists in participation in a just community."²⁵ Because people were created to live in society, an individual's good consists in part in the good of the whole.²⁶ One's individual wellbeing is enhanced when social conditions support one's mental, moral and physical growth and development.

The good of the whole does not stand in opposition to the good of the individual, because Aquinas understands the common good as supporting individual wellbeing. The relationship between person and society is mutually informing: the individual person is oriented toward the good of the whole, but the common good is directed toward the good of the individual. Because a person is a being with a transcendent destiny, a person's

²³ Ibid., I-II.94.2.ad 2.

²⁴ Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, trans. John J. Fitzgerald, First paperback ed. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 47.

²⁵ Jean Porter, *The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics* (1990), 51.

²⁶ Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II-II.47.10.

good is not subsumed by the good of the whole, nor does the good of the whole supersede the good of the individual.²⁷

Any seeming social conflicts between individuals' accessing conditions that advance their flourishing are harmonized through justice, justice being a virtue that directs ones will toward giving another person his due through a "constant and perpetual will."²⁸ General, or legal, justice directs the actions of an individual toward the common good²⁹ and governs the other virtues through orienting them toward the good of the whole. In addition to general justice, Aquinas recognizes two parts of justice that govern different transactions. Commutative justice directs a person toward what is due another in individual transactions. Distributive justice governs the distribution of common goods to individuals.

Human Flourishing and the Common Good in Catholic Social Thought

Theological anthropology in CST is rooted in Aquinas. Catholic social thought recognizes that human beings are made to know and love God and affirms their transcendental destiny.³⁰ It affirms the importance of the body.³¹ And it acknowledges humankind's inherently social nature and the centrality of the common good to one's individual good.³²

²⁷ Ibid., I-II.96.4.

²⁸ Ibid., II-II.58.1.

²⁹ Ibid., I-II.58.5.

³⁰ Vatican Council II, "Gaudium et Spes," par. 12 and 14.

³¹ Ibid., par. 14.

³² Ibid., par. 12 and 26.

CST also emphasizes the proper ordering of goods and the social nature of true human flourishing.

One of the greatest injustices in the contemporary world consists precisely in this: that the ones who possess much are relatively *few* and those who possess almost nothing are *many*. ... [T]he few who possess much ... do not really succeed in 'being' because, through a reversal of the hierarchy of values, they are hindered by the cult of 'having'; and there are others – the many who have little or nothing – who do not succeed in realizing their basic human vocation because they are deprived of essential good. The evil does not consist in 'having' as such, but in possessing without regard for the quality and the ordered hierarchy of the goods one has. Quality and hierarchy arise from the subordination of goods and their availability to man's 'being' and his true vocation.³³

In this passage, John Paul II gives modern voice to the subordination of material to spiritual goods. The desire for superfluous material goods must be subordinated to love of neighbor, which is lived out through ensuring that the basic needs of the most vulnerable members of society who do not have access to "essential good." Love for God is lived through concrete actions that support the ability of the most vulnerable people to live dignified lives. The above passage also emphasizes the social nature of true human flourishing, which John Paul II describes as "integral human development."³⁴ The flourishing of an individual does not occur in a vacuum but happens in relationship to others, in society. Authentic human development requires access to basic material and social goods for all people, and it requires the subordination of superogatory physical wants to the basic material needs of others.

³³ Pope John Paul II, "Sollicitudo Rei Socialis," in *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), par. 28.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, par. 32.

While Catholic social thought retains its Thomistic roots, recent Catholic social teaching integrates a particularly modern anthropology, describing human beings as bearers of rights pertaining to their intellectual, spiritual, social and physical nature.³⁵ For example, as physical beings all people have an equal right to the means necessary for live, such as to adequate food, shelter, and medical care. As intellectual and social beings they have the right to share in the benefits of culture (for example through attaining an education commensurate with others), to speak and assemble freely in public, to participate in political governance, and to contribute to the common good. As beings with a spiritual vocation, intellect and free will they have the right to seek and worship God as they see fit. Persons also have the right to control their own bodies, to work, to earn a living wage, and to work under safe and reasonable working conditions. When these rights go unfulfilled in a person's native land, a person has the right to emigrate.³⁶

Catholic social thought recognizes that human beings are bearers not only of rights but also of responsibilities. For example, each person has the responsibility to seek God and to worship God according to their conscience. She also has the responsibility to honor the rights of others. And she has the responsibility to contribute to the common good.³⁷

This understanding of humans as bearers of rights and responsibilities is particularly pertinent to CST's treatment of the common good, because the common good is correlated with the protection and promotion of human rights. In fact, the Vatican II

³⁵ Pope John XXIII, "Pacem in Terris."

³⁶ Ibid., par. 11-27.

³⁷ Ibid., par. 28-30.

Council names the universal realization of human rights and their attendant responsibilities as one of the chief indicators of the common good.³⁸ *Strangers No Longer* reflects this emphasis, stating that any act that violates basic human rights fails the common good.³⁹

The emphasis on human rights points to another development in the tradition of the common good found in CST – an emphasis on the well being of the least among us. Human flourishing must be assured for all people, especially the most vulnerable populations. Many passages in *Gaudium et Spes* emphasize the need to attend to the wellbeing of the poor and marginalized. It names the elderly, refugees, and the poor as groups of people who are deserve special attention.⁴⁰ It emphasizes the need to foster justice for oppressed people, listing sins against human dignity such as slavery, disgraceful working conditions, and subhuman living conditions.⁴¹ And it notes that the equality of human dignity requires justice and the eradication of discrimination against women.⁴²

John Paul II considers the option for the poor an organizing principle of charity. “The *option* or *love of preference* for the poor ... is an option, or a special form of primacy in the exercise of Christian charity....”⁴³ A Christian is directed toward loving

³⁸ Ibid., par. 60. Vatican Council II, "Gaudium et Spes," par. 26.

³⁹ United States Catholic Conference of Bishops and Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano, *Strangers No Longer*, par. 39.

⁴⁰ Vatican Council II, "Gaudium et Spes," par. 27.

⁴¹ Ibid., par. 29.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Pope John Paul II, "Sollicitudo Rei Socialis," par. 42.

all neighbors, but especially the poor. The option for the poor is not simply an exercise in personal affection toward poor people, however, although it includes an affective dimension. Nor is it a simple exercise of providing aid. Rather, the option for the poor involves working for social and structural change. The changes required are not only local but also national and even international. They include not only changes in personal consumption patterns but also changes in established political structures.⁴⁴ The conditions sought are those that provide all people with basic means for life and human dignity. This includes ensuring access for all to means of subsistence as well as to conditions that foster the social, cultural and spiritual dimensions of the human being.⁴⁵

Human flourishing is enabled when one maintains an option for the poor. It is also enabled through the establishment of justice, which in Catholic social thought is more a set of institutional arrangements rather than a virtue. CST borrows Aquinas' commutative and distributive forms of justice, but it forwards the importance of "social justice," which describes the relationships governing the "comprehensive context, the overall social order, in which the agents involved in the other two forms of justice carry on their activities."⁴⁶ The term social justice was introduced in *Quadregesimo Anno*, which equated it with the common good. "The public institutions of the nations should be such as to make all human society conform to the requirements of the common good, that is,

⁴⁴ Ibid., par. 43. "Centesimus Annus," in *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), par. 58.

⁴⁵ Pope John Paul II, "Sollicitudo Rei Socialis."

⁴⁶ McCann, "The Common Good in Catholic Social Teaching: A Case Study in Modernization," 135.

the norm of social justice.”⁴⁷ In this encyclical, which devotes itself to the economic order, Pope Pius XI indicates that social justice is directed toward equitable social and economic arrangements, including the requirement that growth in the economy or improvements in the social infrastructure benefit all people and not just a select few.⁴⁸

Another way in which CST expands on Aquinas is in its scope. The concept of the common good was developed initially at a time when precursors to the state were forming, and the common good served to justify and limit positive law within a jurisdiction. It thus became correlated with the common good of a nation.⁴⁹ However, in the contemporary context of globalization and universal human rights, Pope John XXIII firmly established the importance of promoting the universal common good.⁵⁰ One must be concerned not only with the flourishing of members of one’s own nation-state, but with that of all people everywhere.

To summarize CST on the common good, the common good is directed toward promoting the flourishing of all persons and groups, and it is characterized by social justice and a special concern for the wellbeing of poor and oppressed groups. CST’s definition of human flourishing is informed by Aquinas’ anthropology, even as it also has distinctly modern elements. Human beings are rational and physical beings who are inherently oriented toward God and self-actualization. Because human beings are bearers

⁴⁷ Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno," in *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Markyknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), par. 110. Pope John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra," par. 110.

⁴⁸ Pope John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra," par. 73.

⁴⁹ Jean Porter, "The Common Good in Thomas Aquinas," in *In Search of the Common Good*, ed. Dennis P. McCann and Patrick D. Miller (New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 118.

⁵⁰ Pope John XXIII, "Pacem in Terris," par. 137.

of dignity, rights and responsibilities, human flourishing requires protection and promotion of those rights and fulfillment of corresponding responsibilities. As social beings, one's own flourishing depends on the common good. One pursues one's full humanity through pursuing God, working for justice, and knowing and loving God and neighbor, especially those neighbors whose basic rights and needs are threatened.

The common good and theological anthropology elaborated in Catholic social thought hold some key insights for immigration ethics. First, the common good is directed toward human flourishing, and human flourishing is defined through human rights. As such, an analysis framed by the common good asks how current immigration trends affect people's wellbeing. It asks, are immigrants more or less able to realize the fulfillment of their human vocation through migration? Furthermore, the common good is directed toward the wellbeing of all people, not just immigrants. A common good analysis hence also asks: How are members of the host country affected by immigration – is their wellbeing hampered or increased?

In addition, the common good is characterized by a preferential option for the poor. A common good analysis consequently focuses its concern for wellbeing on poor and marginalized communities. Because of the preferential option for the poor's focus on at-risk communities, the primary question becomes: How are poor people – both immigrants and citizens of the receiving country – affected by immigration? Are they more or less able to realize their rights and vocations as human beings? Lastly, because the common good requires just social institutions, the question shifts focus once again: instead of inquiring into the effects of immigration on the population, a common good analysis

analyzes the effects of immigration laws, policies and practices that affect immigrants and citizens.

Bringing all elements into focus, a common good analysis of undocumented immigration from Mexico, at its core, asks not only how the universal wellbeing of people is affected, but how undocumented Mexican immigrants, Mexicans, and poor U.S. citizens are affected by current immigration trends – both the migration of Mexicans and the U.S. policies that are currently in place. The answers to these questions will determine whether or not the current combination of immigration and policies promotes the common good, and what responses are called for.

Need for Further Specification of the Common Good in CST

The common good in Catholic thought is a valuable resource for thinking about individual and social wellbeing. However, it would be beneficial to more concretely delineate it in order to ensure its correct application in complex situations in which competing claims must be adjudicated. The common good would benefit from greater demarcation in two areas in particular: the relationship between the national and universal common good and theological anthropology.

I first address the relationship between the national and universal common good, as the latter question is the focus of the rest of the chapter. As discussed above, the principle of the common good was first developed within a political context of emerging precursors to the State, and as the State became the dominant form of public authority, the common good was envisioned as pertaining to the State.⁵¹ In light of globalization,

⁵¹ Porter, "The Common Good in Thomas Aquinas," 98.

John XXIII declared the universality of the common good and insisted on the subordination of the state to the universal common good. He called for the creation of a global political entity whose purpose would be to safeguard the universal common good. Forty-five years after the release of *Pacem in Terris*, however, there is still no democratically controlled global organization with the authority to compel policies promoting the universal common good. The nation state therefore continues to be “the most important (actual or potential) agent for promoting the common good, regionally and even globally.”⁵² The State is thus charged with promoting the common good at the national, regional and universal levels. There has been little discussion of the relationship between the common good at these varying levels. I offer three principles for a more precise understanding of that relationship.

The first principle is that the universal common good forms part of a nation’s good. This is true because just as an individual’s wellbeing depends on the health of society, the health of a society is affected by the health of the community of nations. For example, political instability in the Middle East carries security risks for the United States. The condition of the Brazilian rain forest affects the entire world’s environment. And low wages in Asia negatively affect Mexico’s ability to provide living wages to its workers or even keep industry in Mexico.

The second principle is that the universal common good promotes the good of each individual nation. This is because the common good of a nation or state forms parts of the universal common good; it is an area “in which the common good of the whole

⁵² Ibid., 119.

civilized society achieves greater density.”⁵³ The global common good must ultimately be realized through local realities. Thus, the global common good is not served when the common good of any one country is jeopardized. The universal common good is directed toward the flourishing of each and every member of each and every society, and their flourishing in turn depends on the health of their respective societies.

Third, the national and global common goods are harmonized through justice and an option for the poor. Because the common good is equated with justice, a nation cannot pursue its own interests without regard to the impact of its actions on other societies. Because of the option for the poor, a nation cannot pursue its own interests without considering the impact on poor people in their own and other countries. An option for the poor requires that justice be sought especially for poor and marginalized people, and it requires that social and economic conditions be measured by how well the poorest among us are served by them.

In applying these principles to the immigration issue being studied in this dissertation, the first point of notice is that the national common good differs from national interest. A nationally interested framework is concerned only with the wellbeing of the one population. A common good analysis, however, incorporates into the national common good a concern for the universal whole. This concern reflects the primacy of the human being over the State, the interrelatedness of human societies, and the moral obligation of any people to promote the wellbeing of all peoples, not just those belonging to her own country or community. In light of the common good, therefore, U.S.

⁵³ Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, 55.

immigration policies should be guided not by national interest but by the universal common good. Where there are seeming conflicts between the good of immigrants and the good of U.S. citizens, U.S. policy should attempt to meet, to its highest ability, the needs of the at-risk populations involved –in this case Mexicans and poor U.S. workers – regardless of whether they are immigrants or citizens. Solutions to conflicts between the two should be guided by solidarity and a preferential option for the poor.

Understanding now the relationship between the national and global common good, I turn to the other area whose greater delineation would greatly facilitate accurate usage of the common good as a moral principle: theological anthropology. Aquinas provides a foundation for CST's anthropology, which recognizes the spiritual vocation and dignity of the human being. CST furthermore recognizes human beings as bearers of human rights, which moves the common good toward greater specificity: the common good must protect and promote human rights. However, rights language suffers from abstraction. Rights are intangible things that people have, rather than descriptions of what people are or do when they are flourishing. While rights are based in an implicit universal description of human beings, the epistemological method for reaching that description remains undefined and undefended. Furthermore, human rights as currently delineated refer to an incomplete anthropology, ignoring certain human characteristics such as those relating to one's emotional life.

The Common Good and Human Functioning Capabilities

An important step toward making the common good more concrete is to specify a clearer description of the human being – to complement CST's description of the human

person with an account of what people do rather than in terms of the abstract rights they have. Even though such a description must be specific, it must also be universal, i.e. true for all people, even across cultural differences. Furthermore, it must promote human flourishing for all people. This latter point, while seemingly obvious, is important to set forth, because past theological anthropologies, including Aquinas,' have been oppressive to women.⁵⁴

Suzanne DeCrane provides a model for such an anthropology, through bringing together Aquinas' insights about the spiritual nature of the human person with an amended set of Martha Nussbaum's human functioning capabilities.⁵⁵ The human functioning capabilities are capacities shared by all persons that must be minimally available to each and every person in order to for them to "function in a fully human way."⁵⁶ Nussbaum's human capabilities are comprehensive set of minimally described abilities and potentialities related to a person's rational, physical, moral, emotional and psychological capacities.⁵⁷ In DeCrane's work, the human capabilities expand to include insights from Aquinas and CST on the human person, including the spiritual dimension.

DeCrane argues in her retrieval of Aquinas on the common good that incorporating human functioning capabilities into the common good is not contrary to

⁵⁴ See Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993; reprint, With a New Introduction). Suzanne DeCrane does a critique specifically of Aquinas' anthropology. DeCrane, *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good*.

⁵⁵ DeCrane, *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good*, 114. The human capabilities approach is described in detail in Martha Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁵⁶ Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*.

⁵⁷ The list is discussed at length below. *Ibid.*, 78-80.

Aquinas' methodology, but rather is defensible based on it. She demonstrates that Aquinas' natural law methodology, even while making deductions about human nature based on metaphysical claims, uses "the capacities of intellect and reason (and the disciplines associated with them) to come to greater clarity regarding the truth of the human person and the human good."⁵⁸ In other words, human nature and the human good can be understood through empirical observation about human experience.

The human capabilities approach differs from Aquinas' use of natural law reasoning in that it incorporates cross-cultural dialogue in reaching conclusions.⁵⁹ This method does not conflict, however, with natural law's inductive process, but rather is a more sophisticated form of it. Like John XXIII who aligned the conception of the common good with a global political context, Nussbaum has aligned inductive natural law reasoning with the global cultural context. Instead of positing deductions reached by one individual or even one society, she incorporates into the reasoning approach the recognition that cultural background influences one's understanding of the truth. Incorporating multiple perspectives, she corrects for cultural bias and is able to present a more accurate picture of human nature than otherwise.

For DeCrane, the list of human functioning capabilities represents the best grasp that the human family has on the truth about human beings. While DeCrane does not hold with Aquinas' ahistorical, realist view of human nature as absolute and unchanging, she is careful to distinguish her perspective from the postmodern view that rejects the

⁵⁸ DeCrane, *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good*, 114.

⁵⁹ Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*, 76.

possibility of any truth claims about human nature, on the basis that such relativistic claims disable moral critique.⁶⁰ She posits the set of human capabilities as a middle path between the two extremes,⁶¹ as “some few constituent elements that are universally dependable as truth statements about what it means to be human and to enjoy the circumstances that foster a relatively authentic (good) human life.”⁶²

While DeCrane presents the human functioning capabilities as truth about human nature, she advocates humility about the list, following Aquinas in recognizing the fallibility of human reason. She warns that any conclusions about human nature have a degree of conditionality to them and warns of the necessity to guard against the “tendency to arrogance” in anthropological assumptions.⁶³ This being said, the human functioning capabilities approach minimizes human error through dialogue across difference. The capabilities approach relies on the collective wisdom of people from different cultures and religions – women in particular – who have suffered from marginalization and other forms of oppression. Wisdom is found in the collective voices of oppressed people, a point found in the preferential option for the poor, as discussed below.

Human Functioning Capabilities and CST

Nussbaum’s list of human functioning capabilities includes physical, emotional, and mental capabilities, individual and relational capabilities, and moral capacities. It

⁶⁰ Referring to Lisa Sowle Cahill, Margaret Farley and Martha Nussbaum in doing so. DeCrane, *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good*, 30-31.

⁶¹ Ibid., 29.

⁶² Ibid., 27.

⁶³ Ibid., 28.

goes beyond the capabilities needed for mere survival and includes all faculties that long to be expressed by thinking, reasoning, feeling, and social human beings. In Nussbaum's account, while proper social conditions must exist so that a person can freely choose to develop each capability if so desired, the capabilities do not represent a list of requirements that every person must develop fully, but rather a list of capabilities that every person must have access to developing if they so wish. A Catholic view of the human functioning capabilities is grounded, however, in a Roman Catholic anthropology and therefore views the capabilities as human characteristics that need to be expressed in order for a person to flourish.

DeCrane proposes using all of the human capabilities on Nussbaum's list, and adds to it. The first human functioning capability that DeCrane borrows from Nussbaum is life.⁶⁴ This capability includes ability to live a normal life-span and the ability to live a human life that is worth living.⁶⁵ The second capability is bodily health. This capability includes the ability to obtain proper nourishment, to have good reproductive health, and to obtain adequate shelter.⁶⁶ The third capability is exercising bodily integrity, which refers to a person's ability to make choices about movement from place to place, to set

⁶⁴ Ibid., 36.

⁶⁵ Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*, 78. All subsequent capabilities ascribed to Nussbaum are likewise taken directly from *Women and Human Development*, rather than from DeCrane's *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good*. DeCrane provides her own paraphrasing of Nussbaum's capabilities, but for the sake of integrity I refer to the original document and present a first level interpretation of Nussbaum's ideas. My understanding of the capabilities does not differ substantially from DeCrane's.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

physical boundaries, to be free from external bodily assault, and to make their own choices in regards to sexuality and reproduction.⁶⁷

The fourth human functioning capability concerns the senses, imagination and thought. This capability refers to the human ability to use one's senses and to use one's reason in its creative and analytical aspects and in its search for ultimate meaning. This capability requires cultivation through education and freedom of expression and religious exercise.⁶⁸

The fifth capability concerns the emotional life. It includes the ability to feel emotions. Nussbaum lists justified anger or grief as examples, as well as gratitude; joy would be another such example. It also includes the ability to form emotional attachments with people and things outside of oneself and the ability to love. Nussbaum notes that this capability requires proper conditions and treatment, because conditions leading to excessive anxiety or fear such as abuse or neglect can lead to emotional stunting.⁶⁹

The sixth capability is practical reason. One exercises practical reasoning in taking concepts and applying them practically to given situations. Nussbaum names one of the most fundamental expressions of this capability as that of forming a conception of the good and determining how one will pursue it. Nussbaum specifically notes that this capability requires protection of the freedom of conscience.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 78-79.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 79.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

The seventh human functioning capability is affiliation with others, which encompasses the ability to form friendships, to interact in different social situations, to demonstrate concern for others, to be compassionate and empathetic. It also includes a capacity for justice. Nussbaum's account mentions that this capability requires self-respect, which requires the social conditions that foster it. It also requires protections against discrimination and the ability to work in humane conditions that foster mutually respectful work relationships.⁷¹

The eighth capability concerns the ability to relate to members of other species with concern, be they animals, plants or other parts of the natural world. This capability includes the ability to care for the environment.⁷² The ninth capability is play, which includes the ability to laugh, play and take pleasure in leisure activities.⁷³ The tenth is the ability to control one's environment. This includes the ability to control one's *political* environment through the political participation. It also includes the ability to control one's *material* environment through owning property – as a practical and not just formal opportunity.⁷⁴

Feminist theologian Soble Cahill and others have criticized Nussbaum's work as reflecting too liberal a bias.⁷⁵ Nussbaum's response is that the list is open to revision.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., 80.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Lisa Soble Cahill, *Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Also, see overviews of critiques in David A. Clark, "The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances," in *The Elgar Companion to Development Studies*, ed. David A. Clark

While some critics advocate the abolishment of a set list of capabilities, Sowle Cahill argues, as mentioned above, that the post-modern cultural relativism that refuses to name any universal human characteristics disables moral critique and provides no defense against oppression.⁷⁶ Rather than rejecting the list she suggests amending it, complementing Nussbaum's list with two additional capabilities: kinship and religion.⁷⁷

DeCrane borrows these two additional capabilities from Sowle Cahill. She relates kinship to the ability to bear and raise children within the context of "stable, affiliative relationships of support."⁷⁸ This capability resonates with the centrality of family found in Catholic social thought, while avoiding narrow definitions of family. The capability of religion she names as the ability to "acknowledge, appreciate, and respond to the transcendent."⁷⁹ This capability resonates with the Thomistic understanding that all human beings are oriented toward God, even while it is a more universal expression of it that can be expressed differently by people of differing religious backgrounds. DeCrane adds one additional capability that accords with CST, work – or the ability to do meaningful work and to be compensated adequately and appropriately for it.⁸⁰ This

(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006). And Ingrid Robeyns, "Selecting Capabilities for Quality of Life Measurement," *Social Indicators Research* 74, no. 1 (2005).

⁷⁶ Sowle Cahill, *Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics*.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 59-61.

⁷⁸ DeCrane, *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good*, 37.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 37.

capability correlates to the understanding of work in Catholic social thought as a means through which people participate in God's creative work in the world.⁸¹

This amended set of human functioning capabilities forms a framework for understanding in what human flourishing consists. This anthropology aligns with natural law methodology in that it reaches conclusions through reasoning based on experience. It coheres with Catholic social thought's understanding of human beings as embodied and spiritual beings in that it identifies capabilities that encompass both aspects. Furthermore, it recognizes that human beings flourish through pursuing their transcendent destiny in a way that honors their embodied existence. And recognizes that they thrive when they are enabled to develop themselves spiritually, emotionally, mentally and physically.

The human capabilities approach considers *all* capabilities essential to living a fully human life. This approach honors the embodied aspects of the human experience as an integral element of human flourishing. This respect for embodied elements of human flourishing is consistent with recent Catholic social teaching, which emphasizes honoring human dignity through ensuring human rights. The capabilities approach stresses the importance of creating the social conditions that enable people to exercise all of their human functioning capabilities. The Catholic tradition adds valuable insight into the internal orientation of a person needed to create the conditions in which all people will have this opportunity: namely, one needs to correctly order one's values, subordinating one's superfluous material desires when necessary for ensuring the basic needs of others.

⁸¹ Pope John Paul II, "Laborem Exercens," in *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, ed. David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), par. 4.

The human functioning capabilities give content to the common good, because through them human flourishing is defined. The common good, in promoting human flourishing, promotes the human functioning capabilities of each and every member of society. While human fulfillment and the common good are open-ended, the option for the poor indicates that of greater importance than the upper limit of human capabilities are the lower limits that constitute basic human functioning. Human dignity must be assured. The option for the poor requires one to evaluate situations based on their impact on those people whose basic capabilities are most often at risk.

Summary and Next Steps

The overarching framework for U.S. immigration ethics should be the common good rather than solidarity with immigrants. This is first of all because the common good is the purpose of law, and law is central to today's immigration ethics. Secondly, the common good forces a balanced social analysis that takes into account especially the situation of all vulnerable populations that affected by immigration, immigrants and U.S. born people alike. Thirdly, the common good can provide a framework out of the confusion of competing claims in the public sphere about the impact of immigration on U.S. society. Fourthly, the common good as a moral norm leads to more comprehensive strategies for addressing threats to human capabilities resulting from immigration and the public policies surrounding it. And lastly, it promotes a greater level of solidarity between vulnerable groups.

The common good in Catholic social thought is defined as the sum of social conditions that promote human wellbeing. This definition of human flourishing is rooted

in the Thomistic tradition, in which human flourishing is correlated with progress toward those ends and actions that are aligned with natural human inclinations. The anthropology found in Catholic social thought follows Aquinas in viewing human beings as transcendent beings who are destined for union with God and as both physical and rational beings. However, it also includes a particular modern understanding of the human being as bearer of rights and corresponding responsibilities. CST follows Aquinas in correlating the common good with justice, but it explicates it through a modern understanding of justice called “social justice” and it furthermore includes an option for the poor, and emphasizes the universality of the common good.

While this description of the common good provides general direction, it can be improved through providing a clearer delineation of the relationship between the national and universal common good, which I did, and through more clearly explicating a theological anthropology from which to define human flourishing. In this chapter, I advocated using a definition of human flourishing forwarded by Catholic feminist theologian Suzanne DeCrane, which is based on Martha Nussbaum’s human functioning capabilities approach. This definition of human flourishing makes the common good more concrete than in current Catholic social thought, because it describes abilities pertaining to human beings rather than abstract rights. Using this definition, the common good comes to be understood as promoting the human functioning capabilities of each person. Coupled with the option for the poor, the presence of the common good can be evaluated through examining the extent to which human functioning capabilities are

being assured for the most vulnerable populations. When human capabilities are enabled for the poor and marginalized, the common good is being served.

Because the human functioning capabilities provide a way of evaluating the presence of the common good, a common good methodology would benefit from a system for measuring the presence of human functioning capabilities. In the next chapter, I develop such a system. I first demonstrate an example in Catholic tradition of quantifying Catholic social principles, namely the work of John Ryan on the living wage. I then develop a Common Good Index that can be used to measure the presence of human functioning capabilities and therefore the common good.

CHAPTER THREE

A COMMON GOOD INDEX

In Chapter Two, I argued that the appropriate moral framework for evaluating immigration issues today is the common good, and I explored Thomas Aquinas' and CST's understanding of the common good. CST's definition of the common good starts with Aquinas' teleological understanding of creation – that God wills the perfection of all of creation, and so wills the perfection of each person in their intellectual, physical and moral capacities. CST also maintains Aquinas' understanding of the relationship between the common good and the individual person – that the common good is ultimately expressed through the good of individual persons. CST develops the common good beyond Aquinas through universalizing its scope, incorporating a modern anthropology that stresses human rights and integrating a preferential option for the poor.

I proposed utilizing CST's definition of the common good but informing that definition with an understanding of the human person based in Nussbaum's human functioning capabilities. Because the common good is directed toward human flourishing, and the human functioning capabilities describe human flourishing, the human functioning capabilities can be used to evaluate the extent to which a society is realizing the common good by examining whether, for whom, and at what level human capabilities are functioning.

Through correlating the common good with human functioning capabilities, the common good becomes more clearly defined than it is presently in CST. In this chapter, I propose bringing this moral lens into even greater focus through quantifying it. Since the common good is evaluated through human functioning capabilities, it is made even clearer through quantifying the extent to which basic human functioning capabilities are being realized in society.

I begin this chapter by demonstrating that there is precedence in Catholic social thought for the quantification of Catholic social principles. This precedent is found in John A. Ryan's work on a living wage. Ryan, an early twentieth century U.S. theologian, turned the Catholic social principle of subsistence into a concrete proposal for public policy, proposing a national minimum wage that would ensure basic conditions for human dignity.

The common good, being a more complex phenomenon, requires a more complex quantification. In this chapter, I create a tool called the Common Good Index (CGI), which is an index composed of twelve sociological indicators that measures the common good through measuring the presence of human functioning capabilities. The CGI makes possible a level of common good analysis that was heretofore impossible, and as such is an important contribution to the development of the common good.

I make the proposal for the CGI within the context of a flourishing number of indicator projects in the United States and world-wide. Before laying out the Common Good Index, I briefly review the indicator movement and then briefly examine the

particular model I use for the index, the Index of Social Health.¹ I then delineate the model for the Common Good Index, present the criteria for the twelve indicators chosen, and discuss the choice of each indicator in turn.

Quantifying Catholic Social Principles: John A. Ryan

Catholic social thought offers principles for social, political and cultural policy and action, applying these principles to particular contexts. The U.S. bishops' positions on immigration are one such example. In addition to application of principles, however, there is precedent in the Catholic tradition for bringing an objective measure to these principles. Monsignor John A. Ryan's work on the living wage is a primary example of such a precedent.

Ryan was a Catholic theologian in the early twentieth century whose expertise in the fields of theology and economics made him uniquely suited for the "creative application and adaptation of the [universal Catholic] teaching that was his special genius."² Ryan combined his interests in theology, the social sciences, and public policy to apply Catholic economic principles to the United States context. He was a public scholar who wrote books and articles for an academic audience and also published prolifically for non-academic audiences. Ryan's greatest contribution lay in taking a largely theoretical and European framework that characterized Catholic reflection on

¹ The Index of Social Health was created by Marc and Marque-Luisa Miringoff and Sandra Opdycke and is housed at Vassar's Institute for Innovation in Social Policy, formerly the Fordham Institute for Innovation in Social Policy.

² J. Bryan Hehir, "John A. Ryan, John Courtney Murray, George Higgins, and the Catholic Social Tradition," in *Religion and Public Life*, ed. Robert G. Kennedy, et al. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), 15.

economic principles and making it very concrete as it applied to the United States context.³ This application is apparent in his work with the living wage.

Ryan wrote his first book, *A Living Wage*, at a time in which several U.S. states had minimum wage laws that covered women and children, there were no laws covering men, and the very constitutionality of creating a living wage law for men was questioned. In it, he defended and quantified the right to a living wage. At the same time, Ryan was active in organizations advocating for living wage laws and was a recognized leader in the area of minimum wage laws. His level of involvement was such that he wrote the Minnesota minimum wage bill that was subsequently modified and passed by the Minnesota legislature.⁴

Ryan's *A Living Wage* entered into the public debate on the philosophical grounding of minimum wage laws.⁵ Ryan took the position that a right to a living wage stemmed from the natural rights to subsistence and a decent livelihood. This stance resulted from his engagement with Catholic social thought: Ryan was greatly influenced by Pope Leo XIII, whose encyclical *Rerum Novarum* was published a mere fifteen years before Ryan published his book, *A Living Wage*. While Ryan's viewpoints were controversial in the public sphere (the influential Catholic priest and radio host Charles E. Coughlin disparagingly nicknamed him the "Right Reverend New Dealer" for Ryan's

³ Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, "Contemporary Importance of John A. Ryan," in *Religion and Public Life: The Legacy of Monsignor John A. Ryan*, ed. Robert G. Kennedy, et al. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2001), 292-3.

⁴ Francis Broderick, L., *Right Reverend New Dealer John A. Ryan* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), 82.

⁵ See pp. 41-67, John A. Ryan, S.T.D., *A Living Wage*, Revised and Abridged Edition ed. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920).

defense of Roosevelt's New Deal policies),⁶ his theology was grounded firmly in the Catholic social tradition established by Leo XIII.⁷

Ryan's Use of Natural Law

Maintaining continuity with Leo's intellectual and social orientations, Ryan grounded his work intellectually in the neo-Thomist natural law tradition.⁸ In *Rerum Novarum* Leo XIII grounded the rights to private property and a living wage in a natural law argument linking those rights to God's natural order. The right to private property stems from common use of land as ordained by God, the right to sustenance and the primacy of the family as the basic social unit preceding political forms of social organization.⁹ The right to a living wage is likewise in the right to sustenance. "Let the working man and the employer make free agreements, and in particular let them agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any bargain between man and man, namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a frugal and well-behaved wage-earner."¹⁰ In appealing to natural rights, Leo XIII here disregards the liberal approach to freedoms that espouses the absoluteness of freedom divorced from moral judgments.

⁶ Philip Grant, "John A. Ryan and the Presidential Election of 1936," in *Religion and Public Life: The Legacy of Monsignor John A. Ryan*, ed. Robert G. Kennedy, et al. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2001), 12.

⁷ The bestowal of the designation of Monsignor later in life implies that the Church approved of his theological methodology. Broderick, *Right Reverend New Dealer John A. Ryan*, 214.

⁸ Hehir, "John A. Ryan, John Courtney Murray, George Higgins, and the Catholic Social Tradition," 15.

⁹ Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, (Rome: Vatican, 1891), par. 8-10, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_1-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html (accessed January 28, 2011).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, par. 45.

In *A Living Wage*, Ryan turns to Leo XIII to argue that a living wage is based in the natural rights to subsistence and common use of the land.¹¹ We hear echoes Aquinas as well in Ryan's insistence that, "Men's [sic] natural rights ... are based on the duty of pursuing self-perfection."¹² Starting from Aquinas' teleological foundation, Ryan begins his argument by asserting a person's natural rights to realize their spiritual, physical and social wellbeing, within limits set by the moral law and the rights of others.¹³ A living wage, therefore, must enable a person to meet not only their basic physical needs, but their basic social and spiritual needs as well.

In order to pursue self-perfection, one must have the material means to do so. The material goods necessary must provide not only for physical survival, but for the development of other human faculties. To flourish as a human being, one needs opportunities to exercise one's reason, emotions, body, spirit and will according to the demands of human personality.

[I]f a man [sic] is to live a becoming life he must have the means, not merely to secure himself against death by starvation and exposure, but to maintain himself in a reasonable degree of comfort. He is to live as a man, not as an animal. He must have food, clothing and shelter. He must have opportunity to develop within reasonable limits all his faculties, physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual. The rational ground of this right is the same as that of the right to subsistence. It is the dignity and essential needs of the person. Those means and opportunities that have just been described as a decent livelihood are the minimum conditions of right and reasonable living, since without them man cannot attain to that exercise of his faculties and that development of his personality that makes his life worthy of a human being. When he is compelled to live on less than this minimum he is treated as somewhat less than a man.¹⁴

¹¹ Ryan, *A Living Wage*, 74.

¹² Ibid., 3.

¹³ Ibid., 4, 25.

¹⁴ Ibid., 33.

In short, the duty of self-perfection translates into a right to a decent livelihood. A living wage is necessary because the economic system is such that working people can secure a decent livelihood only through wages. The right to a decent livelihood translates into a right to receive a living wage. “As long as the present organization of industry exists, the obligation of not hindering the laborer from enjoying his right to a decent livelihood will be commuted into the obligation of paying him a Living Wage.”¹⁵

Ryan’s Quantification of the Right to a Living Wage

Ryan takes the natural law methodology a step further than Leo XIII by determining an actual dollar amount of a living wage in the U.S. context. Ryan argues that a living wage must cover not only individual expenses but family expenses as well. A person must be provided with the means to support his [sic] family, because it is through family that two central human needs – a conjugal relationship and self-preservation (through procreation) – are met. Ryan establishes that a living wage should be based on the average amount of money needed to secure decent living conditions for a family. “Rights are to be interpreted according to the average conditions of human life, and these suppose the laborer to become the head of a family.”¹⁶ A family wage should be provided to all workers regardless of their civil status.

Ryan then presents a concrete estimate of how much money it would cost to meet the human needs of an average family, or to maintain an average family in “reasonable

¹⁵ Ibid., 69.

¹⁶ Ibid., 88.

comfort.”¹⁷ He does not attempt to satisfy the demands of complete justice but rather undertakes to describe the minimum resources needed for families to satisfy the demands of human dignity.¹⁸ These needs go above mere survival, encompassing the spectrum of human needs: emotional, physical, and spiritual.

Ryan determines reasonable living conditions for an average family through reflecting on the demands of human dignity and referring to social custom. He uses social custom, because he understands that there is a social component of human needs – the demands of human dignity include not only survival but also social acceptance and self-respect. Therefore, a “decent livelihood, or a Living Wage, must conform in a reasonable degree to the conventional standard of life that prevails in any community or group. For in order to live becomingly, men must possess not only those goods that are objectively necessary, but in some measure those that they think are necessary.”¹⁹ Clothes, for example, have a social as well as utilitarian function. It is recognized that many people will in fact go hungry in order to avoid being out of fashion. Minimum conditions may change over time, as the overall standard of living of a society shifts.

Since human needs are social in nature, Ryan uses convention to justify his list of basic needs. He finds a high degree of consensus between economists, political scientists and labor unionists on what concretely constitute basic needs. However, he does not accept convention blindly but rather augments it with natural law reasoning about human nature. When finding disagreement between the cited sources concerning whether or not

¹⁷ Ibid., 91.

¹⁸ Ibid., 38.

¹⁹ Ibid., 94.

to provide for illness, retirement or disability, Ryan argues that families must be assured the conditions for a decent life even when the bread-winner cannot work due to illness, old age or disability, because of the demands of human nature and dignity.

According to Ryan, the “minimum amount of goods and opportunities that will suffice for decent living and the rearing of a family”²⁰ consist first of all of food, clothing and shelter. Families must have access to food that will enable them to maintain a normal level of health, and to shelter that provides a reasonable amount of health and comfort. Ryan specifies that an average family of five should have at least five rooms in the home, including three bedrooms, in order to meet this requirement. In terms of clothing, Ryan proposes that a living wage must be able to afford each family member at least one formal outfit.²¹ Secondly, they must be afforded the economic means for the family to live decently in the event of accidents, disability, and old age.²² And they must also be paid a sufficient sum to be able to satisfy their mental and spiritual needs, for example through attending primary education, enjoying some recreation, buying some books, joining civic and labor organizations and fulfilling ones religious obligations.²³

These needs are then calculated into a budget. The line-items in the budget include food, clothing, rent, fuel and light, insurance, organizations, religion, street-car fare, paper, books, etc., amusements, drinks, tobacco, sickness, dentist, oculist, glasses, etc., furnishings, laundry, cleaning supplies, and miscellaneous items. Using a

²⁰ Ibid., 100.

²¹ Ibid., 102.

²² Ibid., 103.

²³ Ibid.

comprehensive study that summarized numerous efforts to quantify the average cost of living, Ryan estimated that in 1919 the cost of living for an average family fell between \$1,400 and \$1,500 in the United States, and that the hourly wage for a head of family was 50 cents.

Through his effort to specify in detail what the general principle of a living wage meant in his time and place, Ryan created a model for concretizing Catholic moral principles. Furthermore, through making the right to subsistence concrete, Ryan made Catholic social thought more influential on the living wage debate of the day. The lines of justice became clear: anything less than 50 cents an hour was unacceptable and fell beneath the floor of minimal justice and human dignity. With this sort of specificity, Ryan was able to not only offer visionary statements but to advocate for concrete policy recommendations, to the benefit of working people.

Proposal for Quantifying the Common Good

Recognizing that there is precedent in Catholic social ethics for quantifying Catholic social principles, I propose in this dissertation to quantify the common good. Such enumeration is more complex than a determination of a living wage, because the common good is a considerably more complicated principle. It is multi-faceted. It is open-ended and ever-expanding in nature. And it deals with the relationships between people as well as individual states of being.

This quantification is made possible when human flourishing is understood through human functioning capabilities. Since the common good is directed toward each and every person's flourishing, and human flourishing can be specified through the

human functioning capabilities, one can evaluate the extent to which a society is realizing the common good through evaluating the level of human functioning capabilities among its population. What is needed, therefore, to assess the state the common good are measures of the human capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotional wellbeing, practical reason, affiliation, relatedness to other species and the environment, play, control over one's environment, kinship, religion and work.

The measures taken must be concerned with the state of flourishing among the most vulnerable populations. The preferential option for the poor mandates the basic states of human flourishing for the marginalized be ensured over higher states of flourishing for others. Only when basic states of wellbeing are guaranteed can the common good be realized. In the area of bodily health, for example, one would pass on measuring the upper limits of health for the healthiest in society and instead examine the extent to which women, minorities and other vulnerable populations have access to basic health care services.

In measuring the human functioning capabilities, the CGI provides a concrete baseline measure of the common good. In so doing, it serves four valuable functions. One, the CGI is a measure against which to judge the state of the common good at a given point in time. Two, it establishes a concrete goal toward which societies should strive. Three, it provides a tool for assessing whether society is moving toward or away from the common good; when used in for this purpose, Common Good Index scores are compared over time. And four, it is used to evaluate whether a particular policy proposal

or change promotes or degrades the common good. When used for evaluating potential policy changes, anticipated changes to the Index are calculated and compared to the current Index score. In the case of immigration, there has been so much research discussing the economic and social impact of immigration on the United States that it is possible to compare the actual Common Good Index score to a hypothetical score in the theoretical absence of recent immigration.

The Common Good Index makes possible a level of common good analysis that was heretofore impossible. Rather than teasing out conclusions from the broad philosophical underpinnings of the common good and a general sense of social dynamics, real numbers and facts will direct a common good analysis. The numbers will bring a higher level of clarity and surety to a common good analysis, enabling the common good to be used with far more exactitude.

While the common good cannot be exactly quantified due to the complexity of the common good and the fullness of the human functioning capabilities, it can be sufficiently quantified through *indicators* of human functioning capabilities. What does it mean to indicate rather than measure the common good? An indicator is a measure that *points to* the existence of something. It *suggests* the state of its health or *provides a sign of* how healthy it is. It does not capture the whole, full richness of that thing's entirety, but it does capture pieces of it or provide information on an important symptom of its health.

An index, or set of indicators taken together, provides a snapshot of the health of a complex phenomenon. For example, economic health is measured by indicators such as

the Gross National Product, inflation, job starts and stock prices. Environmental health is indicated by water quality, air quality and cancer rates, among others. Quality of life can be measured by access to health care, homeownership rate, and children in poverty.²⁴ An index can provide a picture of something that is otherwise too complex to get a fix on. The Common Good Index consists of a set of twelve sociological indicators that measure the extent to which human functioning capabilities are being realized in society. I develop the Index below.

First, however, I wish to put the Common Good Index into a broader social context of the proliferation of composite indexes. I do so because in order to take the CGI into a public conversation, it will be necessary to distinguish it from other indicator projects, and as such one needs to be familiar with the other efforts. Furthermore, I use another index (the Index of Social Health, discussed below) as the technical model for developing the CGI. Additionally, the limitations and directions for future improvement of the CGI can be best understood in terms of those of composite indexes in general.

Context for a Common Good Index: Other Indicator Projects

The dominant measure of aggregate social welfare since the 1950's has been national income, usually expressed as the Gross Domestic Product or the Gross National Product.²⁵ However, this measure has been widely criticized as inadequate, on the basis

²⁴ The Southern Growth Policies Board does just this, with an index consisting of sixteen indicators. Linda Hoke and Sandra Johnson, *The Southern Community Index*, (Research Triangle Park, NC: Southern Growth Policies Board, 2005), http://www.southern.org/pubs/pubs_pdfs/community_index.pdf (accessed November 11, 2009).

²⁵ Elizabeth Stanton, *The Human Development Index: A History*, (Amherst, MA: Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2007),

that it does not necessarily reflect the how well people are doing.²⁶ As an example, the United States' GDP increased dramatically between 1970 and 2007, yet during that same time period, a national indicator project in the United States, the Index of Social Health (ISH), showed stagnation in the welfare of the population.²⁷

Alternate methods for measuring social health have gained increasing popularity since the 1966 publication of a U.S. report called *Toward a Social Report* that called for the creation of a social welfare index.²⁸ Although the United States did not follow through on the project, that report generated interest in other countries. Today, most European nations and many developing nations have institutionalized social welfare indices.²⁹

Internationally, hundreds of demographic and social indicators are compiled by organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization. Similar to the U.S.'s *Toward a Social Report*, in 1975 the United Nations published a report that challenged the dominance and inadequacy of using national income data to reflect development and established a statistical reporting system to capture human development through measuring things that people can do (such as read)

http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_101-150/WP127.pdf (accessed January 14, 2010).

²⁶ Ibid., 10.

²⁷ Data360, *Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal* (Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis), (2010), http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=230 (accessed January 28, 2010). "The Index of Social Health," Institute for Innovation in Social Policy, Vassar University, <http://iisp.vassar.edu/ish.html> (accessed January 28, 2010).

²⁸ Marc Miringoff and Marque-Luisa Miringoff, *The Social Health of the Nation: How America is Really Doing* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 48.

²⁹ Marque-Luisa Miringoff and Sandra Opdycke, *America's Social Health: Putting Social Issues Back on the Public Agenda* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), 48.

rather than only have (such as money).³⁰ Today, the United Nations maintains numerous statistical products and databases covering dozens of social and demographic indicators that it collects from its nearly 200 member countries. The World Bank maintains a database with 331 indicators for 209 countries.³¹ The World Health Organization maintains information on approximately 100 health indicators for almost 200 countries.³²

Examining the United States in particular, although the U.S. has no official Index of social welfare, as mentioned above, there is a national indicator project called the Index of Social Health that measures the national welfare of the United States population. In addition, a plethora a quality of life indexes have developed at the local level. *America's Social Health* lists approximately 100 state, local and regional-level community indicator projects.³³ These indicator projects all seek to measure how well people are doing through measuring social data that reflect human wellbeing.

Some indicator projects simply list the varying indicators alongside each other. Others aggregate the indicators to create one synthetic measure. On the international level one composite index stands out, the Human Development Index (HDI). This index was created in the late 1980s, and similar to other indicator projects it was developed in response to dissatisfaction over the ability of national income statistics to measure human

³⁰ Dudley Seers, "A System of Social and Demographic Statistics: A Review Note," *The Economic Journal* 86, no. 343 (1976): 595.

³¹ *Indicators*, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>.

³² *Indicator Definitions and Metadata*, (World Health Organization, 2010), <http://www.who.int/whosis/indicators/en/>.

³³ Miringoff and Opdycke, *America's Social Health: Putting Social Issues Back on the Public Agenda*, 63-66.

development.³⁴ As a composite index, the HDI standardizes and combines several measures to create one final rating. The index consists of three equally-weighted factors: life expectancy, education (which compiles literacy and school enrollment data), and the Gross Domestic Product.³⁵ The index scores for any individual country are calculated in comparison to the countries with the highest development, rather than to an individual country's best score.³⁶ Therefore, it provides relative ranking, rather than an absolute ranking of wellbeing.

The Common Good Index is proposed within this context of international to local interest in capturing information on human wellbeing. I seek to create the Common Good Index as a composite index, and as such I look to composite indexes (such as the HDI) as a model. Composite indexes vary in the number and kind of indicators chosen and in the standardization method, but what they have in common is that they contain a series of indicator data that are standardized and added up to arrive at a single number. I create the CGI as a composite index because the composite number enables one to numerically answer the question with one number: how has x factor affected the common good? In the case of this dissertation, I ask the question: how have recent U.S. immigration trends affected the common good?

³⁴ Stanton, *The Human Development Index: A History*, 10.

³⁵ *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, (New York: United Nations Human Development Programme, 2008), 356, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_Tech_Note_1.pdf (accessed May 10, 2010).

³⁶ *Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*, (New York: United Nations Human Development Programme, 2009), http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf (accessed January 17, 2011).

Critiques of Composite Indexes

Before defending a particular model for the Common Good Index, I first want to note that all indexes have their limitations. I cover here the major criticisms of composite indexes in general and of the HDI (as the most broadly used index), and the Index of Social Health (as the main model for the CGI). One of the main critiques of composite indexes is that they lack of coherent theory for their choice of indicators. For example, many quality of life indicators do not present a theory of what quality of life consists of and why. The indicators chosen thus stand undefended in terms of what they represent.³⁷ The Common Good Index, unlike these indexes, is firmly grounded in theory - the theory of the common good as explicated in previous chapters – and so it avoids this criticism.

Another critique concerns lack of data: data for all indicators are not available for all countries for all years. The United Nations uses linear interpolation to determine data for missing years.³⁸ In the Common Good index, I use the data for closest next year available, although I recommend that in the future linear interpolation be used. The Human Development Index minimizes the problem of data collection through measuring very few variables. The Common Good Index, as we will see, faces more difficulties due to its breadth. Data limitations are endemic to the data-collection community internationally, however, and efforts are constantly being made to address it.³⁹ As

³⁷ Michael R. Hagerty et al., "Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research," *Social Indicators Research* 55, no. 1 (2001): 6.

³⁸ *Human Development Report 2010, 20th Anniversary Edition: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*, (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2010), 217, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/en/> (accessed January 11, 2011).

³⁹ *U.N. Report Asks Governments to Improve Data Collection to Better Women's Lives*, (U.N. News Centre, 2006), <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=17204&Cr=women&Cr1>.

international efforts improve, so will the ability of the Common Good Index to accurately and precisely measure the common good.

Another key issue raised is redundancy among constituent indicators.⁴⁰ An index may contain indicators that “overlap” or fail to point to a discrete quality. A good example of this is poverty. Poverty is recognized to be a key indicator for many other conditions: education level, crime, health, etc. If included in an index with these other elements, it (or the other indicators) would be considered redundant. In the Common Good Index, I welcome redundancy. I do this because it would be impossible to represent the full range of human functioning capabilities without any redundancy. Practicality overrules the statistical concern for perfection in this case.

Thirdly, indexes have been critiqued for their weighting methodologies. The HDI, for example, combined three equally weighted numbers. The suggestion has been made that income, however, should be weighted more heavily than GDP and education due to its ability to affect many more capabilities.⁴¹ Another weighting issue concerns implicit weights.⁴² Some indicators have greater variance than others, and therefore will carry more weight in an equally weighted index. For example, there may be a greater variance in literacy than in unemployment across nations. The Common Good Index follows the example of the HDI and the Index of Social Health in that it weights its indicators evenly.

⁴⁰ Stanton, *The Human Development Index: A History*, 22. Hagerty et al., "Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research," 7.

⁴¹ Allen C. Kelley, "The Human Development Index: "Handle with Care", " *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 2 (1991).

⁴² Stanton, *The Human Development Index: A History*, 18.

It does so on the theoretical basis forwarded by Martha Nussbaum that all the human capabilities are equally important, as noted in the previous chapter.

Lastly, the Index of Social Health in particular is criticized for having an inadequate standardization process, scaling numbers to simple best and worst figures, rather than using a standard deviation methodology.⁴³ However, the same critic recognized the benefit of the simplicity and understandability of their method,⁴⁴ and even though the Index scores would change with a different methodology, the relative value of scores across countries would be hardly affected.⁴⁵ The CGI follows the ISH's standardization process.

Constructing the Common Good Index

The Common Good Index (CGI) created here is an index that measures the end of the common good (human flourishing) through measuring human functioning capabilities. While the CGI has some similarities with the HDI, it is actually modeled after Vassar University's Index of Social Health [of the United States], even it differs from the Index of Social Health in important respects, as is discussed below.

I choose the Index of Social Health (ISH) as the model for the CGI in part it contains the number and kind of indicators that lend themselves to the breadth and scope

⁴³ The Index of Social Health scales the indicators to best and worst performances, subtracting the worst from the best performance scores and dividing by the range. Standard statistical methodology requires dividing the difference in best and worst scores by the standard deviation rather than by the range, in order to avoid an outlier effect. Hagerty et al., "Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research," 45.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ As was found by the United Nations, upon making a similar adjustment to the HDI. *Human Development Report 2010, 20th Anniversary Edition: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*, 217.

of human functioning capabilities. The HDI, as described above, consists of only three indicators: education, life expectancy and GDP. The ISH, on the other hand, consists of sixteen indicators that cover a range of human goods. Furthermore, the Index of Social Health is self-contained, whereas the HDI is qualified by three other indexes: the Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index, the Gender Equality Index, and the Multidimensional Poverty Index.⁴⁶ As such, the overall structure is too onerous for the scope of this project. Lastly, the Index of Social Health has been evaluated as being an excellent public policy tool at all levels of aggregation.⁴⁷ The Common Good Index, like the Index of Social Health, is intended for practical use in evaluating public policy.

Another reason for choosing the ISH as a model is that its indicator criteria are very clear, and many of them are useful and therefore adopted for the construction of the CGI. The CGI indicators are discussed below. Furthermore, it offers helpful examples of indicators, a number of which are likewise used in the CGI, when they are appropriate given the CGI purpose and indicator criteria. Lastly, the ISH's numerical calculation of the Index score, copied in the CGI, is simple and replicable and yields meaningful results, as discussed below.

The ISH is comprised of sixteen social indicators covering five age groups: children, youth, adults, the elderly, and all ages. The CGI contains a dozen indicators of human wellbeing that also measure wellbeing at different age levels. While both indexes measure human wellbeing, they differ in an important respect: the Common Good Index

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ "Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research," 43.

relies on a Catholic anthropology to determine the content of that wellbeing, in contrast to the Index of Social Health, which provides a cross-section of indicators relevant to human wellbeing that are determined not by an underlying anthropology but rather are determined by social consensus.⁴⁸ The Common Good Index, on the other hand, tracks human wellbeing according to the anthropology elaborated in Chapter Two. Specifically speaking, the Common Good Index measures the presence of human functioning capabilities in a population.

CGI Indicator Criteria

The Common Good Index consists of a set of indicators that measure the presence of human functioning capabilities in society. The construction of the CGI begins with choosing criteria for the indicators. The first criterion is that the indicators measure human functioning capabilities. This standard speaks to the foundational definition of the CGI, which is to measure those capabilities. The second criterion is related to the first: it requires that the indicators shed light on important aspects of human capabilities. This norm recognizes that no one indicator captures the fullness of any given capability. It dictates that indicators chosen are significant and relevant to the capability being measured.

The third criterion is that the indicators are measured reliably and consistently over time by government or recognized private research organizations.⁴⁹ The Common

⁴⁸ Miringoff and Miringoff, *The Social Health of the Nation*, 42.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Good Index follows this criterion because it is necessary for statistical accuracy, coherence and consistency.

Fourth, the CGI requires that indicators have international resonance and can be directly compared to statistics kept by other industrialized nations.⁵⁰ When a policy question at hand has international implications, for instance in immigration questions, the Common Good Index must be evaluated at the level of all parties involved. In evaluating recent immigration trends, for example, a common good analysis must include consideration of the common good of both United States and Mexican citizens. The Common Good Index must thus include data for the United States and Mexico. This criterion ensures that the common good can be measured at a global level, which is necessary given the universal nature of the common good,

Fifth, the indicators chosen must be able to be broken down to examine impact on key subgroups in the nation, for example by race, class, gender or age.⁵¹ This criterion is important in order to truly understand which particular groups are suffering. Aggregate numbers can hide inequalities, which are unhidden by a deeper analysis of subgroups. This criterion is particularly important to the CGI because of the preferential option for the poor within the common good. The common good must be able to be analyzed at a local level in order to account for the wellbeing of marginalized persons. It is important, furthermore, because the Catholic social principle of subsidiarity requires that issues be

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

addressed at the most local level possible. A common good index that operates only at a national or global level will disable local level analysis and therefore action.

A sixth criterion judges indicators on how they affect vulnerable populations, requiring that CGI indicators have either a neutral or positive effect on those communities. This standard recognizes that what is measured matters, influencing, for example, what poverty formulation one would use (to be discussed at greater length in the next chapter). Just as John Ryan described the minimum financial resources necessary to maintain a family with dignity, the CGI requires indicators that demarcate the minimum levels of human capability necessary to satisfy the demands of human dignity. This criterion exists as a check to ensure that the Common Good Index does not betray the preferential option for the poor and thereby betray its mission in furthering the common good.

Seventh, while the number of indicators chosen must be broad enough to indicate all human functioning capabilities, the list of indicators must be short enough to be used practically and widely. The brevity of the list belies the richness of the information provided, however: most indicators reflect multiple capabilities, and thus most human capabilities are covered by two or more indicators. For example, the human functioning capability of work is indicated by rates of unemployment and high school drop-out rates.

In sum, the criteria for the Common Good Index are:

1. They measure human functioning capabilities.
2. They shed light on important aspects of the human functioning capabilities they indicate.

3. They are measured reliably and consistently over time by government or recognized private research organizations.
4. They have international resonance and are able to be compared to statistics kept by other nations.
5. They capture how the most vulnerable members of society are affected. This means that the data must be able to be broken down by key subgroups, such as class, race, gender, age or sexual orientation.
6. Their use causes neutral or positive impact on poor and vulnerable populations.
7. The number of total indicators is manageable, so as to make the Index a practical tool that is not unduly cumbersome to use.

With these criteria in mind, I turn to developing the list of common good indicators.

Overview to Methodology for Choosing CGI Indicators

In this section, I examine each human functioning capability and determine what indicator(s) would adequately represent it. In developing the total list, I take into consideration overlap in indication, i.e. which indicators measure more than one capability. In short, I seek a comprehensive and balanced yet relatively short list of indicators of the broad range of human functioning capabilities.

To develop a given indicator, I start with two areas of investigation. The first point of investigation is: what would be one or more physical, concrete manifestations of that capability? This question generates ideas for indicators that directly measure the capability itself. However, an indicator that directly correlates to a capability is not always available, and even if it is, it may not illuminate social conditions contributing to that capability's realization, which limits its usefulness in pointing to directions for change. I therefore also ask: what social conditions either hinder or promote the

realization of that capability? Social conditions can indicate a human capability because of the close relationship between social conditions and the realization of human capabilities. One's health, for example, is compromised by lack of economic access to medical care. Where possible, I choose indicators that reflect social conditions, because they also point to directions for social improvement. Potential indicators are evaluated through the above listed criteria.

I organize the rest of this section according to the human functioning capabilities, since the capabilities are the subject of the Index. To review, there are thirteen human functioning capabilities: life, physical health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reasoning, affiliation, other species and nature, play and recreation, control over environment, relationship to the transcendent, raising children in a stable, supportive environment, and work. I proceed one by one to determine indicators for each, and then present a composite that recognizes where there is overlap and how well the indicators chosen measure human capabilities for people of different age groups.

Life Indicators

The capability of life concerns being able to live a life of normal length and to live a life that is not "so reduced as to be not worth living."⁵² The capability of life is expressed at its most basic level through the length of one's life. Three indicators that directly measure length of life are infant mortality, child mortality and life expectancy. In the interest of limiting the number of indicators, I choose infant mortality (which is one of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals for 2015). While mortality

⁵² Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*, 78.

directly indicates this capability, it does not point to the social causes contributing to realization (or lack thereof) of this capability. Therefore, it is preferable to include another indicator, one that will illuminate causal social conditions. One of the major contributing factors to the length of one's life is one's health, and a key social indicator of health in developed nations is access to health insurance. Health indicators are examined more closely below.

Physical Health Indicators

Health indicators vary widely depending on a country's level of development. The UN Millennium Development Goals include reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters and achieve universal access to reproductive health. Healthy People 2010, a project of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, names the following as the ten leading health indicators: physical activity, overweight and obesity, tobacco use, substance abuse, responsible sexual behavior, mental health, injury and violence, environmental quality, immunization, and access to health care.⁵³

Again, the indicators I choose in this project must be measured internationally, by both developed and developing nations. However, due to project limitations, when there are great differences between the types of indicators that should be used for developing countries versus developed countries, I choose indicators that will reflect conditions in developed countries, in order to shed light on the immigration issue here at home. In the Healthy Families indicators list, some indicators on the list (substance abuse, mental

⁵³ "Healthy People 2010," Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services <http://www.healthypeople.gov/About/hpfact.htm> (accessed February 9, 2010). Accessed February 8, 2010

health, violence and environmental quality) pertain to other human functioning capabilities, and I develop indicators for them during discussion of those capabilities.⁵⁴ They serve as secondary indicators for physical health. One indicator stands out among the remaining: access to health care, because access to health care strongly influences whether or not a person seeks medical attention and therefore significantly impacts one's health, no matter what health problem one is facing. People who have no health insurance, bluntly put, are more likely to die than people with insurance.⁵⁵ For this reason, lack of health insurance is the primary indicator for this capability in the common good index.

Bodily Integrity Indicators

The next human capability, bodily integrity, includes the abilities to move about freely and safely, to control access to one's body and to have choice in matters of sexuality and sexual reproduction. Key indicators of safety and control over access to one's body are homicide and child maltreatment. A third indicator that points to limitations in safety and movement is poverty. A family living in a dangerous neighborhood that cannot afford to move to a safer one may have the liberty to secure their safety in theory, but not in practice. An abused woman without a job that pays a living wage may have the freedom to move out of an abusive situation in theory, but not in practice.

⁵⁴ Substance abuse and mental health correspond to the emotions, violence pertains to bodily integrity, and environmental quality relates to other species and nature.

⁵⁵ This is true even when adjusting for numerous social and individual health-related variables such as race, education, income, body mass index, and smoking. Andrew P. Wilper et al., "Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults," *American Journal of Public Health* 99, no. 12 (2009).

Senses, Imagination and Thought Indicators

The capability of senses, imagination and thought can be indicated by various educational measurements. Martha Nussbaum names literacy as one of the expressions of this capability. Literacy is still a huge issue in some countries – especially the eight countries in which two-thirds of all illiterate adults reside.⁵⁶ The three regions with extremely low literacy rates are the Arab states, South and West Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁷

While literacy is foundational, literacy itself is not a high enough indicator for intellectual capability. Literacy as a standard does not capture the level of mental abilities required to negotiate the complexities of the technologized and globalized context of today's world. A high school degree, while it may not give someone access to the high level of intellectual capability required for today's professional, well-paying jobs, at least gives one basic intellectual skills for negotiating the world of work and entering into higher intellectual explorations. In today's work world, while the better paying jobs require a higher level of thinking, high school graduates have the skills to pursue short term professional certificates, which gives them access to move up the economic ladder. I choose high school drop-out rates as the indicator to measure basic intellectual capacities.

⁵⁶ Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan. "The World Factbook: Field Listing: Literacy," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html> (accessed May 30, 2010).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Emotions Indicators

The human capability of emotions refers to the ability to have a healthy emotional life, including the ability to love and form emotional bonds with others, and to feel a range of emotions, including justified anger. Two indicators of the lack of emotional wellbeing are suicide and child maltreatment.⁵⁸ In terms of suicide, over ninety percent of all people who commit suicides suffered from depression or other mental disorders, and/or substance abuse problems.⁵⁹

Child maltreatment unfortunately cannot be used as an indicator because the reporting for child maltreatment – both in terms of coverage and comparability – is so poor as to prohibit its use. However, I mention this indicator for future reference when more data is collected, because of its importance. Child maltreatment is relevant in two ways as an indicator – both in pointing to the lack of emotional capability in the person committing the maltreatment and in pointing to a likely stunting of emotional ability in the maltreated, since children who are victims or witnesses to abuse are likely to have problems forming healthy emotional attachments with others.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Child maltreatment includes child abuse and neglect. Minimum national standards define child abuse and neglect as “Any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation; or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm.” *Child Maltreatment 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services – Administration on Youth, Children and Families), xi, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/index.htm#can.

⁵⁹ “Suicide in the U.S.: Statistics and Prevention,” U.S. Department of Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/suicide-in-the-us-statistics-and-prevention/index.shtml> (accessed February 29, 2010).

⁶⁰ David A. Wolfe, *Child Abuse: Implications for Child Development and Psychopathology*, Second ed., Development Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Series (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1999), 35.

Practical Reason Indicators

The capability of practical reason refers to the ability to form one's conception of the good and to critically reflect on the planning of one's life. This ability is not directly indicated by any current data collection, but it may be indirectly indicated by education level, since it is fostered by the teaching of critical thinking skills in schools. High school completion rates (or its opposite, drop-out rates) may be used as an indicator for this capability. Nussbaum points out that this capability depends on freedom of conscience and is hindered by the lack of such freedoms. Although freedom of conscience can be indicated through the presence of laws protecting freedom of conscience, there are no numerical indicators that represent the effectiveness or extent of such laws.

Affiliation Indicators

The human functioning capability of affiliation reflects the ability to maintain interpersonal relationships and to demonstrate concern for others on an interpersonal and social level. This includes the capacity for compassion, friendship and justice. Three obvious indicators for this unfortunately cannot be used, however, due to data limitations. Child maltreatment has been showed to negatively affect a child's peer relationships and social competence and could be used as an indicator, except for the data collection problems mentioned above.⁶¹

Two other indicators, although they seemed like obvious choices, proved to be unworkable for the Common Good Index. Hate crimes, for example, reveal a break in affiliation toward others based on differences in race or ethnicity, religion, gender or

⁶¹ Ibid.

sexual orientation or disability. However, there are several problems with using hate crimes as an indicator. It is not broadly used outside of the United States, and the reporting of hate crimes year by year includes total numbers but does not allow for a hate crime rate to be established and compared across years.⁶² Therefore, I do not include it here. Martha Nussbaum notes that affiliation requires equality in social and economic opportunities. The Gini coefficient is a common indicator of social and economic equality, measuring income equality in society. The Gini coefficient cannot be used in the Common Good Index, however, because it cannot be applied to subgroups by race or gender. Furthermore, an ideal Gini score would imply that the lowest skilled laborers receive the same income as the highest skilled workers, a proposition for which there is no social consensus.

Regardless of these limitations, this capability can be indicated through other means, through other indicators of equality of opportunity: when a resource-rich a society such as the United States allows 46 million residents to lack access to health care⁶³ or allow 39 million people to live in poverty, or half of all students at urban public schools to drop out,⁶⁴ it demonstrates a deficiency in this capability. Thus, the indicators of

⁶² The FBI publishes total number of hate crimes reported from participating law enforcement agencies, but does not publish hate crime rates or population information that would allow those rates to be determined. See, for example, *Hate Crimes Statistics, 2008*, (U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008), <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008/index.html>.

⁶³ Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., *Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2009), 21, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf> (accessed February 18, 2010).

⁶⁴ *Cities in Crisis 2009: Closing the Graduation Gap*, (Bethesda, MD: Editorial Projects in Education Research Center, 2009), 13, <http://www.americaspromise.org/~media/Files/Resources/CiC09.ashx> (accessed May 26, 2010).

poverty, health care uninsurance and high school graduation rates serve as indicators for affiliation.

Other Species and Nature Indicators

The realization of the next capability, relating to other species and nature, determines our ability to ensure a healthy future for the environment, life species and indeed of the planet. One of the key areas of measurement for this capability is the environment. The field of the environment is broad, and environmental indexes include numerous indicators for diverse concerns such as land, water, air and biodiversity.⁶⁵ While one indicator alone cannot provide guidance when discussing the impact of certain events or policies on the environment, I choose one indicator for the Common Good Index: carbon dioxide emissions.⁶⁶ Carbon dioxide emissions play a significant role in global warming and the resulting destabilization of the environment and has been a key environmental indicator for many years. A recent research study has shown that CO₂ emissions must be halved by 2050 in order to stabilize global climate.⁶⁷

Control over Environment Indicators

The next human functioning capability is control over one's environment. This capability has two aspects: political and material. Political control over one's

⁶⁵ See, for example, "U.N.S.D. Environmental Indicators," (United Nations Statistical Division, 2010), <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/qindicators.htm>.
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/qindicators.htm>.

⁶⁶ In order to evaluate specifically environmental issues, this indicator should be complemented with other indicators.

⁶⁷ Malte Meinshausen et al., "Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2° C.," *Nature* 458, no. 7242 (2009). The United Nations recognizes the need to limit global warming to 2° C in order to avoid massive global climate destabilization. John Vidal et al., "Low targets, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure," *Guardian.co.uk*, December 19, 2009 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal> (accessed May 16, 2010).

environment refers to the ability to influence the social and political policies that affect one's life. This capability is exercised through participation in political and civil processes, including but not limited to electoral processes. It is protected by the right to assembly, free speech, and by voting rights. I choose to indicate this capability through voter turnout rates. While voter registration rates indicate basic access to voting, voter turnout rates point to barriers to voting other than the formal right to vote.⁶⁸

Material control over one's environment, the second aspect of this capability, refers to one's ability to acquire and hold property, including land and other material goods. This is potentially indicated by property ownership. Homeownership in particular not only indicates control over one's environment but the capabilities of senses, imagination and thought, affiliation and bodily health as well, since it has been found that "housing boosts the educational performance of children, induces higher participation in civic and volunteering activity, improves health care outcomes, lowers crime rates and lessens welfare dependency."⁶⁹

The formal right to own property for both men and women is recognized under international law. Many countries, however, still permit discriminatory policies, and many other countries, while recognizing the formal right, allow "the persistence of discriminatory laws, policies, patriarchal customs, traditions and attitudes [to block]

⁶⁸ Such barriers may include polling hours or locations, or things more difficult to measure such as belief that their vote will make a difference.

⁶⁹ *Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing*, (National Association of Realtors Research Division), 15, http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/30deaa8048be37c3b48cfe0c8bc1f2ed/05_social_benefits_of_stable_housing.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=30deaa8048be37c3b48cfe0c8bc1f2ed.

women from enjoying their rights.”⁷⁰ While homeownership or housing affordability would seem to be an ideal indicator for this index, statistics on housing affordability are not measured in enough countries to use this indicator for the Common Good Index.⁷¹ This indicator cannot, therefore, be used for the Common Good Index.

Another indicator may be used, poverty. Certainly one of the main barriers to ownership is economic, even when the formal right to own property exists. However, a family’s general economic status greatly influences its ability to own property, and thus this capability can be indicated by family income, and especially poverty, since an impoverished person lacks the means to buy even necessities, much less a home.

Work Indicators

The human functioning capability of work requires the ability to work and to be adequately remunerated for it. This capability is also indicated through unemployment rates. The capability of work is also indicated by high school completion rates. This is because educational level strongly influences one’s ability to earn a living wage. High school drop-outs in the United States earn less than \$19,000 a year, placing most families with uneducated workers in poverty. Furthermore, poverty and family wages indicate the

⁷⁰ Marjolein Benschop, *Women's Rights to Land and Property*, (UN-HABITAT, Commission on Sustainable Development, 2004), 3.

⁷¹ The National Association of Realtors has created a Housing Affordability Index that measures the extent to which a typical family can afford to buy a typical home at a typical mortgage rate. The U.N. and World Bank agree that statistics should be kept on median house price to median income ratio (Sock-Yong Phang, "Affordable Homeownership Policy: Implications for Housing Markets and Housing Elasticities," in *European Real Estate Society Conference* (Stockholm: 2009), 5, <http://www.eres2009.com/papers/6FPhang.pdf>). However, neither keeps such statistics in their accessible web-based databases. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN - Habitat has collected housing data through a Global Urban Indicator Database, but information was reported only regionally. Information was collected for this database only twice, the second time in 1998.

capability of work, since it provides a window into whether or not people are receiving a living wage.

Raising Children in a Stable, Supportive Environment Indicators

The capability of raising children in a stable, supportive environment might be indicated by the divorce rate, since divorce reflects instability in child raising, exacts a high psychological toll on all members of the family and generally places women and children at an economic disadvantage.⁷² However, there is a problem with using divorce as an indicator of this capability. While divorce may cause instability, it may actually increase a parent's ability to raise their children in a supportive environment, for example if there is conflict or abuse in the home. This leads to a problem in determining an ideal divorce rate. In an ideal world where all marriages reflect life-giving partnerships between spouses, the divorce rate would be zero. However, in a world where a continued relationship is damaging to the parties involved, especially when involving spousal or child abuse, a zero percent divorce rate would represent a failure to ensure basic wellbeing. A better indicator of this capability is the teenage birth rate. Teenagers who have babies are at a tremendous disadvantage in terms of being able to provide economically provide for their children, to provide the nurturing and guidance that come with maturity, and to provide a stable home with two parents.⁷³

⁷² Lisa Sowle Cahill, *Bioethics and the Common Good* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), 197.

⁷³ This is another indicator that must be used with caution internationally, as the age of marriage and childrearing differs greatly between countries. It has been raised as a concern particularly in developed nations.

Relatedness to the Transcendent Indicators

A common religion indicator is membership in a formal religious organization (e.g. the Catholic Church). However, in an age where an increasing number of people define themselves as “spiritual but not religious,” it is not easy to make the case that a drop in membership in organized religion means a decrease in relatedness to the transcendent. Relatedness to the transcendent can be measured, however, by frequency of prayer or to what extent a person considers God important in their life. For reasons of access to data I choose the indicator of what percentage of the population considers God very important.

Play Indicators

The one capability that lacks an indicator is play. The capacity for play is developed in childhood through ongoing engagement in play activities. Play could possibly be indicated by statistics on organized play activities or time in physical recreation in schools. However, extensive research resulted in some published reports but no systematic, regularly kept statistics on hours of physical education or recreation periods in schools.⁷⁴ Furthermore, while official statistics are maintained on the number of hours adults spend on sports and recreation,⁷⁵ there is no consensus on what the ideal number of hours should be, disabling this as an indicator.

⁷⁴ The U.S. Department of Education recognizes the lack of and need for national data on children’s time allocated on varying activities. Time spent on physical activities or play is not included in the published list of 43 key indicators of child welfare. *America’s Children: Key National Indicators of Wellbeing, 2009*, (U.S. Department of Education - Institute of Education Sciences, 2009), 12, <http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/index3.asp>.

⁷⁵ *American Time Use Survey*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statics), <http://www.bls.gov/tus/>.

Summary of Indicators

To summarize, there are twelve common good indicators representing thirteen human functioning capabilities. Most capabilities are indicated by more than one indicator, however. Table 1 shows the list of human functioning capabilities with their attendant indicators, showing how many indicators each capability has.

Table 1. Human Functioning Capabilities with Attendant Indicators

Human Functioning Capabilities		
1	Life	Infant mortality Uninsurance Poverty
2	Health	Uninsurance Poverty Carbon dioxide emissions
3	Bodily Integrity	Homicide Poverty
4	Senses, imagination and thought	High school drop-out
5	Emotions	Suicide
6	Practical reasoning	High school drop-out
7	Affiliation	Poverty Uninsurance
8	Other species and nature	Carbon dioxide emissions
9	Play and recreation	-
10	Control over environment	Voter turnout Poverty
11	Relationship to the transcendent	God very important
12	Raising children in a stable, supportive environment	Teen pregnancy
13	Work	Unemployment High School drop-out Poverty

As is apparent in Table 1, each human functioning capability has at least one indicator, and in many instances has several. The indicators themselves overlap, however – many indicators indicate more than one capability. Table 2 provides an unduplicated

list of indicators, correlated to the capabilities they represent. As is evident in this table, each indicator represents at least one human functioning capability, with most indicators pointing to the health of several capabilities.

Table 2. Common Good Indicators

	Indicator	Human Functioning Capabilities
1	Infant mortality	Life Health
2	Uninsurance	Life Health Affiliation
3	Homicide	Bodily integrity Life Health Affiliation
4	Family Income	Life Health Bodily integrity Control over environment Work Affiliation
5	Poverty	Life Health Bodily integrity Control over environment Work Affiliation
6	High school drop-out	Senses, imagination and thought Practical reason Work Affiliation
7	Suicide	Emotions Life
8	Carbon dioxide emissions	Other species and environment
9	Voter turnout	Control over environment
10	Unemployment	Work
11	Teenage birth rate	Raising children in a stable, supportive environment
12	God very important	Relatedness to the transcendent

Like the Index of Social Health, the Common Good Index is concerned with taking into account the wellbeing of all age groups – children, youth, adults and elderly. Some indicators, such as infant mortality or high school drop-out rates, indicate human capabilities for only one age group. Others indicate capabilities for two or three age groups; for example, unemployment indicates the capability of work for both youth and adults. Still others, such as food insecurity or poverty, indicate capabilities across all age groups. Table 3 shows the age groups for which data are pulled for each indicator. The age groups correspond to the affected groups as well, although it must be recognized that due to human interrelationality, all age groups are in the end affected by all problems. For example, while infant mortality indicates wellbeing for children, a child's death obviously and negatively affects a parent's wellbeing as well.

Table 3. Indicators: Correspondence to Age Groups

Indicator	Children	Youth	Adults	Elderly
1 Infant mortality	√			
2 Uninsured	√	√	√	
3 Family income	√	√	√	√
4 Homicide		√	√	√
5 Poverty	√	√	√	√
6 High school drop-outs		√		
7 Suicide		√	√	
8 Carbon dioxide emissions	√	√	√	√
9 Voter turnout		√	√	√
10 Unemployment			√	
11 Teenage birth rate	√	√		
12 God very important			√	√
Total # indicators	5	8	8	5

Calculating the Common Good Index Scores

The Common Good Index is set on a range of one to 100, with one 100 representing a Model Year. In the Index of Social Health, the Model Year does not reflect an actual calendar year's performance, but rather reflects a summation of each indicator's highest yearly (standardized) score since 1970.⁷⁶ The Model Year may include, for example, a 1989 score for one indicator and a 2005 score for another. For the application of the CGI in Chapter Four, I based the maximum value for any given indicator on the same year of the indicator value, because it was outside the scope of this work to determine scores for the past thirty years. However, I recommend for the future using a time series comparison, as in the Index of Social Health, for a fuller development of the Index.

To reach the total CGI score, first each indicator value is standardized into a number between one and ten, and then added. The sum is then described as a percentage of the total score possible and multiplied by 100, to reach a number between one and 100. The Common Good Index score, like the Index of Social Health score, is expressed by the following equation:

$$I = \frac{\sum \frac{1}{10} \frac{(MA_i - X_i)}{(MA_i - MI_i)}}{n \times 10} \times 100$$

where I = Index score

X_i = social indicator value for that year

MA_i = maximum value of X_i during Model Year

MI_i = minimum value of X_i during Model Year

⁷⁶ Miringoff and Opdycke, *America's Social Health: Putting Social Issues Back on the Public Agenda*, 71.

n = number of indicators.⁷⁷

As an example, if the highest high school drop-out rate is 23%, then 23% is scored at 0, because that is the worst performance. The lowest high school drop-out rate, 11%, is scored at 10, for best performance. A current year performance of 17%, which falls one-half of the way between the two numbers, would be scored at 5.0. To determine the overall Index score, that indicator's score is added to the other fifteen indicator scores and divided by 160 (16 indicators x 10 maximum points per score = 160), to reach a percentage of the total possible points. That percentage is then multiplied by 100 to reach a total Common Good Index score between 1 and 100.

The scale is relative to historical reality: when indicator scores reach new maximums, these new numbers inform a new Model Year score, creating a higher standard for comparison. Conversely, new lows create a lower standard for comparison. Relative scales have been criticized as being difficult to compare across years because of the “moving goalposts.”⁷⁸ However, the benefits of such a system outweigh the costs. As a relative scale, the CGI is compared against an achievable goal, one that has been already been realized in a given country. Furthermore, a relative scale enables a “meaningful basis of comparison” between nations and provides a pragmatic yardstick for progress or decline.⁷⁹ An Index that measures progress toward or away from previous

⁷⁷ This equation is based on the Index of Social Health. Marc L. Miringoff et al., "Monitoring the Nation's Social Performance: The Index of Social Health," in *Children, Families, and Government: Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Edward F. Zigler, Sharon Lynn Kagan, and Nancy W. Hall (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17, 29.

⁷⁸ The HDI originally employed a similarly relative scale, which it modified after such criticism. Stanton, *The Human Development Index: A History*, 18.

⁷⁹ Miringoff et al., "Monitoring the Nation's Social Performance: The Index of Social Health," 18.

societal “bests” provides a social reading that challenges the global community to bring less developed nations to higher standards of living and challenges developed nations to repeat and outdo what they has already shown themselves capable of.⁸⁰

Summary

The Common Good Index consists of twelve indicators that collectively measure the thirteen human functioning capabilities defined in Chapter Three. These indicators fit into seven criteria that maximize data availability and consistency, highlight important aspects of the human functioning capabilities, keep the index to a manageable size, and orient them toward the wellbeing of vulnerable populations in light of the preferential option for the poor. The Index score is a summation of standardized indicator scores that reflects to what extent the common good is being realized in society.

There is a precedent in Catholic tradition for the quantification of Catholic social principles in John Ryan’s quantification of the right to subsistence in the form of a proposal for a living wage, a proposal that included an actual set dollar amount. The Common Good Index constructed here follows Ryan’s example, quantifying the Catholic principle of the Common Good. In the next chapter, I apply the CGI to the issue of undocumented Mexican immigration to the United States, in order to evaluate its effects on the common good at all levels and develop an appropriate response to it.

⁸⁰ On a technical note, I investigated using a fixed scale for the Common Good Index but found it problematic because a fixed approach implicitly weights some indicators more heavily than others. To explain: the vast majority of indicators are scaled between one and one hundred. So teenage pregnancy is presented as number of births per 1,000 teenagers, the suicide rate is presented as the number of deaths per 100,000 people, and the voter turnout rate is expressed as a percentage of voters. In 2006, the teenage pregnancy rate was 10.1, the suicide rate 12.3 and the electoral participation rate 43.6. Because they are all scaled so differently from the start, to standardize them to a scale of 1-100 weights them randomly. In scaling them to actual historical possibilities instead, the scores become more evenly weighted. A relative scale provides a fairer representation of equality between indicators.

CHAPTER FOUR
APPLYING THE SPECIFIED COMMON GOOD APPROACH
TO THE U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUE

The Common Good Index measures the common good through measuring human functioning capabilities. In the last chapter I presented the methodology underlying the CGI and the rationale for the indicators chosen. In this chapter, I use the CGI to evaluate the impact on the common good of recent undocumented Mexican immigration trends and effects of relevant U.S. social policies. It is important to note that this evaluation not only assesses the effects of unauthorized Mexican migration itself, but also the effects of social policies affecting immigration and immigrants.

I begin this chapter by presenting and analyzing the CGI scores (see Appendices A through C for complete list of scores). I calculate the CGI scores at three levels: international (which includes both the United States and Mexico), national (for the U.S. and Mexico separately) and community (including African Americans, Latinos and undocumented Mexican immigrants). The international level represents the universal level, but in this analysis the International CGI Score encompasses data for the United States and Mexico only, because they are the two nations directly affected by my research question.

The international level of analysis takes precedence over more local units of analysis. Because of the universality of the common good, it is at this level that social

situations and our responses to them are ultimately judged.¹ However, more local levels of analysis are also important in order to bring to light and respond to threats to a particular population's human capabilities, which may be lost in a more general analysis. A tri-level analysis (international, national and community) enables one to develop a comprehensive response to threats to the human functioning capabilities of all affected groups. When threats are recognized at all three levels, strategies can be employed that will maximize the common good to a greater extent than if the common good is examined at the universal level alone. Furthermore, an ethical response that takes all three levels into account will more readily avoid a violation of the preferential option for the poor.

The preferential option for the poor focuses one's attention on vulnerable populations. In this study, it directs attention to the CGI scores of undocumented Mexicans and Mexican residents, and also of the Black and Latino U.S. populations. Blacks and Latinos are much poorer on average than the overall United States population, face disabling disparities in opportunities for education, work, health, and safety, and are more likely to be negatively affected by immigration.² When the threats to these communities are understood, they can be mitigated through focused efforts.

¹ See Pope John XXIII, "Pacem in Terris."

² The African-American population, for example, has infant mortality rates that rival those of some developing nations. Their infant mortality rate is 13.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, similar to infant mortality rates for Sri Lanka (15), Albania (14) and El Salvador (15). *United States: Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths per 1,000 Live Births) by Race/Ethnicity, Linked Files, 2004-2006*, (Kaiser Family Foundation Statehealthfacts.org), <http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=48&rgn=1&cat=2>. *Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 births)*, (The World Bank, 2010), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?order=wbapi_data_value_2009+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc (accessed January 30, 2011).

The CGI scores display the relative abilities of these different populations to achieve their basic human functioning capabilities. I discuss these scores at length below, but to briefly present the results, they show that a much higher percent of U.S. residents meet their basic human capabilities than Mexican residents, but they also show that African Americans and Latinos meet their basic capabilities at a rate that is significantly lower than the U.S. average: their scores fall halfway between the overall U.S. rate and Mexico's rate. Undocumented Mexican immigrants' rate of attainment of basic capabilities is somewhat higher than Mexico's, but falls far below the rate even of the overall U.S. Black and Latino populations.

After presenting the data for the Common Good Index at these different levels, I present recent findings regarding how recent undocumented Mexican immigration has affected the Index's indicators. Using available sociological and economic research, I estimate how the CGI scores would differ if the 6.7 million undocumented Mexican immigrants had not moved to the United States. Comparing this estimate to the real numbers allows for a judgment about whether recent undocumented Mexican immigration trends have increased or decreased the common good.

What is revealed through the CGI is that overall, undocumented Mexican immigration to the United States since 1980 has caused a small decline in the international common good. Furthermore, at the national level undocumented Mexican immigration has improved basic human capabilities for Mexican residents, but it has affected a slight decline in the ability of U.S. residents to achieve their basic capabilities.

At the community level, undocumented Mexican immigration has resulted in noteworthy improvements in human functioning for undocumented Mexican immigrants, and it yields highly significant generational improvements for the offspring of undocumented Mexicans. However, it has negatively affected the ability of low-income U.S. citizens to meet their basic capabilities. The negative effect on the average low-skilled U.S. worker is smaller than the positive effect on the average Mexican and undocumented Mexican immigrant, but because the U.S. population is so much larger than Mexico's population and the undocumented Mexican immigrant population combined, the overall effect on the international common good is negative.

As the final step in this chapter, in light of this data I develop some suggestions for an appropriate Christian response to undocumented Mexican immigration. This effort involves weighing improvements against declines in human functioning capabilities through the lens of solidarity with the poor – all the poor, and not only undocumented Mexicans. Among the recommendations forwarded, I argue that policies should be pursued that enable current rates of Mexican immigration to happen legally and that help to legalize currently undocumented Mexicans, but also that policies to improve the wages and working conditions of all workers should also be advocated by the Catholic Church as part of its immigration agenda.

International, National, and Community Common Good Index Scores

Before exploring the CGI scores, I first present a technical note to facilitate accurate understanding. I name the CGI indicators differently from the actual sociological

indicators used, in order to avoid the following confusion: with most indicators, a higher score is worse; you want to minimize, for example, the suicide rate. CGI indicators, however, measure attainment of human capability on a scale of one to 100, with 100 being the best score possible. To name the CGI indicator “Suicide” may mislead someone into interpreting a high score as a high suicide rate, which is the opposite of the intention. I have named the CGI Indicator in this case Emotional Wellbeing.³ Table 4 contains the names of the CGI indicators of human capabilities, with their corresponding measurements.

International and National CGI(P) Scores

The International CGI(P) score is 75.8 on a scale of one to one hundred. (See CGI(P) Scores, Table 5).⁴ In order to understand what that means, first remember that a CGI score reflects the extent to which people are or are not getting their *basic* needs met. Second, recall that the scale is relative, measured against international best and worst performance. Therefore, a score of 75.8 means that the U.S. and Mexico are collectively in the seventy-fifth percentile internationally in terms of ensuring minimum levels of human capabilities for their residents. The United States’ score is 80.9, which means that

³ I do not name the indicators by to the names of corresponding human capabilities, because of many indicators correspond to multiple capabilities.

⁴ Scores reflect 2006 figures. I use 2006 numbers rather than more recent numbers for two reasons. First, it is the year for which the most number of indicators is available. Data for more recent years is spotty, due to the length of time that it takes governmental bodies to report data. Secondly, later in this chapter I will compare these scores to hypothetical scores in an imagined absence of unauthorized immigration. The literature grounding that analysis uses data through the middle of the decade, but not through the end of the decade. Therefore, use of 2006 data allows for a better comparison. In some cases, I approximate 2006 data with data from 2005 or 2007, due to lack of 2006 data. See Appendix for CGI calculations and citations.

Table 4. CGI(P) Indicators and Corresponding Measurements⁵

Name of CGI(P) Indicator	Measurement Used
Electoral Participation	Voter Turnout
Education	High School Drop-out
Safety from Violence	Homicide
Household Income	Household Income
Infant Life	Infant Mortality
Emotional Wellbeing	Suicide
Age of Mother	Teenage Births
Health Insurance	Uninsurance

the United States is in the eightieth percentile internationally. It comes as no surprise that Mexico's CGI(P) score is significantly lower than that of the United States. Mexico's score of 61.4 shows the dramatically lower level of capabilities among Mexican residents than U.S. residents.

In order to understand the vast difference between these two countries CGI scores, I examine the differences in scores for each indicator (see Table 6). What we see

⁵ CGI(P) stands for the Partial Common Good Index; it is a subset of the CGI. Four of the twelve CGI indicators cannot be included in the calculations in this project due to the lack of information on that indicator for one or more of the various sub-groups. Discarding these indicators, I calculate what I call Partial Common Good Scores (CGI(P) Scores). The indicators that are used to calculate the CGI(P) scores are listed in Table 4.

Although the Partial Common Good Index depicts an incomplete picture of human functioning capabilities, it still includes the majority of the human capabilities toward which the common good is directed. Despite its limitations, the Partial Common Good Index provides information on the condition of enough of the human functioning capabilities to give a fair reading of the effect of recent immigration trends on the common good. It thus remains a valuable tool.

Table 5. CGI(P) Scores: International and National

	International (U.S. & Mexico Combined)	Mexico	United States
Electoral Participation	46.3	57.1	42.4
Education	78.0	33.7	93.5
Safety	90.2	84.6	92.2
Household Income	66.7	20.9	82.8
Infant Life	94.7	89.6	96.5
Emotional Wellbeing	75.5	87.7	71.1
Age of Mother	79.8	67.3	84.1
Health Insurance	75.3	50.2	84.2
CGI(P) Scores	75.8	64.1	80.9

is that Mexico lags behind the United States in eight out of the eleven indicators: infant mortality, uninsurance, homicide, poverty, household income, high school drop-outs, electoral participation, and teen birthrate. Particularly alarming are disparities in income and poverty. The poverty rate for Mexico is almost four times that of the United States: almost half of all Mexicans (47.0%) are impoverished, versus 12.3% of U.S. residents.⁶

The median family income is only thirty percent that of the United States, even in spite of

⁶ This striking difference alone explains the high immigration rates from Mexico. Mexico figures from *Mapas de Pobreza y Rezago Social 2005*, (CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social), 2007), <http://www.coneval.gob.mx/mapas/>. United States figures from Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., *Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008), 57, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf> (accessed January 18, 2011).

Table 6. Human Functioning Indicators: National⁷

	Mexico	United States
Electoral Participation ⁸	58.0	43.6
High School Drop-Out ⁹	66.7	11.0
Homicide ¹⁰	11.0	6.2
Household Income ¹¹	\$14,280	\$48,201
Infant Mortality ¹²	16.2	6.7
Suicide ¹³	4.3	12.3
Teenage Births ¹⁴	82.3	10.1
Uninsurance ¹⁵	49.8	41.9

the fact that Mexico's median family size (3.9) is almost twice that of the United States (2.3).¹⁶

⁷ See Appendix for a complete list of sources.

⁸ Percentage of voting-age population who voted in 2006 national elections.

⁹ United States figures reflects status drop-outs, or the percentage of people aged 18 – 25 who did not graduate from high school and are not currently enrolled. Mexico's figure reflects population aged 25-64 with less than an upper secondary school education.

¹⁰ Rate per 100,000 people.

¹¹ All numbers in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), with U.S. dollars as the standard.

¹² Per 1,000 live births.

¹³ Rate per 100,000 people.

¹⁴ Births per 1,000 women.

¹⁵ Percentage of population without personal or public health insurance.

¹⁶ Mexico's figures from *Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 2006*, (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2007), http://ceidas.org/documentos/Centro_Doc/Resultados_ENIGH_2006.pdf (accessed December 18, 2010). U.S. figures based on U.S. Census Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey, from *HIES - Household*

Although poverty is not included in the CGI(P) index, I discuss it briefly here due to its importance as an indicator. The difference in wages between the two countries seems stark, and yet the question is begged, "What can you buy with it?" The numbers reflected in the above table are in Purchasing Power Parity numbers, with U.S. dollars as the standard. This means that the dollars listed for Mexico can buy the same things as they would in the United States. The average Mexican family income is \$14,280, which is \$7,650 lower than the U.S. poverty line for a family of four of \$22,050.¹⁷ The U.S. poverty line itself is widely criticized as being too low, with advocates supporting a figure of poverty times two as a more accurate indication of whether a family earns the necessary income to pay for basic expenses.¹⁸ These facts lead to the conclusion that the average Mexican family lacks sufficient income to pay for their basic expenses.

Mexico's poverty rate, as measured by Mexican standards, is also much higher than the United States' poverty rate: 47 percent, versus 12 percent. Regarding poverty statistics, a frequently asked question is how comparable the poverty measurements are.

Income and Expenditure Statistics, (International Labor Organization Department of Statistics, 2010), <http://laborsta.ilo.org/> (accessed September 12, 2010).

¹⁷ *The 2009 HHS Poverty Guidelines*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010), <http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml>.

¹⁸ Gregory Acs and Pamela Loprest, "Who Are Low-Income Working Families?," (2005). Another study found that a family needs 1.5 to 3.5 times the poverty income to pay for their basic needs. Kinsey Alden Dinan, *Budgeting for Basic Needs*, (New York: National Center for Children in Poverty, Malman Center for Public Health, Columbia University, 2009), http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_858.pdf (accessed November 11, 2009). The U.S. poverty measurement was determined in 1965, when one-third of family budgets were spent on food. The U.S. poverty measure still equals an adequate food expenditure (based on consumer expenditure surveys), multiplied by three. However, food now constitutes only one-quarter of the average family budget, while child care and health care now constitute a larger share of the family budget. Efforts to change the poverty measurement have been happening since a government sponsored research study was commissioned in 1995. *Measuring Poverty: A New Approach*, ed. Constance F. Citro and Robert T. Michael (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995).

Mexico has a three-level definition of poverty: food-based poverty, capacity-based poverty and assets-based poverty.¹⁹ Mexico's 47 percent poverty rate reflects assets-based poverty, which is defined as the income below which a family cannot afford food, health, housing, transportation and education costs, even if 100 percent of their income is used exclusively on those goods and services.²⁰ This figure does seem to have a similar approximate value to the U.S. poverty figure.²¹

Poverty is one of the most important indicators, as poverty compromises one's ability to realize one's most basic capabilities. Although this number is not included in the CGI(P) calculation, household income serves as a proxy in the calculation. The data also demonstrate the well-documented correlation between poverty and education levels: Mexicans are much less likely to be educated than United States residents: Mexicans are six times less likely to complete high school: 66.7% of Mexicans failed to complete high school, versus 11.0% of U.S. residents.²² Mexicans are thus far less likely to have their basic intellectual capabilities realized.

¹⁹ *La Medición de la Pobreza y su Multidimensionalidad*, (Mexico, D.F.: Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), 2006), 7, <http://www.coneval.gob.mx/>.

²⁰ Expenses are calculated according to consumer expenditure surveys. Ibid.

²¹ In response to criticism that the U.S. poverty line is too low, the U.S. Census Bureau has created three different alternative poverty calculations, all of which are based in a true expense- and income-based methodology. These alternative calculations take in-kind governmental assistance into account, so they do not reflect how many families earn enough to sustain themselves without government help. However, they do reflect how many families are meeting their basic needs through a combination of income and governmental assistance. These alternative poverty measurements result in even lower poverty rates than the traditional formula. Joe Dalaker, *Alternative Poverty Estimates in the United States: 2003*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005), <http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-227.pdf>.

²² Mexican figure reflects the percentage of Mexican residents aged 25-64 who did not complete upper secondary school. *Country Statistical Profiles 2010: Mexico*, (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx>. U.S. figure reflects "status drop-outs," or number of U.S. residents aged 18 – 24 who did not complete or are not enrolled in high school. *High*

Other indicators also demonstrate inequality in capabilities between Mexican and U.S. residents: Mexico has significantly two to three times higher, infant mortality, teen pregnancy, homicide and uninsurance rates. Infants in Mexico are more than twice as likely to die as infants in the U.S. (16.2 infants per 1,000 live births, versus 6.7).²³ Contributing to higher rates of infant mortality, poverty and high-school drop-outs, teens in Mexico are twice as likely to bear children as teens in the United States, with 82.1 births per 1,000 young women versus 41.9 in the U.S.²⁴ And people in Mexico are almost twice as likely to die from homicide (11.0 homicides per 100,000 people, versus 6.2 in the U.S.).²⁵ Adding to the threat to basic health and life is lack of health insurance: almost half of the Mexican population is uninsured, over three times the U.S. rate (49.8%, versus 15.8% for the U.S.).²⁶

School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau), <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/education.html>

<http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0262.pdf>. The OECD Country Statistical Profiles 2010 reports that the number of U.S. residents who failed to complete high school is 12.1, which is slightly higher than the U.S. census bureau number. However, I use the U.S. Census Bureau statistics, because it is then possible to compare the overall U.S. numbers to those of Latinos and African Americans.

²³ "OECD Health Data 2009 - Selected Data: Health status (Mortality)," in *OECD.Stat Extracts* (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)), http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/0,3352,en_2825_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.

²⁴ U.S. figure from *U.S. Teenage Pregnancies, Births and Abortions: National and State Trends and Trends by Race and Ethnicity*, (Guttmacher Institute, 2010), 7, <http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/USTPTrends.pdf>. Mexico figure from *Adolescent Birth Rate, per 1,000 Women*, (United Nations, 2010), <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx> (accessed December 20, 2010).

²⁵ Mexican figures from *Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2005 - 2006*, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), 4, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2010). U.S. figures from *Deaths: Final Data for 2006* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Disease Control, 2009), 5, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf (accessed January 30, 2011).

²⁶ Mexican statistics from Secretaria de Salud de Mexico, *Indicadores Basicos de Salud, 2000-2004*, (Mexico, D.F.: Organización Panamericana de la Salud: Oficina Regional de la Organización

It is interesting that while Mexico's overall CGI(P) score is close to 20 points lower than the United States, Mexico still shows better performance in two indicators measured in the Partial Common Good Index, namely suicide and electoral participation. In Mexico the voter participation rate is 58 percent, versus 43.6 percent for the United States.²⁷ And Mexico's suicide rate is almost three times lower than that of the United States (3.4 suicides per 100,000 people, versus 10.1).²⁸ Mexico's relatively low suicide rate is interesting in light of the fact that Mexicans suffer many more deprivations than United States residents. A cross-cultural study of emotional health would have to be done to demonstrate the reasons for this anomalous finding.

While these facts are not insignificant, they still do not change the fact that Mexico's overall CGI(P) score is markedly lower than that of the United States. This forms part of the basis of why Mexicans migrate to the United States: to seek a better life.²⁹ However, the picture changes somewhat when comparing social conditions in Mexico with social conditions in the United States in the African American and Latino

Mundial de la Salud), <http://sinais.salud.gob.mx/indicadores/> (accessed January 30, 2011). U.S. Statistics from DeNavas-Walt et al., *Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007*, 22.

²⁷ Mexico figure from *Eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Federal Electoral, 2010), <http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/OE/participacion2006/reportes/circ.html> (accessed January 30, 2011). U.S. figure from *Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau), <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html>.

²⁸ "OECD Health Data 2009 - Selected Data: Health status (Mortality)."

²⁹ Various migration theories account for a multiplicity of reasons why people migrate. Economic push factors (e.g. poverty or political instability) form one important set of reasons. Other reasons include the "pull" factor of jobs in the host country, such as labor demand or social capital that facilitates ease of migration, e.g. relationships with other migrants already residing in the host country. For a good overview of migration theories, see Massey et al., *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*, 9-23.

communities, and in comparing the capabilities of undocumented Mexican immigrants with their Mexican counterparts.

African American and Latino Common Good Index Scores: 2006

While the United States' population as a whole far surpasses Mexico in basic attainment of human functioning capabilities, this wellbeing is not equally shared by all groups. The indicator scores for minorities in the United States fall quite short of the overall U.S. scores. This is true for the African American and Latino communities, and it is certainly true of the undocumented Mexican immigrant community, whose scores I will discuss in more detail in the next subsection (see Table 7). The African American Community CGI(P) score is 72.9, eight points below the national average. The Latino Community CGI(P) score is even lower, at 70.2. Both scores fall about half way between Mexico's and the United States' National Common Good Index scores. The score for undocumented Mexican immigrants is even lower than for Latinos and African Americans, at 63.4.

Examining individual CGI(P) scores, it is troubling that in almost all indicators African Americans and U.S. Latinos lag behind U.S. whites (see Table 8). African Americans rank worse than the U.S. national average in every indicator but one. Needless to say, these statistics reflect great disparities within the nation. The Black infant mortality rate (13.5) stands over twice the national U.S. rates (6.7).³⁰ Even more

³⁰ *Unemployed Persons by Marital Status, Race, Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, Age and Sex*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Labor Statistics, 2007), <ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat24.pdf> (accessed January 14, 2011).

alarming, Black homicides stand at four times the national rate (23.6 deaths per 100,000, versus 6.2). Blacks are 29% more likely to be uninsured,³¹ 18% more likely to drop out of high school,³² 9% less likely to vote,³³ and 52% more likely to give birth as a teenager.³⁴

Table 7. CGI(P) Scores

	International (U.S. & Mexico Combined)	Mexico	United States	African America ns	Latinos	Undoc. Mexican Immigra nts
Electoral Participation	46.3	57.1	42.4	37.3	17.7	0.0
Education	78.0	33.7	93.5	91.4	77.2	61.4
Safety	90.2	84.6	92.2	70.1	89.9	90.4
Household Income	66.7	20.9	82.8	53.1	63.7	60.5
Infant Life	94.7	89.6	96.5	91.5	97.4	97.9
Emotional Wellbeing	75.5	87.7	71.1	85.4	82.9	86.6
Age of Mother	79.8	67.3	84.1	75.1	67.0	60.4
Health Insurance	75.3	50.2	84.2	79.5	65.9	50.0
CGI(P) Score*	75.8	61.4	80.9	72.9	70.2	63.4

³¹ DeNavas-Walt et al., *Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007*, 22. You can use 2009 data now - it is easily available online.

³² *High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007*.

³³ *Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008*.

³⁴ *Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0084.pdf> (accessed May 25, 2010).

Table 8. Human Functioning Indicators: National and Minority Populations³⁵

	Mexico	United States	African Americans	Latinos	Undocumented Immigrants
Electoral participation ³⁶	58.0	43.6	38.6	19.3	0.0
High School Drop-Out ³⁷	66.7	11.0	13.0	26.2	40.9
Homicide ³⁸	11.0	6.2	23.6	8.0	7.6
Household Income ³⁹	\$14,280	\$48,201	\$31,969	\$37,781	\$36,000
Infant Mortality ⁴⁰	16.2	6.7	13.5	5.5	4.9
Suicide ⁴¹	4.3	10.1	5.1	6.0	4.7
Teenage Births ⁴²	82.3	41.9	63.7	83.0	99.0
Uninsurance ⁴³	49.8	15.8	20.5	34.1	50.0

It is furthermore troubling that some African American indicators are lower not only than the U.S. as a whole but than Mexico as well. The African American community fares considerably worse, for example, than both the Mexico and U.S. averages in

³⁵ See Appendix for sources.

³⁶ Percentage of voting-age population who voted in 2006 national elections.

³⁷ United States figures reflects status drop-outs, or the percentage of people aged 18 – 25 who did not graduate from high school and are not currently enrolled. Mexico's figure reflects population aged 25-64 with less than an upper secondary school education.

³⁸ Rate per 100,000 people.

³⁹ All numbers in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), with U.S. dollars as the standard.

⁴⁰ Per 1,000 live births.

⁴¹ Rate per 100,000 people.

⁴² Births per 1,000 women.

⁴³ Percentage of population without personal or public health insurance.

homicide rates. African Americans are almost four times as likely as the U.S. average to die of homicide, with 23.6 homicides per 100,000 people, versus 6.2.⁴⁴ And they are twice as likely to die from homicide as Mexicans, who suffer 11.0 homicides per 100,000 people. In addition, Blacks suffer a poor infant mortality rate in comparison to Mexico: infant mortality among African Americans is 13.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, which is close to Mexico's 16.2.⁴⁵

The African American community performs better than the U.S. overall in one indicator: suicide. The suicide rate in the African American community is 5.1 deaths per 100,000 people, versus 13.9 for the overall U.S. population. Blacks fare better than Mexicans in this regard as well: the Mexican suicide rate is 6.0.⁴⁶

Overall, Blacks fare worse than the average U.S. resident but better than Mexicans. The Latino CGI(P) scores show a similar dynamic. In comparison to the national average U.S. Latinos are two or more times as likely to be uninsured,⁴⁷ give birth as a teenager⁴⁸ or drop out of high school.⁴⁹ They are 1.7 times as likely to be impoverished,⁵⁰ 1.3 times as likely be unemployed and 1.29 times as likely to be a victim

⁴⁴ *Deaths: Final Data for 2006*

⁴⁵ *United States: Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths per 1,000 Live Births) by Race/Ethnicity, Linked Files, 2004-2006.*

⁴⁶ "WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2006," (United States Center for Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2009), http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html.

⁴⁷ *Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007*, 22.

⁴⁸ *Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007.*

⁴⁹ *High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007.*

⁵⁰ *Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007*, 57.

of a homicide than the U.S. average.⁵¹ Their median family income is only three-quarters of the U.S. average.⁵² While these numbers are worse than the overall U.S. scores, they are better than Mexico's scores: U.S. Latino poverty, high school drop-out and homicide rates are all approximately 40% lower than Mexico's, and their income is two and half times that of Mexico.

One area in which U.S. Latinos fare worse than both the U.S. and Mexico is electoral participation. Only 19.3 percent of Latinos voted in the 2006 election, versus 56 percent for the U.S. overall and 73 percent for Mexico.⁵³ Another area in which U.S. Latinos score worse than Mexico is mental wellbeing: 6 suicides per 100,000 persons. This score is worse than Mexico's (4.3), but better than that of the United States (13.9). One area in which Latinos fare better than the U.S. average is infant mortality. The infant mortality rate is 5.5, eighteen percent lower than the United States' 6.7, and two-thirds lower than Mexico's rate of 16.2.⁵⁴

The vast majority of the indicator scores for the Latino and African American communities in the U.S. are lower than the overall U.S. scores, reflecting unequal opportunities for the different communities and the challenges these communities have in meeting their basic needs. However, the well being of both groups, as indicated by the

⁵¹ *Deaths: Final Data for 2006* 68.

⁵² *Money Income of Families—Median Income by Race and Hispanic Origin in Current and Constant (2007) Dollars: 1990 to 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0681.pdf> (accessed November 25, 2010).

⁵³ *Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008*.

⁵⁴ U.S. data from *Deaths: Final Data for 2006* Mexican data from *Country Statistical Profiles 2010: Mexico*.

CGI(P) scores, exceeds that of Mexico. This is significant to the immigration debate in that it suggests that Mexicans are the group most at risk, which therefore suggests that it is in the interest of the universal common good to enable Mexicans to migrate to the United States in order to improve their abilities to meet their basic needs. This supposition can be tested by examining the impact of undocumented Mexican migration on the Common Good Index score. A specified common good approach requires, however, a more comprehensive look at how capabilities of many groups are affected by immigration, which I provide below.

Relative Capability Levels and the Preferential Option for the Poor

With an overall CGI(P) score of 70.2, Latinos suffer impediments to their basic human capabilities at a much lower rate than the average U.S. citizens (80.9). African Americans suffer similarly low levels of capability, although the disparities are not quite as pronounced (72.9). These differences are important to note, because they suggest that Black and Latino populations are deserving of solidarity and should be included in the preferential option for the poor.

However, both groups have higher capabilities than Mexicans. What does this mean in light of the preferential option for the poor? Does it mean that only Mexicans are deserving of solidarity, because they are the *most* needy? Certainly, the preferential option for the poor calls for special concern for the most vulnerable populations. As such, the Mexican population as a whole merits this concern. However, the option for the poor requires special concern for all vulnerable populations. The African American and Latino

communities CGI(P) scores show that those communities are at risk communities. There is a subsection even of those populations that is very economically and socially marginalized: unskilled workers, who are disproportionately Black and Latino, and who are the citizens most affected by immigration.⁵⁵ In 2009, high school dropouts in the United States earned an average of \$23,608 annually, versus \$53,248 for college graduates with Bachelors degrees. This income still far exceeds Mexico's. And yet, the average income needed in the U.S. to supply basic necessities for one parent and one child is \$32,241 a year.⁵⁶ True, the United States has many social programs, including food and shelter programs, which supplement low incomes to supply basic necessities. However, many poor people are not poor enough to qualify for those programs. For example, in order to qualify for food stamps, a family must earn less than 130% of poverty guidelines, which for a family of two equals \$18,948. Families earning over that amount but less than \$32,241 annually cannot receive that subsidy, and yet do not earn enough to cover their basic costs.

With this picture in mind, it becomes clearer to recognize that the defense of poor and marginalized people must extend to all who suffer from such vulnerable circumstances, regardless of their country of origin. It is insufficient to promote solidarity only with the people whose capabilities are *most* compromised; rather, solidarity must be

⁵⁵ I would have created CGI(P) scores for poor U.S. residents in particular, but could not due to data constraints. The African American and Latino communities stand as a sort of proxy for poor America, even though I recognize that there are notable segments of both communities who are not poor.

⁵⁶ Necessities include food, shelter, child care, transportation to and from work, healthcare and taxes. In addition, the Basic Family Budget Calculator adds a small percentage for other necessities such as clothing, entertainment, personal products and educational materials. *Basic Family Budget Calculator*, (Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute), http://www.epi.org/pages/budget_calculator_intro/.

extended to *all* people who suffer from the inability to meet their basic capabilities.

Solutions must be informed by a mutual solidarity.

Effects of Recent Immigration Trends on the Common Good

The issues of mutual solidarity and the vulnerability of low-income people in the U.S. arise when considering the effects of immigration on the common good. In this section I analyze what kind of effect immigration has had on the common good through examining the impact of recent immigration trends have had on the Common Good Index at all three levels: international, national and community. Much research has been performed on how immigration has affected a variety of social indicators, including most of the indicators composing the Common Good Index. I use this research to compare actual indicator scores to theoretical scores in the counterfactual absence of immigration. A correct response is based in part on what happens at the universal level. If the international Common Good Index score improves as a result of recent undocumented Mexican immigrant flows and U.S. response to it, then this immigration and the U.S. response to it have benefited the common good. If it declines as a result of recent undocumented Mexican immigration, then the common good has been harmed. A correct response also depends on trends at the national and community levels, however. Only through understanding local dynamics can an effective strategy to improve human functioning capabilities be devised.

I wish to underscore here that I am evaluating not only recent undocumented immigration from Mexico, but also the U.S. response to it. Many factors go into creating

a given situation, and all parties bear some responsibility for the results – the United States, Mexico, immigrants and U.S. citizens. Yes, undocumented Mexican immigrants' actions affect the quality of life of those around them, but governmental policies greatly affect the abilities of individuals and their families to achieve basic levels of human functioning. CST recognizes the primacy of the human person and the natural right to obtain conditions to live with dignity, even if it means migrating. It is important to avoid “blaming the victim” and instead view the situation holistically. Is poverty the fault of the individual, the employer that pays a non-living wage, or the government who fails to create or enforce living wage laws? Solidarity requires a social analysis that investigates systemic causes of problems, so that systemic solutions may be sought to benefit the many persons involved. A common good analysis requires analysis of social sin, which is what I undertake in this work.

Furthermore, the social analysis and recommendations I forward below pertain to United States' (rather than Mexican) policies, as do the solutions I forward. Just as the parable of the Good Samaritan challenges its listeners to be good neighbors to the stranger, U.S. citizens must ask themselves how to be good neighbors to immigrants.⁵⁷ The correct ethical orientation toward immigrants is one of neighbor, and the implication for social ethics is that U.S. citizens must focus on what the United States can do to promote the wellbeing of immigrants, rather than focusing on what others should do

⁵⁷ William R. O'Neill and William C. Spohn, "Rights of Passage: The Ethics of Immigration and Refugee Policy," *Theological Studies* 59, no. 1 (1998).

differently. Hence, I focus my investigation on what the United States can do to promote human functioning capabilities.

In this section, I first review the effect of undocumented Mexican immigration on the International CGI(P) and then delve more closely into the internal dynamics, investigating the changes to the CGI(P) scores at the national and community levels. To briefly present the results, recent immigration trends have caused some decline in the international CGI score (a difference of zero to 0.2 points, on the 100 point CGI scale).⁵⁸ (See Table 9.) The relatively small scale of the decline to the universal common good suggests that the ethical evaluation must rely more heavily on what happens to the common good at lower levels – national and community.

To review the changes at the national and community levels: Mexico's CGI score definitely improves as a result of immigration, by 0.5 points, and undocumented immigrants improve their CGI score by 2 points. The human capabilities of United States citizens declines, however, as a result of recent immigration trends. Recent undocumented Mexican immigration in light of U.S. policies has caused a 0.2- and 0.5-point reduction in the CGI score for U.S. citizens overall, and up to a 0.2- or 0.3-point reduction for African Americans and Latinos, respectively.⁵⁹ These findings, and what they mean, are discussed below, beginning with undocumented Mexican immigrants.

⁵⁸ One factor that complicates the conclusions is the lack of consensus among economists regarding the effect of immigration on U.S. wages. I thus present the CGI(P) scores as ranges, in order to incorporate the differing economic conclusions into my analysis.

⁵⁹ I use the term U.S. citizen as shorthand to refer to all U.S. residents except undocumented Mexican immigrants. The CGI score for this group of people was determined by subtracting undocumented immigrants from the equation. This group thus includes not only U.S. citizens, but immigrants – including

Table 9. Changes to International CGI(P) Scores Resulting from Immigration

	Current State: International CGI(P) Score, with Immigration	International CGI(P) Score, in Absence of Immigration
Electoral Participation	46.3	47.3
Education	78.0	78.2
Safety	90.2	90.1
Household Income	66.7	64.9-66.6
Infant Life	94.7	94.6
Emotional Wellbeing	75.5	75.5
Age of Mother	79.8	80.4
Health Insurance	75.3	75.3
CGI(P) Scores*	75.8	75.8 – 76.0

Immigration's Effects on Undocumented Mexican Immigrants

Even though undocumented Mexican immigration's effect on the international common good is unclear, changes to the common good at lower levels are less ambiguous. In comparing between the scenarios "with immigration" and "without immigration," the data yields at least one expected result: that through migrating Mexicans are able to increase their wellbeing, even in spite of their undocumented status in the U.S. (see Table 10). The CGI(P) score for undocumented Mexican immigrants

undocumented immigrants from other countries. While I recognize the philosophical limitations of referring to this broad group as citizens, it would be unreasonably cumbersome to constantly describe this complex grouping of people.

(63.4) is 2 points higher than the CGI(P) score for Mexico (61.4), indicating that Mexicans achieve their basic capabilities at a higher rate through immigration.

The overall improvement is less dramatic than I expected. I had hypothesized that the CGI(P) scores of undocumented Mexican immigrants would be closer to those of the African American and Latino communities. In seeking an explanation for why in the data, I find that immigration has a mixed effect for immigrants. Four indicators improve for immigrants over their counterparts in Mexico (Income, Safety from Violence, Infant Life, and Education), yet two remain fairly constant (Emotional Wellbeing and Health Insurance) and two decline greatly (Age of Mother and Electoral Participation). The most dramatic increase in capabilities for undocumented Mexican immigrants is in household income, whose CGI(P) score rises from 20.9 to 60.5. Significantly, the average income of an undocumented Mexican family in the United States is 2.6 times that of Mexican residing in Mexico: \$36,000 versus \$14,280.⁶⁰ This rise in income takes undocumented immigrants out of poverty.

Education levels also increase dramatically for undocumented Mexicans over their Mexican peers. The high school drop-out rate in Mexico is 66.7 percent, but it is only 40.9 percent for undocumented migrants in the United States. This number in part reflects the fact that undocumented Mexican immigrants are more highly educated than their Mexican counterparts. However, it also reflects increasing education among young undocumented Mexicans: when only undocumented youth are considered, the drop-out

⁶⁰ As noted above, the Mexican figure is in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which is standardized to the U.S. and reflects U.S. purchasing power.

Table 10. Effects of Immigration on Mexican/Immigrant CGI(P) Scores

	In Theoretical Absence of Immigration	Current State: With Immigration	
	Mexico's CGI(P)	Undocumented Immigrants' CGI(P)	Mexico's CGI(P)
Electoral Participation	57.1	0.0	57.1
Education	33.7	61.4	33.7
Safety from Violence	84.6	90.4	84.6
Household Income	16.8	60.5	20.9
Infant Life	89.6	97.9	89.6
Emotional Wellbeing	88.0	86.6	87.7
Age of Mother	67.3	60.4	67.3
Health Insurance	50.2	50.0	50.2
CGI(P)	60.9	63.4	61.4

rate dives to 33 percent, 7 points lower than the official 40.9 figure, and 10 ten points lower than Mexico.⁶¹ The number is even lower for students who arrived at a younger age.⁶² Furthermore, educational attainment rises generationally: second-generation Latino youth drop out at a rate of only 8.5 percent and third- and higher-generation youth drop

⁶¹ Figure for foreign-born Latino youth between the ages of 18 and 24. *Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), 48-49, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/117.pdf> (accessed November 5, 2010).

⁶² Ibid. Also, see this 1990 national study showing the correlation between age of immigration on high school drop-out rates: Charles Hirschman and Jennifer C. Lee, "Race and Ethnic Inequality in Educational Attainment in the United States," in *Ethnicity and Causal Mechanisms*, ed. Michael Rutter and Martha Tienda (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

out at a rate of 11.6 percent, only one-third the first-generation rate.⁶³ This indicator, while reflecting significant change to educational levels for immigrants, masks how large the educational effect is.

Another capability that improves greatly for undocumented Mexicans is life, which is reflected in a lower infant mortality rate for Mexican immigrants (4.9 deaths per 1,000 live births, which is less than one-third that of Mexico's (16.2)).⁶⁴ The infant mortality rate among Mexican immigrant women is also lower than that of white women (who have a higher socio-economic status) in the U.S., prompting scholars to investigate the reason for the anomaly. While they have not found it, they have at least demonstrated that the remarkably low mortality rate does *not* stem from selective migration. In other words, the causes can be found in the conditions of the immigrant women's lives in the United States.⁶⁵

⁶³ A comparison of generational differences in 2009 high school drop-out rates is found in *Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America*. Those numbers, which are generated by Pew from Census reports on drop-out rates for 16-24 year olds, are quite different from Census reports. In order to maintain consistency with other drop-out rates used in this dissertation, rather than using those numbers directly, I apply the Pew differential to Census generated 2006 status drop-out rates for 18-24 year olds. *High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007*.

⁶⁴ Robert A. Hummer et al., "Paradox Found (Again): Infant Mortality among the Mexican-Origin Population in the United States," *Demography* 44, no. 3 (2007), *OECD Health Data 2009 - Selected Data: Health status (Mortality)*, (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx>. Data is at times unavailable for the undocumented Mexican community alone, which is true of infant mortality. In this case, infant mortality among Mexican-born women serves as an approximation of mortality rates among undocumented Mexican immigrant women. The undocumented comprise approximately 60 percent of all Mexican immigrants in the United States, but over 80 percent of all Mexican immigrants either are or were undocumented at one time. Only 22 percent of Mexican immigrants in the United States are naturalized citizens. *Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States: 2006*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Institute, 2008), <http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/factsheet.php?FactsheetID=35>, Passel and Cohn, *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*.

⁶⁵ Hummer et al., "Paradox Found (Again): Infant Mortality among the Mexican-Origin Population in the United States."

Safety from violence also improves for those who migrate; the homicide rate among undocumented Mexican immigrants is 7.6, versus Mexico's 11.0.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, this indicator does not capture another important characteristic of the capability of bodily integrity: physical safety on the job. Latinos die on the job at a 23 percent higher rate than whites and a 14 percent higher rate than African Americans.⁶⁷ Nonetheless, homicide, as an indicator of safety from violence, presents valuable information about the additional capacity undocumented immigrants have gained in this important aspect of bodily integrity.

While these four indicators improve greatly, yet another remains essentially unchanged for undocumented Mexicans over Mexican residents: the health insurance rate. Fifty percent of undocumented Mexicans lack health insurance.⁶⁸ The high rate of uninsurance of undocumented Mexican immigrants is over three times the U.S. average because they are concentrated in temporary and low-wage positions whose uninsurance

⁶⁶ Singh shows that foreign-born Latinos are 0.95 times as likely to die from homicide as native-born Latinos. While admittedly there will be differences between different origin-groups, Mexicans comprise 70% of the foreign-born population, so this statistic serves as an approximation. Gopal K. Singh and Robert A. Hiatt, "Trends and Disparities in Socioeconomic and Behavioural Characteristics, Life Expectancy, and Cause-Specific Mortality of Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations in the United States, 1979–2003," *International Journal of Epidemiology* 35 (2006).

⁶⁷ Hours based fatality rate. *Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) - Current and Revised Data*, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010), <http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#2009> (accessed January 19, 2010).

⁶⁸ *Statistical Profiles of the Hispanic and Foreign-Born Populations in the U.S.: 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010), <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=120> (accessed January 30, 2011).

rate exceeds the average, and because they are ineligible for public health insurance programs.⁶⁹

Furthermore, three other indicators decline. The suicide rate for undocumented Mexican immigrants is about ten percent worse than for Mexican residents (4.3 versus 4.7).⁷⁰ The teenage birth rate is twenty percent worse: an estimated 99 births per 1,000 among first generation Latino immigrants, much higher than Mexico's rate of 82.1.⁷¹ And electoral participation drops to zero, because undocumented immigrants do not have voting rights in the United States and cannot therefore exercise their right to political participation. One of the grave problems facing undocumented immigrants is that there is no way for most of them to become legalized and gain the right to vote.⁷² This lack of a pathway to citizenship perpetuates the violation of the human capability of political

⁶⁹ Ibid, "Medicaid Eligibility: Are You Eligible?," U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidEligibility/02_AreYouEligible_.asp#TopOfPage (accessed January 19, 2011).

⁷⁰ Singh and Hiatt, "Trends and Disparities," 914.

⁷¹ Numbers calculated from a study that showed that while 26% of foreign-born Latinas between the ages of 18 and 19 have children, only 16% of second-generation and 21% of third-generation Latinos have children. *Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America*, 69.

⁷² U.S. immigration policy sets a ceiling of 20,000 immigration visa per country per year, so there is little chance of winning the legal right to enter. Massey et al., *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*, 43. For an immigrant who has entered illegally, pathways to legalization are extremely limited. There are three ways of becoming legal: through having an employer file for a work visa for you, marrying a U.S. citizen, or having your adult U.S. citizen son or daughter petition for you. The first avenue is expensive and time consuming for employers, who find it easier to just hire undocumented immigrants. Even if a person can petition for a green card through one of the two latter mechanisms, she must apply from Mexico, because according to the Immigration Reform Act of 1996. U.S. law anyone found residing illegally in the U.S. must be deported and is banned from entering legally for 10 years. Conversation with Jose Manuel Ventura, Director of Legal Services, Centro Romero (Chicago: January 19, 2011).

control over one's environment and leaves them in a political limbo.⁷³ Legislation has been put forward in recent years to enable undocumented immigrants to “earn” legalization through living here a certain number of years, contributing to the tax base, and avoiding criminal activity.⁷⁴ Such legislation would certainly rectify the violation of capability in this area. This and other recommendations are presented below.

In sum, the higher CGI(P) for undocumented Mexican immigrants over their Mexican counterparts owes to improvements in family income and in the drop-out, infant mortality and homicide rates. The vast improvements in these areas are muted by weakened voting, suicide and teenage birth rates. The net effect is positive, however, and this positive effect becomes even stronger if generational improvement is examined. The Common Good Index figures reflect one immediate point in time, so it captures the immediate effects of immigration. Immigrants move, however, in order to benefit not only themselves but their children and grandchildren. Research on second- and third-generation Latino immigrants demonstrates that subsequent generations fare significantly better than the immigrant generation as they integrate into U.S. society, and that they

⁷³ Another argument for the right to vote comes from Michael Walzer, who has argued from a communitarian perspective that guest workers who supply needed labor for the host country are de facto members of society, and as such should be given a political voice. While undocumented immigrants are not formally guest workers, they serve the same role in society, and the “pull” factors described in the Introduction suggest that United States immigration policy is not as uniformly pro-enforcement (of immigration laws) as much public rhetoric makes it out to be. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

⁷⁴ See, for example, *Earned Legalization and Family Unification Act of 2003*, 108th Congress, H.R. 3271, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-3271> (accessed January 21, 2011).

catch up and even surpass the U.S. average.⁷⁵ Over time, immigrant families improve their CGI(P) scores dramatically, with successive generations born to undocumented Mexican families reaching almost ten points higher than Mexico (70.2 score for U.S. born Latinos, versus 61.4 score for Mexico).

Immigration's Effects on Mexican Residents

The Partial Common Good Index shows that undocumented Mexican immigrants have benefited overall from their decision to migrate. Mexican residents have benefited as well, as demonstrated in a rise of Mexico's CGI(P) score from 60.9 to 61.4. The improvement in this score is due almost entirely to income.

There are two ways that Mexico's income rises as a result of migration. The first is through remittance income, or income sent to Mexican residents by immigrants abroad. Remittance income accounts for 7.3 percent of Mexico's income.⁷⁶ In fact, Mexico receives more money in remittances than it does in foreign investment income.⁷⁷ Mexican income would therefore decline by 7.3 percent overall in the absence of

⁷⁵ Income, unemployment and educational indicators improve greatly for the second generation. These indicators tend to be slightly worse for the third generation than for the second, but third-generation levels still far exceed that of the first-generation immigrants themselves and approximate U.S. Latino averages. See discussion on high-school drop-outs, above, and see Rakesh Kochhar, *Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: The Latino Experience in Recession and Recovery*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2003), 32, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/21.pdf> (accessed January 19, 2011). For a discussion on wages and educational attainment of second-generation immigrants, see David Card, "Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?," *The Economic Journal* 115, no. 507 (2005).

⁷⁶ Given that 80 percent of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. entered illegally (see fn 66), remittances are mostly due to undocumented immigration. Remittance figure from *Informe Anual*, (Mexico, D.F.: Banco de Mexico, 2007), <http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/informes-periodicos/anual/{4EF1BFA3-67A1-F187-0DB0-1243591806B5}.pdf>. Total income figure from *Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 2006*.

⁷⁷ Dilip Ratha, "Remittances in Development," *Finance and Development* 46, no. 4 (2009).

immigration. The decline in income to migrant-sending families would be much more severe. Remittances to Mexico have reduced food-based poverty by 50 percent and capabilities-based poverty by 30 percent.⁷⁸ In their absence the ability of very poor families to afford food and health care services would be severely compromised.

The second factor that causes in a rise in income for Mexican residents due to immigration is the reduction in workforce. Immigration caused a 10 percent reduction in the Mexico workforce between 1970 and 2000, and research shows that this out-migration of labor resulted in an 8 percent rise in Mexican wages.⁷⁹ Between this factor and remittances, Mexico's income would drop by 15% in the absence of immigration, an alarmingly high number for an already impoverished population.

Another area of improvement for Mexicans resulting from immigration is in infant mortality. Infants in migrant-sending households are 3 percent less likely to die

⁷⁸ Remittances relieve poverty only up to a certain point, however, causing no reduction in asset-based poverty, the measure used in this study. Gerardo Esquivel and Alejandra Huerta-Pineda, *Remittances and Poverty in Mexico: A Propensity Score Matching Approach*, http://cloud2.gdnet.org/cms.php?id=research_paper_abstract&research_paper_id=11248 (accessed December 20, 2010). Food based poverty reflects the income under which a family cannot afford enough food, even if 100% of its income were spent on food. Capacity-based poverty reflects the income under which a family cannot afford food, education, and health expenditures, although 100% of its income were spent on those costs. *La Medicion de la Pobreza y su Multidimensionalidad*.

⁷⁹ Prachi Mishra, "Emigration and Wages in Source Countries: Evidence from Mexico," *Journal of Development Economics* 82, no. 1 (2007): 181.

than in non-migrant households.⁸⁰ This improvement in infant health is due to increased income from remittances and to improved health behaviors.⁸¹

In spite of the overall positive benefits accruing to Mexican residents as a result of immigration, immigration has had mixed effects on Mexico, just as it has had uneven effects on immigrants. Although Mexico benefits economically and health-wise, the disruption in family relationships due to immigration causes emotional strife that seriously affects the suicide rate. Members of migrant-sending households are 1.67 times as likely as non-migrant households to commit suicide due to immigration's disruptive effect on families.⁸²

Family disruption is also used to explain immigration's ambiguous effects on Mexican youth in Mexico as well. On one hand, research across many countries has shown that immigration results in educational improvements.⁸³ One Mexican-based study finds that a significant increase in literacy and the number of years of schooling for young children belonging to migrant households, especially where the mother has a very

⁸⁰ David J. McKenzie, "Beyond Remittances: the Effect of Migration on Mexican Households," in *International Migration, Remittances & the Brain Drain*, ed. Çağlar Özden and Maurice Schiff (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 128. This effect is not large enough, however, to affect Mexico's infant mortality score in the Common Good Index.

⁸¹ Reanne Frank and Robert A. Hummer, "The Other Side of the Paradox: The Risk of Low Birth Weight among Infants of Migrant and Nonmigrant Households within Mexico," *International Migration Review* 36, no. 3 (2002).

⁸² Guilherme Borges et al., "Immigration and Suicidal Behavior among Mexicans and Mexican Americans," *Journal of Public Health* 99, no. 4 (2010): 142.

⁸³ See literature review in Ernesto Lopez-Cordova, *Globalization, Migration, and Development: The Role of Mexican Remittances*, (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Developmental Bank 2006), 11, <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35317372>.

low educational level.⁸⁴ However, research is inconclusive whether or not immigration lowers or raises educational outcomes for high school students in migrant-sending families in Mexico. Some studies have found that immigration results in lower school attendance rates for Mexican teenagers from migrant-sending households.⁸⁵ However, other studies have found exactly the opposite: that migration reduced the high school drop-out rate. A Mexican study found that children in migrant-sending households are 10 percent less likely to drop out of school than children from non-migrant-sending households.⁸⁶ A Salvadoran study similarly found that remittances helped reduce high school drop out rates.⁸⁷ Because the evidence is inconclusive, I have not attributed any change to high school drop-out rates in the CGI(P) scores.

An indicator that shows no improvement for Mexican migrants or their families in Mexico is that of health insurance coverage. Undocumented immigrants have an uninsurance rate of 50 percent, which is approximately the same as Mexico's. This low rate is due to low employer coverage, coupled with ineligibility for receiving Medicaid.⁸⁸ The Common Good Index also fails to capture improvements to access to health care for

⁸⁴ Gordon Hanson and Christopher Woodruff, *Emigration and Educational Attainment in Mexico*, http://www.childmigration.net/files/Hanson_2003.pdf (accessed December 19, 2010).

⁸⁵ Lopez-Cordova, *Globalization, Migration, and Development: The Role of Mexican Remittances*, 23. McKenzie, "Beyond Remittances: the Effect of Migration on Mexican Households," 139-42.

⁸⁶ Adam Sawyer, *In Mexico, Mother's Education and Remittances Matter in School Outcomes*, (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2010).

⁸⁷ Alejandra Cox Edwards and Manuelita Rueta, "International Migration, Remittances and Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador," *Journal of Development Economics* 72, no. 2 (2003).

⁸⁸ In fact, even legal immigrants are barred from receiving Medicaid for five years after entry. *Summary of Immigrant Eligibility Restrictions Under Current Law, as of 2/25/2009*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009), <http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/immigration/restrictions-sum.shtml#sec1> (accessed December 30, 2010).

Mexicans resulting from remittances. One study found that after controlling for size, location and demographics of the receiving household, that remittances were responsible for a 44% increase in the share of household income being spent on health care.⁸⁹

Remittance-receiving households are able to obtain more health care because of remittance income. This fact is not captured in the indicator of uninsurance.

In addition to its failure to express the full extent of improvements to immigrants' lives, the Index also masks generational improvement in access to health insurance for undocumented Mexican migrants. Children born in the United States to Mexican immigrants are U.S. citizens and are therefore eligible for Medicaid, unlike their parents. This indicator will rise, therefore, for second-generation immigrants.

Immigration's Effects on U.S. Residents

This analysis gives evidence to the common understanding that undocumented Mexican immigrants improve their opportunities by immigrating, even while it recognizes that they face many challenges in their new country. But a common good analysis examines the wellbeing of all groups, doing so with an eye toward the preferential option for the poor. In this section, I examine the effects of undocumented Mexican immigration in light of U.S. policies on United States citizens, especially poor U.S. citizens.

According to the Partial Common Good Index, undocumented Mexican immigration has caused a decline in capabilities of U.S. residents overall, as reflected in

⁸⁹ One of the major uses of remittances money is health care. Jim Airola, "The Use of Remittance Income in Mexico," *International Migration Review* 41, no. 4 (2007).

the difference between the CGI(P) scores with and without undocumented Mexican immigration. The score with such immigration is 80.9, which is 0.6 to 0.9 points lower than the score in the hypothetical absence of such immigration (81.5-81.8, see Table 11). To what is this decline due? In part, it results from the subtraction of a very vulnerable population: undocumented Mexican immigrants. Once undocumented Mexicans are subtracted from the U.S. population, the CGI(P) score for the United States becomes 81.3, which is 0.2 to 0.5 points lower than the range of scores without immigration (see Table 11). The data show that immigration has slightly depressed human functioning capabilities for U.S. citizens.⁹⁰

Immigration has been shown to negatively affect U.S. citizens in three areas: wages, unemployment and education. Two of these, wages and education, correspond to indicators in the CGI(P): household income and high school drop-outs. The third, unemployment, was removed from the CGI(P) due to an inability to measure that indicator for undocumented immigrants.

Regarding education, there is evidence that recent immigration from Mexico has lowered the educational attainment level of other students around them. Research has broadly shown that student outcomes are influenced by peers. Desegregation programs, for instance, have improved the reading scores and graduation rates of African American

⁹⁰ As I mentioned earlier, for the sake of expedience I will henceforth refer to this group as U.S. citizens, even though it includes immigrants, including an additional four million undocumented immigrants from countries other than Mexico.

Table 11. Changes to U.S. CGI(P) Scores Resulting from Immigration

	In Theoretical Absence of Immigration	Current State: With Immigration	
	U.S. Population Overall	U.S. Population Overall	U.S. Citizens
Electoral Participation	43.5	42.4	43.5
Education	95.2	93.5	94.3
Safety	92.2	92.2	92.2
Household Income	83.3-85.7	82.8	83.3
Infant Life	96.5	96.5	96.5
Emotional Wellbeing	70.8	71.1	70.8
Age of Mother	85.4	84.1	84.7
Health Insurance	85	84.2	85
CGI(P)	81.5 – 81.8	80.9	81.3

participants.⁹¹ Studies about the influence of lower scoring students on higher scoring students have likewise shown a peer effect, especially intra-racially.⁹² One U.S.-based study calculated the impact of immigration on the educational outcomes of native-born students. This study showed that the immigration influx of the 1980s decreased the

⁹¹ As per this literature review: Janet Ward Schofield and Leslie R.M. Hausmann, "The Conundrum of School Desegregation: Positive Student Outcomes and Waning Support," *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 66, no. 1 (2004).

⁹² Eric D. Gould et al., "Does Immigration Affect the Long-Term Educational Outcomes of Natives? Quasi-Experimental Evidence," *Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society* 119, no. 540 (2009). Caroline M. Hoxby, Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation.

African American graduation rates by approximately 1 percent, and that it increased native-born Latino drop-out rates by 3.5 to 4 percent.⁹³

Before turning to the most highly debated effect of undocumented Mexican immigration (wages), I want first to note that although there has been concern for public safety raised in the public debate, research has found that violence among Latino immigrants is roughly the same as populations with comparable socio-economic backgrounds.⁹⁴ Furthermore, research has investigated peer effects on teen pregnancy and has found significant effects, but those effects are limited to one's immediate circle of friends, not one's peer group at large.⁹⁵ This indicator remains unchanged by immigration, therefore, because of segregation between immigrants and native-born teenagers.

⁹³ That study was national in scope, but it found that the negative effects on Latinos nearly disappeared when California was removed from the sample, suggesting that the effect was related to geographic concentration. At the time the study was published, California was home to one-quarter of foreign-born Latinos (and is still home to 22% of undocumented students). This study was performed using 1980 and 1990 census data. In spite of the fact that immigration increased greatly in the 1990s, I use the statistic presented in this work to represent the effect of undocumented Mexican immigrants on U.S. citizens, because the immigration of the 1990s was more broadly dispersed than in the 1980s, and therefore I estimate the effects to be commensurate to the California effects of the early study. Julian R. Betts, "Educational Crowding Out: Do Immigrants Affect the Educational Attainment of American Minorities " in *Help or Hindrance?: The Economic Implications of Immigration for African Americans*, ed. Daniel S. Hamermesh and Frank D. Bean (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998).

⁹⁴ Gopal K. Singh and Mohammad Siahpush, "All-Cause and Cause-Specific Mortality of Immigrants and Native Born in the United States," *American Journal of Public Health* 91, no. 3 (2001). In 2000, homicide rates among Latino immigrants were 95% that of U.S. born Latinos. Singh and Hiatt, "Trends and Disparities," 914.

⁹⁵ Mir M. Ali and Debra S. Dwyer, "Estimating Peer Effects in Sexual Behavior among Adolescents," *Journal of Adolescence*, no. In Press, Corrected Proof (2010). Peter S. Bearman and et al., *Peer Potential: Making the Most of How Teens Influence Each Other*, (Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 1999), <http://www.etr.org/recapp/index.cfm?fuseaction=pages.currentresearchdetail&PageID=219&PageTypeID=5>.

The other indicator besides education that undocumented Mexican immigration has affected is income. The evidence is mixed on the extent to which undocumented immigrants have affected native wages. Most studies show that there is negligible impact on either native wages or unemployment, and yet some studies demonstrate notable impact on both. Rather than a consensus in the literature, two divergent perspectives have emerged.⁹⁶ I examine the evidence on both sides.

Two types of studies have traditionally been performed to determine the impact of immigrant inflows on the native-born workforce. These studies have not focused specifically on undocumented Mexican immigration but on the influx of low-skilled workers due to immigration. However, because the predominance of Mexicans among low-skilled unauthorized immigrant workers, these studies are directly applicable to the question of how undocumented Mexican immigration has affected U.S. wages.⁹⁷ The first of these two types, empirical studies, examine existing sociological and economic data

⁹⁶ Giovanni Peri, *Immigrants, Skills and Wages: Measuring the Economic Gains from Immigration*, (Washington, D.C.: American Immigration Law Center, 2006), 5, <http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/images/File/infocus/Skills%20&%20Wages.pdf> (accessed January 18, 2011). Economists who have found slight immigration effects include David Card, Giovanni Peri and Robert Topel. Economists who have found large immigration effects include George Borjas, Richard Freeman and Gordon Hanson.

⁹⁷ I use the results of these studies as an estimation of the effect of undocumented Mexican immigration in particular, because although Mexicans comprise 59 percent of all undocumented immigrants, they are much less educated than other undocumented immigrants and therefore comprise a much higher percentage of unskilled workers. Undocumented Mexicans are over three times as likely as other unauthorized workers to have not completed high school. Passel and Cohn, *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*, 22. Furthermore, the total number of undocumented Mexican workers in 2006 approaches the total number of undocumented immigrants in 2000 even more closely because of the continued influx of undocumented Mexicans: between 2000 and 2005 the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants rose by 2.5 million, or 22 percent. Jeffery S. Passel, *Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005), 37, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf>.

and draw conclusions from it. These “cross-sectional” studies examine immigration’s labor effects on local markets. The second type, econometric studies, focus on national level wage effects, deriving conclusions from theoretical mathematical models. The empirical studies have found only very slight negative wage effects, although they have found that the wage effects are greater on low skilled U.S. laborers. Econometric studies, on the other hand, have found a more significant wage effect, for reasons explained below.

A considerable body of empirical studies dating back almost 30 years shows that immigration labor supply shocks reduce wages by very small amounts. Reviews of the economic literature on this topic in the 1980s and early 1990s show that most empirical analysis has concluded that a ten percent increase in immigrant population (as was experienced in the 1980s through the mid 1990s) reduces wages of competing native-born workers by 1 percent or less, although recent immigrants experience a greater decline (2 to 4 percent).⁹⁸ One of the most influential early empirical studies examined wages in Miami in the years after the Mariel boatlift, an important study due to the fact that the immigration wave was due to effects exogenous to the economy.⁹⁹ This wave of immigration brought a large number of relatively poor and uneducated Cubans to Miami, increasing Miami’s labor pool by 7 percent. Card found, surprisingly, that this labor

⁹⁸ James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration* (Washington, DC: National Research Council - Panel on the Demographic and Economic Impacts of Immigration, 1997), 219. Also, see Rachel M. Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt, "The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment, and Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9, no. 2 (1995).

⁹⁹ David Card, "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Economy," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 43, no. 2 (1990).

shock had very small effect on the wages of previous Cuban immigrants, and none at all on non-Cuban workers.¹⁰⁰

Other more recent empirical studies have demonstrated similar results.¹⁰¹ Card, for example, in 2001 found that a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor results in a 1.5 percent decline in wages for competing low-skilled workers.¹⁰² Orrenius and Zavodny in 2003 found that a ten percent increase in immigrant labor results in an even smaller negative effect, between 0.05 and 0.25 percent.¹⁰³ I thus use the 0.5 percent number to calculate family income for in the absence of immigration.

Econometric studies, however, traditionally result in findings that are quite a bit larger than those identified in empirical studies. For the past twenty years prominent economist George Borjas has built a case that immigration significantly harms U.S. workers, especially competing (unskilled) workers.¹⁰⁴ He found that immigration of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in an 8.9 percent decrease in wages for unskilled U.S. workers

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ One recent econometric study has found an opposite effect: that immigration causes a slight *increase* in wages for low skilled U.S. workers. However, it used a questionable assumption (including high school juniors and seniors, who have low workforce attachment). When that assumption is reversed, his methodology finds a small negative effect. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, *Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory and the Empirics*, (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008), [nber](http://www.nber.org/papers/w14311) (accessed March 30, 2009), George Borjas et al., "Imperfect Substitution between Immigrants and Natives: A Reappraisal," no. March (2008), <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~GBorjas/Papers/BGH2008.pdf>.

¹⁰² This number is higher in higher-immigrant cities, and lower in lower-immigration cities. He found a 1-3 percent wage decline in major cities. "Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Market Impacts of Higher Immigration," *Journal of Labor Economics* 19, no. 1 (2001).

¹⁰³ Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, *Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level Evidence*, (Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2003), <http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0302a.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴ Other economists who have worked with Borjas and support this claim include Richard Freeman, Lawrence Katz, and Jeffery Grogger.

and a 3.2 percent decrease in wages across the population as whole.¹⁰⁵ Borjas finds in a later study that the influx of low-skilled workers through migration has resulted in a 2.5 percent decline in wages for low-skilled African American worker.¹⁰⁶ I use Borjas' conclusions to calculate the "worst case scenario" extreme of the family income indicator, as it has been affected by immigration.

What accounts for the differences in conclusions? Borjas et al. argue argued that there are three problems with empirical studies: one, that high-immigration cities attract immigrants because of their robust economy, two, that they ignore out-migration of native workers to other cities in response to labor supply shocks, and three, that intercity trade nationally diffuses the effects of a labor supply shock, causing an overall decline that may not be noticeable locally.¹⁰⁷ Empirical studies have addressed two of these three criticisms. Card's Mariel study undermines the first, demonstrating that even in the absence of a particularly robust economy, immigration does not necessarily have a large negative effect. Card also studied native out-migration and found no evidence that native workers were leaving because of immigrant influxes.¹⁰⁸ However, there is evidence that native workers may migrate out of their immediate locale to other parts of the same

¹⁰⁵ Borjas, "The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market."

¹⁰⁶ George Borjas et al., "Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American Men," *Economica* 77, no. 306 (2010). Curiously, in that same study Borjas found the wage effect on white high school drop-outs is higher than for Blacks, which helps to explain why the national effect found in his 2003 study is higher than the Black wage decline found in 2010.

¹⁰⁷ "On the Labor Market Impacts of Immigration and Trade," in *Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas*, ed. George Borjas and Richard Freeman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

¹⁰⁸ Card, "Immigrant Inflows."

metropolitan area, which may account for some of the softening of immigration wage effects.¹⁰⁹

What is an ethicist to do in light of this contradictory information? An orientation of solidarity with the poor directs one at least to take into account those analyses that demonstrate harm to vulnerable populations. In terms of the Common Good Index, I therefore include the extremes of the findings in the CGI(P), presenting the “without immigration” family income indicator as a numerical range. Using Orrenius and Zavodny’s and Borjas’ estimates, I estimate the decline in wages among low skilled U.S. workers to be between 0.5 percent and 8.9 percent, and the national effect to range from 0.5 and 3.2 percent. I estimate the effect on Blacks to be 1.0 to 2.5 percent, and the effect on Latino workers to be 1.5 to 3 percent.¹¹⁰

The research surveyed here considers the impact of immigration on U.S. workers before the current economic recession. One might assume that immigration in this current economic climate would cause much larger wage depression and unemployment than in better economic times. However, three considerations weigh against this conclusion. The first consideration is that immigrants, as consumers and entrepreneurs, create jobs in addition to taking jobs. It is erroneous to view immigrants as people who simply take jobs away from U.S. citizens. They contribute to job creation.

¹⁰⁹ Mark D. Partridge et al., “Recent Immigration: The Diversity of Economic Outcomes in Metropolitan America,” *Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research* 11, no. 3 (2009).

¹¹⁰ In terms of the “worst-case effect,” I assume a similar effect for the Latino community as the African American community, although slightly higher due to findings that the group whose wages are most affected by immigration are previous immigrants, who are predominantly Latino.

Secondly, immigration is a self-regulating activity that decreases in economically difficult times, as evidenced in recent trends. In 2006, 10.1 out of every 1,000 Mexican residents emigrated, but in 2008, that number had dropped to 6.2. This decline in immigration eases the negative effects of immigration in difficult economic times for the host country.¹¹¹

Third, there is evidence that Latino immigrants have recently suffered similar job losses to native-born Latinos and Blacks. From the fourth quarter 2007 to the fourth quarter 2008 the unemployment rate for Latino immigrants rose from 5.1 percent to 8.0 percent, a rise of 2.9 percentage points. The unemployment rate for native-born Latinos and Blacks rose by 2.8 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively – from 6.7 to 9.5 percent for native-born Latinos and from 8.6 to 11.5 percent for African Americans. The unemployment rate for the nation overall rose by 2 percentage points, from 4.6 to 6.6 percent.¹¹² This data suggests that in this economic downturn employers are not keeping immigrants on the payroll at the expense of native-born workers. Rather, immigrants have been integrated into the economy and are similarly affected by economic shifts.¹¹³

¹¹¹ *Informacion sobre el Flujo Migratorio Internacional de Mexico*, (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, 2009), <http://www.inegi.gob.mx/inegi/contenidos/espanol/prensa/Boletines/Boletin/Comunicados/Especiales/2009/junio/comunica1.pdf>.

¹¹² Rakesh Kochhar, *Unemployment Rises Sharply Among Hispanic Immigrants in 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), 3, <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=102> (accessed January 19, 2011).

¹¹³ Immigrants are, however, being hired back at a higher rate than native-born workers. Kochhar, *Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: The Latino Experience in Recession and Recovery*. Kochhar suggests that this is due to the fact that immigrant workers tend to work in more seasonal and temporary work than the average.

To summarize the effects of immigration on U.S. residents: recent undocumented immigration from Mexico has caused a decrease in human capabilities for U.S. residents. This decline results from negative wage and educational effects, although there is no consensus on the extent of the wage effect. The combined effect is a 0.1 to 0.5 point decline in the CGI(P) for the United States, a 0.1 to 0.2 point decline for African Americans, and a 0.1 to 0.3 point decline for Latinos.

A Common Good Response

The Partial Common Good Index has mathematically indicated undocumented Mexican immigration's effects on the wages of native-born U.S. residents and brought to light the negative peer effect that immigration has on high school graduation rates. In addition, it has confirmed the general consensus that immigration improves the lives of immigrants, even while it has drawn attention to its detrimental aspects. The CGI(P) has rendered the conclusion that the universal common good declines slightly in the presence of these recent immigration trends. How does a Catholic ethicist respond to these findings?

While numerical changes to the CGI(P) are small, the numbers reflect significant changes to the individuals affected by immigration – especially to poor individuals. Data reveal that average wages more than double for undocumented Mexicans over what they earned in Mexico, bringing them above the poverty line, and their children's educational levels increase dramatically. On the other hand, by some estimates the poorest native-born U.S. workers wages decline almost 10 percent as a result of immigration, and their

children tend to complete fewer years of school due to peer effects of lower-performing Mexican immigrant children (whose scores while much improved over their parents, still trail the educational scores of their U.S. born peers). Immigration brings about real changes in people's ability to meet their basic human needs for health, thought, safety and other concerns. Therefore, a response is required.

According to the International CGI(P), the harm to U.S. citizens caused by undocumented Mexican immigration slightly outweighs the good to Mexicans (undocumented Mexican immigrants and Mexican residents combined). This result seems to suggest that immigration should be reduced or eliminated. However, Mexicans – who are the most vulnerable people in this situation – would be greatly harmed if immigration were ended, a fact that militates against such a solution. Mexico's poverty rate is four times that of the United States, and the median family income is less than one-third that of the United States – even in spite of the fact that their families are almost twice as big as U.S. families. Undocumented immigrants increase their income by a factor of 2.5 when they immigrate here, enabling them and their families back home to eat, seek medical attention, and pay for basic necessities. In moving they achieve great gains in education, health, and safety. To tell them to go back to Mexico would be to condemn them to deep poverty and suffering. This is surely not in keeping with the will of God, the “permanent defender of life, especially the life of the poor, whom Yahweh delivers from oppression.”¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Gustavo Gutierrez, *The God of Life*, trans. Matthew O'Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991), 10.

The preferential option for the poor requires special consideration for vulnerable populations, and solidarity requires critical thinking and action in union with and in the interests of those populations. Solidarity with the poor requires in this case solidarity with undocumented Mexican immigrants. This stance negates an easy acceptance of a restrictionist position. Even so, such a position might be warranted – if the harm were vastly greater than the good done, and the country had insufficient resources for addressing the harms. However, that is not the situation here; in this case, the overall change to the CGI(P) is small, and the United States' relatively higher CGI(P) score suggests that the United States has the capacity to implement social policies or programs that will enable continued immigration while improving conditions for poor U.S. workers.

Nevertheless, undocumented Mexican immigrants are not the only group deserving of solidarity: low wage workers in the United States, who are disproportionately Black and Latino, are also vulnerable to violations of their human capabilities. They work at poverty wages. They are disproportionately uninsured.¹¹⁵ They are more vulnerable to violence in their neighborhoods. They are poorly educated. And they are harmed by immigration: their wages decline by as much as 9 percent. While the harms to the average low wage worker's capabilities are less pronounced than the benefits to the average undocumented Mexican immigrant, this does not mean that their problems should be ignored in light of Mexicans' greater need. Low wage native workers

¹¹⁵ "Income and Poverty Status," Cover the Uninsured (A Project of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation), <http://covertheuninsured.org/content/income-and-poverty-status> (accessed January 19, 2011).

struggle to meet their basic human functioning. Even though the level of harm is not dramatic, it must still be taken into account because of the demands of solidarity and the preferential option for the poor.

So we arrive at a seeming conflict. The reduction in the CGI(P) demonstrates a decline in the common good, and some of the United States' most vulnerable citizens are harmed by immigration. That situation must be rectified. And yet, it should not be resolved through reducing or eliminating immigration. The principle of solidarity points to a way out of this dilemma. Solidarity brings forth a different imagination; it generates the impetus to create solutions that will benefit all groups involved. Solidarity advocates that policies be pursued to enable continued immigration, and that policies be simultaneously pursued to improve wages and education for poor U.S. citizens.¹¹⁶

Solutions through Solidarity

The path to a Christian solution lies in solidarity with and between all of these populations, with exact solutions being hammered out in encounters with leaders of all affected populations. Solidarity involves recognition of mutual interests and involves a search for solutions that will meet those interests for all involved. Certainly the Black, Latino and undocumented Mexican immigrant communities can recognize low wages, for

¹¹⁶ Although it might be argued that this is not a necessary conclusion, and that Mexico should provide better opportunities for its residents, the depth and breadth of poverty in Mexico make that solution a long-term rather than a short-term solution. As expressed in *Strangers No Longer*, Catholic social thought maintains that people have the right to opportunities for a dignified life in their own country. The bishops' first recommendation stems from this principle: that the United States should work with Mexico to adopt economic policies that will reduce economic inequality between the nations and improve Mexico's economic conditions. I agree with these recommendations. However, the focus of recommendations in this dissertation is shorter-term.

example, as a common problem and work together to find solutions to it. In the spirit of solidarity, disparate groups can hammer out solutions that benefit all parties involved, rather than forwarding solutions that pit one relatively powerless group in society against another, or that leave one group out.

Pastor and Marcelli note wisely that mutuality at times involves some “horse-trading” and some compromises.¹¹⁷ They suggest, for example, that African American leaders could support non-restrictionist immigration policies in exchange for Latino support on maintaining African American employment in the public sector.¹¹⁸ They note that Blacks may fear that legalization of undocumented immigrants will result in African Americans being pushed out of well-paying public sector jobs. If this is the case, immigrant rights groups could more easily win Black support for one of their issues, legalization, through agreeing to not pursue equitable representation in employment in the public sector. Although such a solution may be realistic, it would be unacceptable in light of the Catholic insistence on justice. One thing that Pastor and Marcelli have right, however, is that in order to gain support for legalization, the immigrant rights community must be willing to listen to the needs of other communities and support them in their needs.

From the perspective of solidarity, there are points of mutuality that do not require selling one community short on the demands of justice. Solidarity goes beyond

¹¹⁷ Manuel Jr. Pastor and Enrico Marcelli, "Somewhere over the Rainbow? African Americans, Unauthorized Mexican Immigration, and Coalition Building," *The Review of Black Political Economy* 31, no. 1/2 (2003): 151.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

negotiated settlements, seeking common concerns and common ground for solutions.

Solidarity requires a critical thinking that recognizes how the issues of one group affect another.

While all solutions should ultimately be determined by representatives of the affected communities, this specified common good analysis does lead to certain policy suggestions. One public policy proposal that has been forwarded as “pro-immigrant” is legalization of undocumented immigrants. Indeed, legalization would provide the conditions for much higher achievement of human capabilities among those immigrants who are currently undocumented. A study of immigrants who were legalized through the 1986 Immigration Reform Control Act shows that between 1990 and 2006, 28 percent more IRCA immigrants had received their high school diplomas, only half as many lived in poverty, and double the number owned their own homes.¹¹⁹ This solution should be endorsed as a way of improving their human functioning, and it should include provisions for future undocumented immigrants to earn legalization through paying taxes, being law-abiding citizens, and paying a fine.¹²⁰

I am suggesting here a legalization of all undocumented immigrants, not just undocumented Mexicans. While this study has focused specifically on the effects of

¹¹⁹ Rob Paral and Associates, *Economic Progress via Legalization*, (Washington, D.C.: Immigration Policy Institute, 2009), <http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/economic-progress-legalization-lessons-last-legalization-program> (accessed January 19, 2011).

¹²⁰ For an example of earned legalization legislation, see *Summary of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America's Security and Prosperity Act (CIRASAP) of 2009*, (Washington, D.C.: Immigration Policy Center of the American Immigration Council, 2009), <http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/summary-comprehensive-immigration-reform-americas-security-and-prosperity-act-2009> (accessed January 29, 2011).

undocumented Mexican immigration, I include other undocumented immigrants in this and my other proposals because other undocumented immigrants face similar challenges in realizing their basic capabilities and their suffering – and need to increase their ability to realize their basic human capabilities – must also be addressed. Furthermore, the demographics suggest that a CGI analysis that included non-Mexican undocumented immigrants would not yield dramatically different trends than those identified in this study.

Although the inclusion all undocumented immigrants in the CGI would magnify the negative effect on unskilled U.S. workers, this change would not be so great as to warrant a different kind of ethical response. Their numbers are fewer, first of all – Mexicans comprise a majority (59 percent) of all undocumented immigrants. Secondly, non-Mexican undocumented immigrants have higher education levels than undocumented Mexicans, comprising only 5 percent of all undocumented immigrants without high school degrees.¹²¹ Their relatively higher educational level thus makes non-Mexican undocumented immigrants less substitutable for U.S. born high school dropouts, which diminishes their effect on the wages of U.S. born unskilled workers relative to that of undocumented Mexican workers. Third, because a relatively high percentage of non-Mexican undocumented immigrants have college degrees (30 percent, versus only 4 percent of undocumented Mexicans), their legalization would mitigate even further their

¹²¹ Passel and Cohn, *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*, 22.

effect on unskilled U.S. workers, as newly legal college graduate immigrants seek higher-skilled work.¹²²

Legalization for undocumented immigrants should be endorsed for another reason as well: it would secure better wages not only for immigrants but also for U.S. residents over all.¹²³ Wages decline due to undocumented immigration not only because immigrants add workers to the labor pool. They also shrink because undocumented immigrants are allowed to stay undocumented. Employers can pay unauthorized workers less and treat them worse than other workers because they know that these immigrants are afraid to speak up.¹²⁴ Although undocumented immigrants still have labor rights in this country, those rights go largely unclaimed because of fear of losing one's job or even being deported. However, once immigrants become legal, their wages rise.¹²⁵ Just as undocumented immigrants' willingness to accept less money depresses wages for everyone, a new insistence on higher wages will effectively raise wages across the industries in which they work. Reframed through the eyes of solidarity, it becomes clear that legalization is "pro-worker" issue. This solution meets the criteria of the common

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ It is important to note that immigration is only one factor, and not the main reason, for falling wages. Borjas et al., "Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American Men," 277.

¹²⁴ With good reason. Employers have been known to call the immigration authorities to bust unionization efforts. Lori A. Nessel, "Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform," *Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review* 36, no. 2 (2001). An even more concerning problem is non-payment of immigrants for work performed. *Wage Theft*, (Chicago: Interfaith Worker Justice, 2010), <http://www.iwj.org/index.cfm/wage-theft> (accessed January 29, 2011).

¹²⁵ Paral and Associates, *Economic Progress via Legalization*.

good, because it would increase human capabilities for immigrants and other poor U.S. workers.

Most of the bishops' proposals in *Strangers No Longer* (which seek to maintain family unity, legalize workers, enforce U.S. borders humanely, and ensure due process rights and asylum rights) should remain as recommendations within a common good analysis, because they would forward human capabilities for undocumented immigrants. Other proposals could also be included that focus on the human capabilities of immigrants. One such proposal is the Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation (POWER) Act, which would protect whistle-blowing immigrants from retaliation.¹²⁶ This legislation would make it more difficult for employers to use workplace raids as a way of preventing immigrant workers from defending their workplace rights.

One of the bishops' proposals, however, should be removed: the formation of a guest worker program. This is because temporary immigrants hold precarious social positions that are not dissimilar to when they are undocumented. Fearing involuntary removal, guest workers, like undocumented immigrants, are disabled from insisting on fair working conditions. This results in depression of wages. Temporary workers earn an estimated 12 percent less than their legal immigrant counterparts.¹²⁷ While a guest worker might sound like an ideal political compromise between restrictionists (who want

¹²⁶ *Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation (POWER)*, 111th Congress, SB 3207, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.03207>: (accessed January 20, 2011).

¹²⁷ Peter B. Brownell, "Wage Differences between Temporary and Permanent Immigrants," *International Migration Review* 44, no. 3 (2010).

to prevent legalization) and liberals (who want legalization), qualitatively it will advance the same dysfunction in wages as undocumented immigration.

Beyond modifying the bishops' current proposals to improve conditions for undocumented immigrants, a specified common good analysis directs solidarity toward not only immigrants but also poor U.S. residents, and it therefore leads to additional policy recommendations aimed at improving human functioning for poor immigrants and U.S. citizens. In particular, a common good approach advocates public policies to address areas in which immigration causes a decline in U.S. capabilities. This means first of all that the Church should promote policies to protect wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. Advocacy around wages and working conditions are not new in the Church. John Ryan's work on the minimum wage is one example of it. However, what is new is that these issues should be seen as an immigration issue. They should be linked so that the Church can help build the solidarity necessary between communities that will enable all workers' rights to be protected.

Undocumented immigration is not the only reason for falling wages, and legalization is not the only avenue to raising them.¹²⁸ One of the problems facing undocumented immigrants is non-payment for work performed. And while undocumented immigrants are more vulnerable to this unjust practice due than others, they are not the only ones who suffer from it: it is a problem confronting millions of U.S.

¹²⁸ Theories include globalization to institutional change to new technology. Paul Beaudry and David A. Green, "Changes in U.S. Wages, 1976–2000: Ongoing Skill Bias or Major Technological Change?," *Journal of Labor Economics* 23, no. 3 (2005): 610.

citizens.¹²⁹ A promising legislative proposal that would address wage problems for both immigrants and native-born workers is the Wage Theft Prevention Act. This legislation would offer stronger protections to U.S. workers who are trying to get paid money they are owed by employers. A similar act was passed in New York in December 2010; efforts should be increased to pass a federal law on this matter, and immigrant rights groups would be wise to take it up as an immigration issue and join forces with others to pass it.¹³⁰

In recent years, many worker protection bills have been forwarded to protect workers. Many of these can and should be supported by the Church as part of its immigration agenda. These bills aim to achieve, among other things, greater safety in the workplace and greater protections for workers trying to organize unions. Earlier, I discussed above the high rate of immigrant deaths in the workplace. Worker safety is an issue for all workers, not just immigrants. While 393 Latino immigrants died in the workplace last year, over five thousand workers total died.¹³¹ Bills aiming to improve workplace safety, such as the Protecting American Workers Act of 2007-2008, should be

¹²⁹ Kim Bobo, *Wage Theft in America: Why Millions of Working Americans Are Not Getting Paid - And What We Can Do About It*, (New York: The New Press, 2008).

¹³⁰ Steven Greenhouse, *A Move to Protect Low-Wage Workers*, (New York: New York Times, 2010), <http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/a-move-to-protect-low-wage-workers/#more-145443> (accessed January 29, 2011).t

¹³¹ *Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) - Current and Revised Data*.

supported as part of a comprehensive immigration ethic.¹³² So should bills aimed at protecting workers' rights in the workplace, such as the Employer Free Choice Act.¹³³

In addition to wage and worker protection issues, a common good immigration ethic requires mutual efforts to improve education. Education issues are much more complex, encompassing such diverse issues as pedagogy, teacher evaluations, classroom size and school size, school funding, and charter schools. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the myriad of recent proposals. However, the main point here is that the Catholic Church should examine and forward proposals for how to improve the educational opportunities of all students in public schools. Evaluations of those proposals should be guided by a common good analysis.

I have identified some additional policies and policy areas for inclusion in a Catholic immigration policy agenda that is guided by the common good. The Church as a whole should be advocating for policies such as these. Policy proposals should be discussed and decided by lay leaders of affected communities, and efforts should be led by lay people as well as priests.

In light of the difficulty of getting any such legislation passed on the national level, both citizens and immigrants should work on state and local levels around common issues. These issues should be directed at the areas identified in the Common Good Index

¹³² The Act was pared down in 2010 as a miner protection bill in the hopes of passage in the face of political opposition, but even that effort failed. *Protecting America's Workers Act*, 110th Congress, HR 2067, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2049> (accessed January 21, 2011).

¹³³ "Uphill Battle Over Unionization Bill Moves to House, Senate," *Workforce Management*, March 10, 2009, <http://www.workforce.com/section/news/article/uphill-battle-over-unionization-bill-moves-house-senate.php>.

as needing improvement, including immigration policies, wages and education, but also extending to other issues of concern such as health care and violence. There are many issues on which immigrant and native-born residents can work jointly. Joint efforts will build human capabilities, and they will also build solidarity between citizen and non-citizen communities. Such local action is supported by CST's principle of subsidiarity, which calls for issues to be adjudicated on the most local level possible.¹³⁴

In my own work as a community organizer between 1988 and 2003, I worked with coalitions in which immigrants and non-immigrants worked together on a variety of issues, for example winning new school buildings for overcrowded schools and achieving universal health insurance for Illinois' children (KidCare). I saw how these joint efforts increased solidarity between immigrants and non-immigrants. A study of grassroots solidarity between African American Latino immigrant workers likewise demonstrates that solidarity between Blacks and Latino immigrants is not only possible but in many communities a reality.¹³⁵ Gordon and Lenhardt point to both workplace-based efforts and community-based efforts. They offer that there are certain ways of effectively promoting solidarity between the two groups. One is identifying real shared interests. Another is to discuss each group's social positioning and history, in order to foster increased understanding. Third, such efforts should be supported by community organizations,

¹³⁴ Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno," par. 80.

¹³⁵ Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt, Conflict and Solidarity between African American and Latino Immigrant Workers, <https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/GordonLenhardtpaperNov30.pdf> (accessed April 27, 2010).

churches and unions and not just left to individuals.¹³⁶ The Church, though its hierarchy and lay members, has the opportunity play a pivotal role in increasing solidarity between immigrants, including undocumented Mexican immigrants, and non-immigrants, and it can realize that role through promoting and working on issues of common concern as part of its immigration agenda.

Next Steps

When I first undertook this process, I thought that the numbers for the Common Good Index would lead to clear-cut solutions for the thorny problems presented by immigration. I hypothesized that overall, human functioning capabilities would decline significantly in the absence of immigration. Instead, I find that the picture is not so clear. The CGI(P) demonstrates mixed results, and that the overall effect of recent undocumented Mexican immigration on the common good is slightly negative.

However, a look at the CGI(P) scores of the United States and Mexico and of some vulnerable sub-populations militates against an anti-immigration stance, while calling for solidarity between immigrants and other vulnerable groups in the United States – African Americans, Latinos, and low-wage workers in general. This solidarity requires not only that U.S. citizens support rights for undocumented immigrants, it also requires undocumented immigrants to support issues of importance to U.S. Blacks, Latinos and low-wage workers. It also requires all groups to seek areas of joint concern and join forces to address them.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

In the next chapter, I explore implications of a common good ethic and a Common Good Index for immigration ethics in Catholic thought. The Common Good Index helps point to areas of concern and directs one's attention in solution-making toward ensuring human capabilities for all people. And through its inclusion of the preferential option for the poor, it helps to guide a moral community toward proper interpretation of the Common Good Index results and toward appropriate solutions. The specific common good approach developed and implemented in this dissertation has shown itself to provide a more robust, balanced ethical analysis than the bishops' framework of solidarity with the immigrant. In the Conclusion I review the contributions of this approach and the Common Good Index. I also review their weaknesses and present directions for further development.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

I began this dissertation with a critique of the immigration ethic used by the U.S. and Mexican bishops in their pastoral letter *Strangers no Longer*. An analysis of the Bishops' letter demonstrates that their central ethical framework for immigration ethics is solidarity with the immigrant. While that framework accords with biblical injunctions to love the immigrant and CST's emphasis on the rights of immigrants, it leads to a misinterpretation of the preferential option for the poor and has led the bishops to selectively ignore evidence that immigration has harmed certain vulnerable, unskilled, U.S. populations. I argued that a better framework for immigration ethics is the common good, in part because immigration ethics today is largely focused on immigration law and according to Catholic social teaching the purpose of the law is the common good, and also because the common good as a central moral principle militates against favoring one vulnerable population to the disregard of others. This shift in moral framework comprises the first contribution of this dissertation. The benefits of using the common good become even more fully illuminated through the development and application of a specified common good approach, as discussed below. This approach yields some significant improvements over the bishops' ethical framework.

I created a specified common good approach in order to facilitate use of the common good as the central moral principle. In this method, the common good is first more precisely delineated via defining human flourishing (toward which the common good is directed) through a set of human functioning capabilities. Secondly, the specified common good evaluates situations through a Common Good Index (CGI), which measures human flourishing in society through measuring human functioning capabilities. The Common Good Index incorporates a range of sociological indicators that indicate the presence of minimum levels of capabilities among the population. The indicators are: uninsurance, homicide, poverty, wages, high school drop-outs, infant mortality, carbon dioxide emissions, voter turnout, unemployment, teenage births, suicide, and the importance of God in one's life. The indicators are scaled to create CGI scores between 1 and 100, and the overall CGI score is created through averaging the individual scores.

This quantification of the Catholic social principle of the common good constitutes the second contribution of this dissertation. In quantifying the common good, it becomes possible to use this principle with more precision and accuracy than previous elaborations have allowed. The tool's specificity forces its user to attend concretely and specifically to a number of measures, and to do so for each affected population. The CGI makes unlikely the kind of oversight that the bishops are guilty of: ignoring the negative effects of immigration on poor U.S. residents. The mathematical nature of the instrument itself forces a rigor in its use and therefore in the application of the principle of the common good.

Lest this exercise be seen as outside of Catholic tradition, I demonstrated that it falls within the example of early twentieth century theologian John A. Ryan, who quantified the principle of a living wage. Just as Ryan's work focused on defining some very concrete requirements of human dignity, like having enough to eat and to wear, Common Good Index numerically calculates some very concrete minimum requirements for the common good. The focus is on minimum levels of wellbeing, because the common good's attendant preferential option for the poor insists first on basic wellbeing for all before focusing on higher levels of flourishing for some.

I call this ethical methodology – evaluating a social situation through the framework of the common good, using the CGI – the “specified common good approach.” This framework is superior over the bishops’ in four ways. First, it maintains a balance of concern for all poor populations involved, including both immigrants and native-born members of the host society. This balanced focus supports a more comprehensive (and therefore appropriate) application of the preferential option for the poor and promotes solidarity with all poor communities, not just immigrants.

Secondly, it is more precise and accurate, because it requires a quantitative analysis. The bishops’ error of ignoring the effect of immigration on poor U.S. residents is unlikely to happen when evaluating immigration through the framework of a specified common good, because the approach is too exacting.

Third, it has a clearly defined aim: to maximize human capabilities. The specificity of aim and analysis allow one to identify where particular capabilities are being compromised, which prompts one to investigate why those capabilities are being

compromised, and what can be done to improve those capabilities. In the case of immigration, this line of questioning promotes a more comprehensive set of solutions: one that includes immigration policies per se, but that also include other types of policies directed toward the fulfillment of particular capabilities, for example wage or education laws.

Fourth and finally, the specified common good approach facilitates solidarity between marginalized groups. Whereas the bishops' solidarity with immigrants urges a one-way solidarity in which other groups support issues affected undocumented immigrants, the specified common good approach calls for proposals and actions aimed at increasing human capabilities for all vulnerable populations, immigrant and non-immigrant alike. It promotes an understanding of common issues facing immigrant and non-immigrant communities, and it facilitates the generation of common solutions between those communities.

With its focus on human functioning capabilities, the specified common good approach identifies areas of concern outside of the contentious arena of immigration. The working relationships formed through such efforts facilitate the breaking down of barriers and the opening of hearts and minds to the needs, perspectives and policy proposals of other groups. The implication is not only that non-immigrants will become more inclined to support immigration issues such as legalization, but that immigrants will learn to support issues of other communities – notably African American, Latino and working poor communities – as well.

Evaluation of Immigration through a Specified Common Good Approach

In Chapter Four, I used the CGI to evaluate how recent undocumented Mexican immigration trends (defined as the influx of undocumented Mexican immigrants, coupled with immigration policies contextualizing that immigration) have affected the common good, in order to develop of an appropriate ethical response. Using eight out of the twelve indicators (due to incompleteness of data for the other four), I determined that recent immigration trends have slightly diminished the international common good.

While this result seems simple, it hides more complex internal dynamics, which are revealed through a CGI analysis by nation and subgroup. Undocumented Mexican immigrants certainly improve their opportunities for achieving their basic needs and capabilities by immigrating. In some cases their capabilities rise dramatically as a result of immigration – their income increases by a factor of 2.5, their infant mortality rates drop by two-thirds, and their high school drop-out rate declines by 40 percent and their homicide rate is reduced by 30 percent. However, losses in other areas of capability dampen their overall improvement: voter participation drops to zero due to their inability to vote in the U.S., teenage pregnancy rises by 20 percent, the suicide rate is almost 10 percent higher and the rate of uninsurance remains the same as in Mexico.

The result is similar for Mexican residents: overall positive, but with uneven effects on individual indicators. Immigration improves the incomes of Mexican residents by nearly 18 percent and improves infant mortality of migrant-sending communities by 3 percent. It depresses mental health, however, as evidenced by a 2.4 percent increase in

suicides among migrant-sending families. And it fails to produce expected gains in education.

While undocumented immigration from Mexico overall benefits Mexican residents and undocumented Mexicans, it poses an overall risk to the United States public, causing 1 and 4 percent declines in the educational levels of Blacks and Latinos, respectively, (who have been negatively affected by their undocumented Mexican peers' lower educational attainment) and as high as a 9 percent reduction in wages of unskilled workers (although other research shows as small as a negative 0.5 percent wage effect). In other words, undocumented Mexican immigration results in a decline in wellbeing for poor U.S. residents. The injury to the average poor U.S. family due to immigration is smaller than the average rise in capabilities that an undocumented Mexican immigrant family realizes through immigrating. However, the harms to the U.S. population are not insignificant, and they cause a net decline in the international CGI score due to the greater U.S. population size.

The strengths of the specified common good approach are demonstrated through its application to this immigration example. This methodology provides evidence for the bishops' claims around undocumented immigration's positive effects on immigrants and Mexico, but it has also enabled the identification of a problem that has been hidden from the bishops' view: the harm to U.S. workers resulting from immigration. Furthermore, this approach has identified particular areas of concern: areas of low human functioning, especially where immigration has caused a decline in human functioning. Poor U.S. residents, who are disproportionately Black and Latino, suffer drops in wages and

education due to immigration. Undocumented Mexican immigrants, meanwhile, experience a drop in their electoral participation and increases in teen birth and suicide rates over their Mexican counterparts. Furthermore, even though immigrating has vastly benefited undocumented Mexican immigrants in the areas of income, infant mortality and education, these indicators all still fall well below the average for the United States. This disparity points to the need to address these issues.

In terms of policy recommendations, most of the immigration policies forwarded by the bishops would certainly improve the wellbeing of undocumented Mexican immigrants (as well as other undocumented immigrants) and would thus be supported by the specified common good approach. One exception to this is a guest worker program, which research shows leaves immigrant workers in a vulnerable economic and social position, not unlike their undocumented immigrant peers. Furthermore, some of these policy recommendations, seen through the lens human capabilities, are revealed to be in the interest of the U.S. community, as is the case with legalization, which would increase wages for both undocumented immigrants and low-wage workers in general.

A specified common good framework forwards solutions beyond just immigration policies, however, because it encourages joint action around mutual problems experienced by both undocumented immigrants and U.S. citizens, especially those exacerbated by immigration: wages and education. In addition, it promotes cooperative efforts around improving all areas of human capability in need of improvement. One that particularly stands out in this case is health insurance. Efforts to improve all capabilities

will be most effectively initiated at a community level and determined by community leaders, as indicated by the principle of subsidiarity.

Technical Evaluation of the Common Good Index

Having applied the Common Good Index to this complex issue, I turn to a technical evaluation of the Index and examine how it might be improved. The Common Good Index, through measuring human capabilities, creates rigor and specificity to ethical evaluations. However, there are some limitations that should be noted and addressed in order to ensure that it generates the most accurate analysis and conclusions.

The first data limitation is that there are many indicators that would be ideal to include in the Index, but that cannot be included due to lack of data gathering. On the international level, for example, child maltreatment data is not widely available.¹ For this reason, it was omitted from the Common Good Index, even though it would be a key indicator of emotional health and of the ability to raise children in a stable, supportive environment. Furthermore, even when data is widely available across nations, it is not always available for sub-populations. For this reason, I omitted carbon dioxide emissions, unemployment and the importance of religion, which are unavailable for undocumented Mexican immigrants, from my analysis in Chapter Four. In addition, data is not always available on the effect of a given issue, a fact that led to the elimination of one more indicator, poverty, from the calculations used in the immigration application in the last

¹ *World Report on Violence and Health*, (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002), http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/summary_en.pdf.

chapter. This limitation is a common one to indicator projects, and as data collection improves, it will become less of an issue.

Another data limitation is that even when information is available on a particular indicator, such information is not always commensurate across nations. This is true for the high school drop-out figures. First of all, the school systems are different. But secondly, the high school drop-out rate for Mexico is measured in terms of individuals who are 25 – 64 years old, while the U.S. measure drop-outs among 18 – 25 year olds, which is quite different. Poverty is also difficult to compare internationally.² As discussed in Chapter Four, the poverty measurement for Mexico is determined through a completely different formula than for the United States, and it is unclear how truly comparable those measurements are. This limitation is addressed through qualifying the results in the narrative, but like data gaps, improvements in internationally comparability will increase the accuracy of the CGI.

Lastly, this method is restricted by how long it takes data to be published. Data is difficult to obtain data for recent years. In this immigration study, for example, the latest

² There do exist internationally comparable poverty indicators, which measure what percentage of the population lives at U.S. \$1 or \$2 (PPP) a day. However, these indicators are not useful for the developed world. In fact, the World Bank has no report for those indicators for the United States at all, and for Mexico the rate falls below 5 percent. *Indicators*. There are other poverty measurements, however, that have been developed by individual nations such as the U.S. and Mexico, which provide a more enlightening picture for those nations.

data available on suicide, for example, is for the year 2007.³ And the latest compilation of high school drop-out rates from the U.S. Census Bureau ends likewise in 2007.⁴

Data limitations are suffered not only by the CGI, but by well-known index projects such as the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI). International organizations such as the United Nations recognize that there are many gaps in data collection, and are working on improving data collection, aggregation and harmonization processes.⁵ As improvements are made in these areas, the Common Good Index will be able to be used more easily and with greater precision.

Another area of improvement for the Index concerns the choice of indicators. The main issue with the indicators chosen for the CGI is that not all of them show progress in developing nations, because progress made in those countries would likely fall below the level of the indicator baseline. For example, in a country with a high illiteracy rate, you can measure social change more effectively through literacy rates or primary school graduation rates than high school graduation rates, because the latter will move at a much

³ *WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2007*, (United States Center for Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2010), http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html (accessed January 30, 2011).

⁴ *High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007*.

⁵ See, for example, *Second Meeting of the Statistical Commission for Africa (StatCom Africa - II)*, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Africa 2010), <http://www.uneca.org/statcom/docs/Report%20of%20the%20WG%20on%20MDG%20Indicators%20to%20STATCOM-AFRICA%20II.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2011). Even in developed nations where much data is already gathered, there is a need for additional data gathering and for harmonization of data between countries. *European Health Indicators: Development and Initial Implementation*, (Helsinki, Finland: National Public Health Institute, European Community Health Indicators Monitoring (ECHIM), 2008), http://www.echim.org/docs/ECHIM_final_report.pdf (accessed December 31, 2010).

slower rate than the former.⁶ In another example, gender equality in education may be a more relevant indicator of family stability and wellbeing in developing nations than teenage birth rates.⁷ While the indicators in the Index have been chosen because they represent the minimal level of attainment necessary for the fulfillment of human capabilities, using only these indicators constrains the CGI's use as an international tool.

Furthermore, the indicators chosen may not be sufficient to evaluate specialized areas of concern. For example, if someone wanted to examine the effects of a certain environmental policy regarding water usage on the common good, the one environmental indicator, carbon dioxide emissions, will not be at all helpful in doing so. Rather, a different indicator, and perhaps a different set of indicators, would need to be chosen to shed light on whether or not those policies improve people's relationship with the environment or harm it. While the indicators chosen reflect a breadth of impact, they do not go deep enough to evaluate every situation.

The United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI) suffered a similar problem, in that it failed to shed adequate light on different levels or aspects of development: women's development and progress in industrialized versus developing nations. It responded by adding three accompanying indexes: the Human Poverty Index

⁶ One of the United Nation's Millennium Development goals is to "ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling." For a complete list, see *Official List of MDG Indicators*, (United Nations, 2008), <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm> (accessed December 31, 2010). The Acute Multidimensional Poverty Index, also directed at measuring conditions in developing countries, similarly tracks primary school completion. Sabina Alkire and Maria Emma Santos, *Acute Multidimensional Poverty: A New Index for Developing Countries*, <http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/ophi-wp38.pdf>.

⁷ This is another Millennium Development Goal. *Official List of MDG Indicators*.

for Developing Countries (HPI-1), the Human Poverty Index for Selected OECD Countries (HPI-2), and the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI).⁸ Each one of the additional indexes contains the same categories as the original HDI: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. However, the indicators within those categories differ in order to make them more relevant to the population at hand, and in addition one category has been added for the HPI-2: social exclusion.⁹ This strategy is potentially applicable to the CGI. I recommend further investigation to see how it might be applied.

In spite of its limitations, the Common Good Index is a valuable tool for determining the status of the common good in society and how a given situation or policy affects that status. It provides enough information about human functioning to evaluate the level of human capabilities and the common good in society at many different levels, both nationally and among given populations. As data collection processes improve and as further work is done to improve the choice of indicators the CGI will become even more accurate and useful as a tool for measuring the common good.

Moving Forward

As outlined above, a specified common good approach offers many advantages over the bishops' framework of solidarity with the immigrant. Even beyond immigration, however, its use is promising for a wide range of social issues. It is particularly salient for economic issues. As Pope Benedict XVI recognized, "economic activity ... needs to be

⁸ *Human Development Report 2010, 20th Anniversary Edition: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development*, 215.

⁹ Ibid.

directed towards the pursuit of the common good,” and cannot be approached “through the simple application of commercial logic.”¹⁰ The specified common good could be used to evaluate past and pending trade agreements, government budgets proposals, international aid, and other economic policies. Through this approach, economic policies will be evaluated first and foremost by their effect on people’s human functioning capabilities.

This method can be furthermore applied to other specific issues directly indicated by the CGI indicators, for example around uninsurance, unemployment, homicide prevention or high school drop-out prevention. The specified common good approach mandates in these cases a more sophisticated analysis than is usually performed. A moral evaluation of a proposal to cut health insurance, for example, usually stops at a denunciation of such a cut. A CGI evaluation of a proposal to cut health insurance coverage would certainly illuminate the decline in human capabilities stemming from such a cut, including declines in the very direct indicator of uninsurance and other affected indicators such as infant mortality. However, the CGI also takes into account other dynamics resulting from such a cut. It has been argued, for example, that small businesses lose employees due to high health care costs, raising unemployment. This kind of factor is also taken into account in a specified common good analysis, rendering fuller moral analysis and conclusions.

¹⁰ Pope Benedict XVI, *Caritatis in Veritate*, (Rome: Vatican, 2009), par. 36, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html (accessed March 3, 2011).

The specified common good approach developed in this dissertation has the potential to be used widely. As demonstrated in the case of undocumented Mexican immigration and suggested in the above health care example, the specified common good approach allows for all sides of a debate to be quantifiably taken into account, thereby enabling a more comprehensive, detailed, accurate and compelling evaluation of a social issue. It has the additional benefit of fostering a two-way solidarity, as concerns on all sides of a debate are taken into account and mutual interests are identified. With its specification through the Common Good Index, the common good becomes a rigorous ethical framework ready to take its place at the center of social ethics.

APPENDIX A
INDICATOR STATISTICS

Definitions

1. Electoral participation rate = Percentage of population who voted
2. High school drop-out rate
 - a. (U.S., African American, Latinos) = Percentage of population aged 18-64 who have not graduated and are not currently enrolled.
 - b. (Mexico) = Percentage of population aged 25-64 who have not completed upper secondary school.
 - c. (Undocumented Mexican immigrants) = Percentage of population aged 25-64 who have not completed upper secondary school.
3. Homicide rate = Number of homicides per 100,000.
4. Household income = Median household income in Purchasing Power Parity (U.S. dollars).
5. Infant mortality rate = Number of deaths before age one, per 1,000 live births in a given year.
6. Suicide rate = Number of suicides per 100,000.
7. Teenage birth rate = Number of births per 1,000 women.
8. Uninsurance rate = Percent of population lacking private or public health insurance.

Table 12. Real Indicator Statistics (2006), With Undocumented Mexican**Immigration**

	Mexico	U.S.	African Americans	Latinos⁴⁰⁶	Undocumen- ted Mexican Immigrants
Electoral Participation	58.0	43.6	35.9	19.3	0.0
High school drop-out	66.7	11.0	13.0	26.2	40.9
Homicide	11.0	6.2	23.6	8.0	7.6
Household Income	\$14,280	\$48,201	\$31,969	\$37,781	\$36,000
Infant mortality	16.2	6.7	13.5	5.5	4.9
Suicide	4.3	10.1	5.1	6.0	4.7
Teenage birth	82.3	41.9	63.7	83.0	99.0
Uninsurance	49.8	15.8	20.5	34.1	50.0

Sources of Real Indicator Statistics*Mexico*

1. Electoral participation: *Eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Federal Electoral, 2010), <http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/OE/participacion2006/reportes/circ.html> (accessed January 30, 2011).
2. High school drop-out: *Country Statistical Profiles 2010: Mexico*, (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx>.
3. Homicide: *Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2005 - 2006*, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf> (accessed January 30, 2011).
4. Household income: *Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 2006*, (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática,

⁴⁰⁶ Latinos includes all residents of Hispanic descent, regardless of race.

- 2007), http://ceidas.org/documentos/Centro_Doc/Resultados_ENIGH_2006.pdf (accessed December 18, 2010). Purchasing Power Parity numbers from enn World Table, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania), http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed December 15, 2010).
5. Infant mortality: *OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality)*, (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx> (accessed January 30, 2011).
 6. Suicide: *OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality)*, (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx> (accessed January 30, 2011).
 7. Teenage birth: *Adolescent Birth Rate, per 1,000 Women*, (United Nations, 2010), <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx> (accessed December 20, 2010).
 8. Uninsurance: Secretaria de Salud de Mexico, Indicadores Basicos de Salud, 2000-2004, (Mexico, D.F.: Organización Panaméricana de la Salud: Oficina Regional de la Organización Mundial de la Salud), <http://sinais.salud.gob.mx/indicadores/> (accessed January 30, 2011).

United States

1. Electoral participation: *Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau), <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html> (accessed January 30, 2011).
2. High school drop-out: *High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau), <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/education.html> (accessed January 2, 2011).
3. Homicide: *Deaths: Final Data for 2006* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Disease Control, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57_14.pdf (accessed January 30, 2011).
4. Household income: *HIES - Household Income and Expenditure Statistics*, (International Labor Organization Department of Statistics, 2010), <http://laborsta.ilo.org/> (accessed September 12, 2010).

5. Infant mortality: *OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality)*, (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx> (accessed January 30, 2011).
6. Suicide: *OECD Health Data 2010 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality)*, (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), <http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx> (accessed January 30, 2011).
7. Teenage birth: *Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0084.pdf> (accessed May 25, 2010).
8. Uninsurance: Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., *Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2009), <http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf> (accessed February 18, 2010).

African Americans

1. Electoral participation: *Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau), <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html> (accessed January 30, 2011).
2. High school drop-out: *High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007*.
3. Homicide: *Deaths: Final Data for 2006*.
4. Household income: *Money Income of Families—Median Income by Race and Hispanic Origin in Current and Constant (2007) Dollars: 1990 to 2007*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0681.pdf> (accessed November 25, 2010).
5. Infant mortality: *WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2007*, (United States Center for Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2010), http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html (accessed January 30, 2011).
6. Suicide: *WISQARS Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2007*, (United States Center for Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2010).

7. Teenage birth: *Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007*.
8. Uninsurance: DeNavas-Walt et al., *Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008*.

Latinos

1. Electoral participation: *Table A-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008*.
2. High school drop-out: *High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007*.
3. Homicide: *Deaths: Final Data for 2006*.
4. Household income: *Money Income of Families - Median Income*.
5. Infant mortality: *Deaths: Final Data for 2006*.
6. Suicide: "Suicide in the U.S.: Statistics and Prevention," U.S. Department of Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/suicide-in-the-us-statistics-and-prevention/index.shtml> (accessed February 29, 2010).
7. Teenage birth: *Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007*.
8. Uninsurance: *Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008*.

Undocumented Mexican Immigrants

1. Electoral participation: *Eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Federal Electoral, 2010), <http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/OE/participacion2006/reportes/circ.html> (accessed January 30, 2011).
2. High school drop-out: *Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/117.pdf> (accessed November 5, 2010).
3. Homicide: Gopal K. Singh and Robert A. Hiatt, "Trends and Disparities in Socioeconomic and Behavioural Characteristics, Life Expectancy, and Cause-

- Specific Mortality of Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations in the United States, 1979–2003," *International Journal of Epidemiology* 35 (2006).
4. Household income: Jeffery S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, *A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009), <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf> (accessed March 9, 2010).
 5. Infant mortality: Robert A. Hummer et al., "Paradox Found (Again): Infant Mortality among the Mexican-Origin Population in the United States," *Demography* 44, no. 3 (2007).
 6. Suicide: Singh and Hiatt, "Trends and Disparities.
 7. Teenage birth: Undocumented immigrant teenagers are 1.45 times as likely as U.S. born Latino teens to give birth. Latino teenage birthrate from *Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007*.
 8. Uninsurance: *Statistical Profiles of the Hispanic and Foreign-Born Populations in the U.S.: 2008*, (Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010), <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=120> (accessed January 30, 2011).

Hypothetical Indicator Statistics (2006), Without Undocumented Mexican

Immigration: “Worst Case Scenario” (Highest Wage Effect)

Calculations and Definitions

1. U.S. figures include all U.S. residents except undocumented Mexican immigrants.

This figure therefore includes other immigrants, including undocumented immigrants from countries other than Mexico. The baseline scores were determined by subtracting out the undocumented Mexican immigrant scores from the total scores, proportionately to their population. Then any immigration effect (i.e. percentage change due to immigration) was multiplied to that baseline number.

$$US_S = IE * \frac{(US_P * US_S) - (UMI_P * UMI_S)}{(US_P - UMI_P)}$$

Where US_S = United States score
 IE = Immigration effect
 US_P = United States population
 UMI_S = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
 UMI_P = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

2. African American scores were determined by multiplying the real African American scores (with immigration) by the immigration effect (i.e. percentage change due to immigration).

$$AA_S = IE * AA_S$$

Where IE = Immigration effect
 AA_S = African American score

3. Latinos includes all residents of Hispanic descent, regardless of race.

4. Latino citizen scores include all U.S. Latino residents except undocumented Mexican immigrants. This figure thus includes other immigrants, including undocumented immigrants from countries other than Mexico. Each score was determined by subtracting out the undocumented Mexican immigrant score from the total real Latino score, proportionately by population. Then any immigration effect (i.e. percentage change due to immigration) was multiplied to that baseline number.

$$LC_S = IE * \frac{(L_P * L_S) - (UMI_P * UMI_S)}{(L_P - UMI_P)}$$

Where LC_S = Latino citizen score
 L_S = Latino score
 IE = Immigration effect
 L_P = Latino population
 UMI_S = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
 UMI_P = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

Table 13. Hypothetical Indicator Statistics (2006)

	Mexico	U.S.	African Americans	Latinos
Electoral Participation	58.0	44.6	38.6	32.3
High school drop-out	66.7	9.5	12.9	17.2
Homicide	11.0	6.2	23.6	8.06
Household Income	\$12,138	\$48,442 – \$49,743	\$32,289 – \$32,768	\$38,348 – \$38,914
Infant mortality	16.2	6.7	13.5	5.6
Suicide	4.2	10.2	5.1	6.2
Teenage birth	82.3	39.0	63.7	68.0
Uninsurance	49.8	15.0	20.5	31.3

Sources of Hypothetical Indicator Statistics

Most U.S. and Latino indicator statistics have changed solely as a result of the subtraction of the undocumented Mexican immigrant population from the original calculation. Two indicators have changed through immigration's effects on U.S. citizens: Household Income and Education. The same two indicators have changed for the African American community as a result of immigration. Two indicators have changed for Mexico as a result of immigration: Household Income and Suicide. The sources for these changes are listed below. The other statistics in this chart are derived from the sources identified above, in "Real Indicator Statistics (2006), With Undocumented Mexican Immigration."

Mexico

1. Household Income: Mexican household income has increased by 8 percent as a result of the departure of migrants from the labor force.⁴⁰⁷ Remittance income accounts for 7.3 percent of Mexico's income.⁴⁰⁸
2. Suicide: The suicide rate among migrant-sending families is 1.67 times higher than the average.⁴⁰⁹ The final statistic does not change from the original real number, due to rounding effects.

United States

⁴⁰⁷ Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda, Remittances and Poverty in Mexico: A Propensity Score Matching Approach.

⁴⁰⁸ Remittance figure from *Informe Anual*. Total income figure from *Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) 2006*.

⁴⁰⁹ McKenzie, "Beyond Remittances: the Effect of Migration on Mexican Households."

1. High school drop-out: Immigration has caused a 4 percent increase in the Latino drop-out rate, and a 1 percent increase in the African American drop-out rate due to the effects of poorer peer performance. See citations below.
2. Household income: Undocumented immigration has caused between a 0.5 and 3.2 percent decline in U.S. wages.⁴¹⁰

African Americans

1. High school drop-out: Immigration has caused a 1 percent increase in the African American drop-out rate, due to the effects of poorer peer performance.⁴¹¹
2. Household income: Black wages have declined between 1.0 and 2.5 percent due to undocumented immigration.⁴¹²

Latinos

1. High school drop-out: Immigration has caused a 4 percent increase in the Latino drop-out rate, due to the effects of poorer peer performance.⁴¹³
2. Household income: Latino wages would rise 1.5 and 3.0 percent in the absence of immigration.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁰ Lower figure from Orrenius and Zavodny, *Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level Evidence*. Upper figure from Borjas, "The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market."

⁴¹¹ Betts, "Educational Crowding Out: Do Immigrants Affect the Educational Attainment of American Minorities ".

⁴¹² Borjas et al., "Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American Men."

⁴¹³ Betts, "Educational Crowding Out: Do Immigrants Affect the Educational Attainment of American Minorities ".

⁴¹⁴ Figures for Latinos calculated based on assumption of a similar wage effect on the Latino community as the African American community, although slightly higher due to findings that the group whose wages are most affected by immigration are previous immigrants, who are predominantly Latino. Lower figure from Orrenius and Zavodny, *Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level Evidence*. Higher figure from Borjas et al., "Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American Men."

APPENDIX B
CGI(P) SCORES

Calculations and Definitions

1. The Common Good Index scores are determined by the following formula:

$$I = \frac{\sum \frac{1}{10} \frac{(MA_i - X_i)}{(MA_i - MI_i)}}{n \times 10} \times 100$$

Where I = Index score
 X_i = social indicator value for that year
 MA_i = maximum value of X_i during Model Year
 MI_i = minimum value of X_i during Model Year
 n = number of indicators.

2. International CGI(P) scores are determined through adding the U.S. and Mexico scores proportionately to their populations.

$$I_S = \frac{(US_P * US_S) + (M_P * M_S)}{(US_P + M_P)}$$

Where I_S = International score
 US_P = United States population
 US_S = United States score
 M_S = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
 M_P = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

3. U.S. Citizens includes all U.S. residents except undocumented Mexican immigrants.

This figure thus includes other immigrants, including undocumented immigrants from countries other than Mexico. It was determined by subtracting out the undocumented Mexican immigrants from the total.

$$USC_S = \frac{(US_P * US_S) - (UMI_P * UMI_S)}{(US_P - UMI_P)}$$

Where USC_S = United States citizens score
 US_S = United States score
 US_P = United States total population

UMI_S = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
 UMI_P = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

4. Latinos includes all residents of Hispanic descent, regardless of race.
5. Latino citizens includes all U.S. Latino residents except undocumented Mexican immigrants. This figure thus includes other immigrants, including undocumented immigrants from countries other than Mexico. It was determined by subtracting out the undocumented Mexican immigrant scores from the total, proportionately to their population.

$$LC_S = \frac{(L_P * L_S) - (UMI_P * UMI_S)}{(L_P - UMI_P)}$$

Where LC_S = Latino citizens score
 L_S = Latino score
 L_P = Latino population
 UMI_S = Undocumented Mexican immigrant score
 UMI_P = Undocumented Mexican immigration population

Table 14. Correspondence of CGI(P) Indicator Names with Indicators Used

Name of CGI Indicator	Indicator Used
Electoral Participation	Voter Turnout
Education	High School Drop-out
Safety from Violence	Homicide
Household Income	Household Income
Infant Life	Infant Mortality
Emotional Wellbeing	Suicide
Age of Mother	Teenage Births
Health Insurance	Uninsurance

Table 15. Real CGI(P) Scores (2006), With Undocumented Mexican Immigration

	Internationalⁱ	Mexico	U.S.	U.S. Citizens	African Americans	Latinos	Latino Citizens	Undocumented Mexican Immigrants
Electoral Participation	46.3	57.1	42.4	43.4	37.3	17.7	30.9	0.0
Education	78.0	33.7	93.5	94.3	91.4	77.2	86.1	61.4
Safety	90.2	84.6	92.2	92.2	70.1	89.9	89.8	90.4
Household Income	66.7	20.9	82.8	83.3	53.1	63.7	64.3	60.5
Infant Life	94.7	89.6	96.5	96.5	91.5	97.4	97.3	97.9
Emotional Wellbeing	75.5	87.7	71.1	70.8	85.4	82.9	82.2	86.6
Age of Mother	79.8	67.3	84.1	84.7	75.1	67.0	73.3	60.4
Health Insurance	75.3	50.2	84.2	85.0	79.5	65.9	68.7	50.0
CGI(P) Scores	75.8	61.4	80.9	81.3	72.9	70.2	74.1	63.4

Table 16. Hypothetical CGI(P) Scores (2006), Without Undocumented Mexican**Immigration**

	International	Mexico	U.S.	African Americans	Latinos
Electoral Participation	47.3	57.1	43.5	37.3	30.9
Education	78.2	33.7	95.2	91.5	86.9
Safety	90.1	84.6	92.2	70.1	89.8
Household Income	64.9 – 66.6	16.8	83.3 – 85.7	53.7 – 54.6	64.8 – 65.8
Infant Life	94.6	89.6	96.5	91.5	97.3
Emotional Wellbeing	75.5	88.0	70.8	85.4	82.2
Age of Mother	80.4	67.3	85.4	75.1	73.3
Health Insurance	75.3	50.2	85.0	79.5	68.7
CGI(P) Scores	75.8 – 76.0	60.9	81.5 – 81.8	73.0 – 73.1	74.2 – 74.4

APPENDIX C

MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM SCORES USED FOR CGI(P) CALCULATIONS

Definitions

1. Electoral participation rate = Percentage of population who voted
2. High school drop-out rate
 - a. (U.S., African American, Latinos) = Percentage of population aged 18-64 who have not graduated and are not currently enrolled.
 - b. (Mexico) = Percentage of population aged 25-64 who have not completed upper secondary school.
 - c. (Undocumented Mexican immigrants) = Percentage of population aged 25-64 who have not completed upper secondary school.
3. Homicide rate = Number of homicides per 100,000.
4. Household income = Median household income in Purchasing Power Parity (U.S. dollars).
5. Infant mortality rate = Number of deaths before age one, per 1,000 live births in a given year.
6. Suicide rate = Number of suicides per 100,000.
7. Teenage birth rate = Number of births per 1,000 women.
8. Uninsurance rate = Percent of population lacking private or public health insurance.

Table 17. Minimum and Maximum Scores Used for CGI(P) Calculations

	Lowest International Performance	Country of Lowest Performance	Highest International Performance Score	Country of Highest Performance
Electoral Participation	0	Cuba	98	Malta
HS Drop-out	98	Germany	5	Burkina Faso
Homicide	79	S Africa	0	Myanmar
Household Income	\$2,976	Kazakstan	\$57,576	Switzerland
Infant Mortality	138	Afghanistan	2	Iceland
Suicide	35	Belarus	0	Honduras, Haiti, others
Teen birthrate	244	Niger	3.8	Netherlands
Uninsurance	0	Not indicator for developing countries	100	Canada, Japan, most of Europe

Sources of Minimum and Maximum Scores Used for CGI(P) Calculations

1. Electoral participation: *Voter Turnout Database*, (Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2010), <http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm#> (accessed December 17, 2010).
2. High school drop-out:
 - a. Minimum: "On the Line - Education in Burkina Faso," (England: 2010), <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/coolplanet/ontheline/explore/journey/burkina/prteduc.htm> (accessed December 17, 2010).
 - b. Maximum: *Education at a Glance 2010: OECD Indicators*, (Paris: OECD, 2010), <http://www.ecs.org/html/offsite.asp?document=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eoeecd%2Eorg%2Fedu%2Feag2010> (accessed December 17, 2010).
3. Homicide: *Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2005 - 2006*, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf> (accessed January 30, 2011).
4. Household Income: *HIES - Household Income and Expenditure Statistics*, (International Labor Organization Department of Statistics, 2010), <http://laborsta.ilo.org/> (accessed September 12, 2010).
5. Infant Mortality: *Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 births)*, (The World Bank, 2010), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?order=wbapi_data_value_2009+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc (accessed January 30, 2011).
6. Suicide: *Country Reports and Charts Available*, (World Health Organization, 2003), http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/country_reports/en/ (accessed December 17, 2010).
7. Teenage birthrate: *UNFPA State of the World Population 2006A Passage to Hope: Women and International Migration*, (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2006), http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/pdf/en_sowp06.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acs, Gregory, and Pamela Loprest. "Who Are Low-Income Working Families?" (2005).
- "Adolescent Birth Rate, Per 1,000 Women." In *Millenium Development Goals Indicators*: United Nations, 2010.
- Airola, Jim. "The Use of Remittance Income in Mexico." *International Migration Review* 41, no. 4 (2007): 850-59.
- Alfano, Sean. "Arizona Immigration Law SB 1070 Has Support of 55% of Americans, New Poll Shows " *NYDailyNews.com*, July 28, 2010.
- Ali, Mir M., and Debra S. Dwyer. "Estimating Peer Effects in Sexual Behavior among Adolescents." *Journal of Adolescence*, no. In Press, Corrected Proof (2010): 1-8.
- Alkire, Sabina, and Maria Emma Santos. "Acute Multidimensional Poverty: A New Index for Developing Countries." In *OPHI Working Paper No. 38*. Oxford: Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI), University of Oxford, 2010.
- "America's Children: Key National Indicators of Wellbeing, 2009." U.S. Department of Education - Institute of Education Sciences, 2009.
- "American Time Use Survey." Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stastics.
- Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologica*. Translated by Fathers of the Dominican Province. 5 vols. Vol. 2. New York, NY: Benzinger Brothers, 1948.
- Archibold, Randal C. "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration." *New York Times*, April 24, 2010.
- Associated Press. "DREAM or Nightmare? Immigration Bill Clears House, but Appears Doomed." *FoxNews.com*, December 9, 2010.
- "Basic Family Budget Calculator." Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.

- Bearman, Peter S., and et al. "Peer Potential: Making the Most of How Teens Influence Each Other." Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 1999.
- Beaudry, Paul, and David A. Green. "Changes in U.S. Wages, 1976–2000: Ongoing Skill Bias or Major Technological Change?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 23, no. 3 (2005): 609-48.
- Benschop, Marjolein. "Women's Rights to Land and Property." In *Women in Human Settlements Development Challenges and Opportunities*: UN-HABITAT, Commission on Sustainable Development, 2004.
- Betts, Julian R. "Educational Crowding Out: Do Immigrants Affect the Educational Attainment of American Minorities " In *Help or Hindrance?: The Economic Implications of Immigration for African Americans*, edited by Daniel S. Hamermesh and Frank D. Bean, 253-81. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998.
- "Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009.
- Bobo, Kim. "Wage Theft in America: Why Millions of Working Americans Are Not Getting Paid - and What We Can Do About It." New York: The New Press, 2008.
- Borges, Guilherme, Joshua Breslau, Maxwell Su, Matthew Miller, Maria Elena Medina-Mora, and Sergio Aguilar-Gaxiola. "Immigration and Suicidal Behavior among Mexicans and Mexican Americans." *Journal of Public Health* 99, no. 4 (2010): 728-33.
- Borjas, George. "Immigrants, Minorities, and Labor Market Competition." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 40, no. April (1987): 382-92.
- . "The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118, no. 4 (2003): 1335-74.
- Borjas, George, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence F. Katz. "On the Labor Market Impacts of Immigration and Trade." In *Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas*, edited by George Borjas and Richard Freeman, 213-44. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Borjas, George, Jeffrey Grogger, and Gordon Hanson. "Immigration and the Economic Status of African-American Men." *Economica* 77, no. 306 (2010): 255-82.

- Borjas, George, Jeffrey Grogger, and Gordon H. Hanson. "Immigration and African-American Employment Opportunities: The Response of Wages, Employment, and Incarceration to Labor Supply Shocks." In *NBER Working Paper Series*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.
- . "Imperfect Substitution between Immigrants and Natives: A Reappraisal." no. March (2008), <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~GBorjas/Papers/BGH2008.pdf>.
- Broderick, Francis, L. *Right Reverend New Dealer John A. Ryan*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963.
- Brownell, Peter B. "Wage Differences between Temporary and Permanent Immigrants." *International Migration Review* 44, no. 3 (2010): 593-614.
- Card, David. "Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Market Impacts of Higher Immigration." *Journal of Labor Economics* 19, no. 1 (2001): 22-64.
- . "Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?" *The Economic Journal* 115, no. 507 (2005): 300-23.
- . "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Economy." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 43, no. 2 (1990): 245-57.
- Card, David, and Ethan G. Lewis. "The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990s: Explanations and Impacts." In *Mexican Immigration*, edited by George Borjas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- "Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (Cfoi) - Current and Revised Data." In *Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries - Hours-Based Rates*. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010.
- "Changes in Low-Wage Labor Markets between 1979 and 2005." Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, 2006.
- "Child Maltreatment 2007." In *Child Maltreatment*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services – Administration on Youth, Children and Families
- Chiquiar, Daniel, and Gordon H. Hanson. "International Migration, Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States." *The Journal of Political Economy* 113, no. 2 (2005): 239-81.
- "Cities in Crisis 2009: Closing the Graduation Gap." Bethesda, MD: Editorial Projects in Education Research Center, 2009.

- Clark, David A. "The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances." In *The Elgar Companion to Development Studies*, edited by David A. Clark. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006.
- CNN Wire Staff. "Nebraska Immigration Law Passes." *CNN.com*, June 22, 2010.
- Collier, Elizabeth W. "Who Is My Neighbor? Negotiating the Tension between the Local and the Global in Catholic Social Teaching to More Adequately Address United States Immigration Policy." Loyola University Chicago, 2007.
- "Country Statistical Profiles 2010: Mexico." In *OECD.Stat Extracts*. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010.
- Cox Edwards, Alejandra, and Manuelita Rueta. "International Migration, Remittances and Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador." *Journal of Development Economics* 72, no. 2 (2003).
- Dalaker, Joe. "Alternative Poverty Estimates in the United States: 2003." In *Current Population Reports*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005.
- Data360. "Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal (Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis)." 2010.
- "Deaths: Final Data for 2006." In *National Vital Statistics Report*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Disease Control, 2009.
- DeCrane, Suzanne M. *Aquinas, Feminism and the Common Good*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004.
- DeNavas-Walt, Carmen, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica C. Smith. "Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007." In *Current Population Reports: Consumer Income*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.
- . "Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008." In *Current Population Reports: Consumer Income*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2009.
- Diamond, Diane. "Fighting Illegal Immigration at the Local Level." <http://dianedimond.net/contact/> (accessed January 12, 2010).

- Dinan, Kinsey Alden. "Budgeting for Basic Needs." New York: National Center for Children in Poverty, Malman Center for Public Health, Columbia University, 2009.
- Earned Legalization and Family Unification Act of 2003*. 108th Congress, H.R. 3271.
- "Economic Report of the President." Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2005.
- "Eleccion De Presidente De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos." In *Participacion Ciudadana en las Elecciones Federales de 2006*. Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Federal Electoral, 2010.
- "Encuesta Nacional De Ingresos Y Gastos De Los Hogares (ENIGH) 2006." Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 2007.
- "Erga Migrantes Caritas Christi." Vatican City: Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, 2004.
- Esquivel, Gerardo, and Alejandra Huerta-Pineda. "Remittances and Poverty in Mexico: A Propensity Score Matching Approach." New Delhi: Global Development Network, 2006.
- "European Health Indicators: Development and Initial Implementation." edited by Katri Kilpeläinen, Arpo Aromaa and ECHIM Core Group. Helsinki, Finland: National Public Health Institute, European Community Health Indicators Monitoring (ECHIM), 2008.
- Frank, Reanne, and Robert A. Hummer. "The Other Side of the Paradox: The Risk of Low Birth Weight among Infants of Migrant and Nonmigrant Households within Mexico." *International Migration Review* 36, no. 3 (2002): 746-65.
- Friedberg, Rachel M., and Jennifer Hunt. "The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment, and Growth." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9, no. 2 (1995): 23-44.
- García, Juan Ramon. *Operation Wetback: The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workers in 1954*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1980.
- Gathright, Alan. "Senators Push in-State Tuition for Undocumented Students." *TheDenverChannel.com*, January 19, 2011.

- Gordon, Jennifer, and R.A. Lenhardt. "Conflict and Solidarity between African American and Latino Immigrant Workers." Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley Law School, 2007.
- Gould, Eric D., Victor Lavy, and M. Daniele Paserman. "Does Immigration Affect the Long-Term Educational Outcomes of Natives? Quasi-Experimental Evidence." *Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society* 119, no. 540 (2009): 1243-69.
- Grant, Philip. "John A. Ryan and the Presidential Election of 1936." In *Religion and Public Life: The Legacy of Monsignor John A. Ryan*, edited by Robert G. Kennedy, Mary Christine Athans, BVM, Bernard V. Brady, William C. McDonough and Michael J. Naughton, 23-30. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2001.
- Greenhouse, Steven. "A Move to Protect Low-Wage Workers." New York: New York Times, 2010.
- Gutierrez, Gustavo. *The God of Life*. Translated by Matthew O'Connell. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991.
- Hagerty, Michael R., Robert A. Cummins, Abbott L. Ferriss, Kenneth Land, Alex C. Michalos, Mark Peterson, Andrew Sharpe, Joseph Sirgy, and Joachim Vogel. "Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research." *Social Indicators Research* 55, no. 1 (2001): 1-96.
- Hanson, Gordon H. "Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States." *Journal of Economic Literature* 44, no. 4 (2006): 869-924.
- Hanson, Gordon, and Christopher Woodruff. "Emigration and Educational Attainment in Mexico." San Diego: University of San Diego, 2003.
- "Hate Crimes Statistics, 2008." In *Uniform Crime Report*: U.S. Department of Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008.
- "Healthy People 2010." Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services <http://www.healthypeople.gov/About/hpfact.htm> (accessed February 9, 2010).
- Hehir, J. Bryan. "John A. Ryan, John Courtney Murray, George Higgins, and the Catholic Social Tradition." In *Religion and Public Life*, edited by Robert G. Kennedy, Mary Christine Athans, BVM, Bernard V. Brady, William C.

- McDonough and Michael J. Naughton, 11-22. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001.
- "HIES - Household Income and Expenditure Statistics." In *LABORSTA Internet*: International Labor Organization Department of Statistics, 2010.
- "High School Dropouts by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1980 to 2007." In *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2010*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau.
- Hirschman, Charles, and Jennifer C. Lee. "Race and Ethnic Inequality in Educational Attainment in the United States." In *Ethnicity and Causal Mechanisms*, edited by Michael Rutter and Martha Tienda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Hoke, Linda, and Sandra Johnson. "The Southern Community Index." Research Triangle Park, NC: Southern Growth Policies Board, 2005.
- Hoxby, Caroline M. "Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation." In *NBER Working Paper*. Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000.
- "Human Development Report 2007/2008." New York: United Nations Human Development Programme, 2008.
- "Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development." New York: United Nations Human Development Programme, 2009.
- "Human Development Report 2010, 20th Anniversary Edition: The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development." New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2010.
- Hummer, Robert A., Daniel A. Powers, Starling G. Pullum, Ginger L. Gossman, and W. Parker Frisbie. "Paradox Found (Again): Infant Mortality among the Mexican-Origin Population in the United States." *Demography* 44, no. 3 (2007): 441-57.
- "Income and Poverty Status." Cover the Uninsured (A Project of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation), <http://covertheuninsured.org/content/income-and-poverty-status> (accessed January 19, 2011).
- "Indicator Definitions and Metadata." In *WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS)*: World Health Organization, 2010.

- "Indicators." Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010.
- "Informacion Sobre El Flujo Migratorio Internacional De Mexico`." In *Comunicado Num 162/98*. Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, 2009.
- "Informe Anual." Mexico, D.F.: Banco de Mexico, 2007.
- Justice for Immigrants Campaign. "Economics and Migration: The Facts." In *Justice for Immigrants: A Journey of Hope, Parish Resource Kit*. Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006.
- Kelley, Allen C. . "The Human Development Index: "Handle with Care"." *Population and Development Review* 17, no. 2 (1991): 315-24.
- Kochhar, Rakkesh. "Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: The Latino Experience in Recession and Recovery." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2003.
- . "Unemployment Rises Sharply among Hispanic Immigrants in 2008." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009.
- "La Medicion De La Pobreza Y Su Multidimensionalidad." Mexico, D.F.: Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), 2006.
- Lopez-Cordova, Ernesto. "Globalization, Migration, and Development: The Role of Mexican Remittances." In *Working Paper*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Developmental Bank 2006.
- "Mapas De Pobreza Y Rezago Social 2005." CONEVAL (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social), 2007.
- Maritain, Jacques. *The Person and the Common Good*. Translated by John J. Fitzgerald. First paperback ed. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
- Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan Malone. *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002.
- McCann, Dennis P. "The Common Good in Catholic Social Teaching: A Case Study in Modernization." In *In Search of the Common Good*, edited by Dennis P. McCann and Patrick D. Miller, 121–46. New York: T & T Clark, 2005.
- McKenzie, David J. "Beyond Remittances: The Effect of Migration on Mexican Households." In *International Migration, Remittances & the Brain Drain*, edited

by Çağlar Özden and Maurice Schiff. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Measuring Poverty: A New Approach. Edited by Constance F. Citro and Robert T. Michael. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995.

"Medicaid Eligibility: Are You Eligible?". U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidEligibility/02_AreYouEligible_.asp#TopOfPage (accessed January 19, 2011).

Meinshausen, Malte, Nicolai Meinshausen, William Hare, Sarah C. B. Raper, Katja Frieler, Reto Knutti, David J. Frame, and Myles R. Allen. "Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2° C. ." *Nature* 458, no. 7242 (2009): 1158-62.

"Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 2008." In *Fact Sheet*. Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009.

Mexico, Secretaria de Salud de. "Indicadores Basicos De Salud, 2000-2004." Mexico, D.F.: Organización Panamericana de la Salud: Oficina Regional de la Organización Mundial de la Salud.

"Migrant." In *Merriam Webster*, 2010.

"Migration and Refugee Services: A Brief History." Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2010.

Miringoff, Marc L., Marque-Luisa Miringoff, and Sandra Opdycke. "Monitoring the Nation's Social Performance: The Index of Social Health." In *Children, Families, and Government: Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, edited by Edward F. Zigler, Sharon Lynn Kagan and Nancy W. Hall, 10 - 20. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Miringoff, Marc, and Marque-Luisa Miringoff. *The Social Health of the Nation: How America Is Really Doing*. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Miringoff, Marque-Luisa, and Sandra Opdycke. *America's Social Health: Putting Social Issues Back on the Public Agenda*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008.

Mishra, Prachi. "Emigration and Wages in Source Countries: Evidence from Mexico." *Journal of Development Economics* 82, no. 1 (2007): 180-99.

- "Money Income of Families—Median Income by Race and Hispanic Origin in Current and Constant (2007) Dollars: 1990 to 2007." In *The 2010 Statistical Abstract*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.
- "Mortality Rate, Infant (Per 1,000 Births)." In *Data*: The World Bank, 2010.
- Nessel, Lori A. "Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform." *Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review* 36, no. 2 (2001): 345-405.
- Nussbaum, Martha. *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- O'Neill, William R., and William C. Spohn. "Rights of Passage: The Ethics of Immigration and Refugee Policy." *Theological Studies* 59, no. 1 (1998): 84-106.
- "OECD Health Data 2009 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality)." In *OECD.Stat Extracts*: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- "OECD Health Data 2009 - Selected Data: Health Status (Mortality)." In *OECD.Stat Extracts*: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- "Official List of Mdg Indicators." United Nations, 2008.
- Orrenius, Pia M., and Madeline Zavodny. "Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level Evidence." Atlanta: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2003.
- Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., and Giovanni Peri. "Immigration and National Wages: Clarifying the Theory and the Empirics." Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.
- Paral, Rob, and Associates. "Economic Progress Via Legalization." Washington, D.C.: Immigration Policy Institute, 2009.
- Partridge, Mark D., Dan S. Rickman, and Kamar Ali. "Recent Immigration: The Diversity of Economic Outcomes in Metropolitan America." *Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research* 11, no. 3 (2009): 29-57.
- Passel, Jeffery S. "Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics." In *Background Briefing Prepared for Task Force on Immigration and America's Future*. Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005.

- Passel, Jeffery S., and D'Vera Cohn. "A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States." Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009.
- . "U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down Sharply since Mid-Decade." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010.
- Pastor, Manuel Jr., and Enrico Marcelli. "Somewhere over the Rainbow? African Americans, Unauthorized Mexican Immigration, and Coalition Building." *The Review of Black Political Economy* 31, no. 1/2 (2003): 125-55.
- Peri, Giovanni. "Immigrants, Skills and Wages: Measuring the Economic Gains from Immigration." In *Immigration Policy in Focus*. Washington, D.C.: American Immigration Law Center, 2006.
- Phang, Sock-Yong. "Affordable Homeownership Policy: Implications for Housing Markets and Housing Elasticities." In *European Real Estate Society Conference*. Stockholm, 2009.
- Pope Benedict XVI. "Caritatis in Veritate." Rome: Vatican, 2009.
- Pope John Paul II. "Centesimus Annus." In *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, edited by David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, 439-88. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004.
- . "Ecclesia in America." Rome: Vatican, 1999.
- . "Laborem Exercens." In *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, edited by David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, 352 - 92. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992.
- . "Sollicitudo Rei Socialis." In *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992.
- Pope John XXIII. "Mater Et Magistra." In *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, edited by David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, 84-128. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004.
- . "Pacem in Terris." In *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, edited by David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, 131-62. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004.
- Pope Leo XIII. "Rerum Novarum." Rome: Vatican, 1891.

Pope Paul VI. "Pastoralis Migratorum Cura." 1969.

Pope Pius XI. "Quadragesimo Anno." In *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, edited by David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, 42-80. Markyknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004.

Pope Pius XII. "Exsul Familia Nazarethana." Rome: Vatican, 1952.

Porter, Jean. "The Common Good in Thomas Aquinas." In *In Search of the Common Good*, edited by Dennis P. McCann and Patrick D. Miller, 94-120. New York: T & T Clark, 2005.

———. *The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics*, 1990.

Protect Our Workers from Exploitation and Retaliation (POWER). 111th Congress, SB 3207.

U.S. Congress. *Protecting America's Workers Act*. 110th Congress, HR 2067.

Ratha, Dilip. "Remittances in Development." *Finance and Development* 46, no. 4 (2009).

Robeyns, Ingrid "Selecting Capabilities for Quality of Life Measurement." *Social Indicators Research* 74, no. 1 (2005): 191-215.

Rowland, Stephen Dinan and Kara. "Justice: Sanctuary Cities Safe from Law." *The Washington Post*, July 4, 2010.

Ruether, Rosemary Radford. *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. Reprint, With a New Introduction.

Ryan, John A., S.T.D. *A Living Wage*. Revised and Abridged Edition ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920.

Sawyer, Adam. "In Mexico, Mother's Education and Remittances Matter in School Outcomes." Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2010.

"Second Meeting of the Statistical Commission for Africa (Statcom Africa - II)." Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Africa 2010.

Seers, Dudley. "A System of Social and Demographic Statistics: A Review Note." *The Economic Journal* 86, no. 343 (1976): 595-98.

- Singh, Gopal K., and Robert A. Hiatt. "Trends and Disparities in Socioeconomic and Behavioural Characteristics, Life Expectancy, and Cause-Specific Mortality of Native-Born and Foreign-Born Populations in the United States, 1979–2003." *International Journal of Epidemiology* 35 (2006): 903–19.
- Singh, Gopal K., and Mohammad Siahpush. "All-Cause and Cause-Specific Mortality of Immigrants and Native Born in the United States." *American Journal of Public Health* 91, no. 3 (2001): 392–99.
- Smith, James P., and Barry Edmonston. *The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration*. Washington, DC: National Research Council - Panel on the Demographic and Economic Impacts of Immigration, 1997.
- "Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing." National Association of Realtors Research Division.
- "Southern Border Security Act of 2010." In *H.R. 5256*, edited by Govtrack.us, 2010.
- Sowle Cahill, Lisa. *Bioethics and the Common Good*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004.
- . *Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Stanton, Elizabeth. "The Human Development Index: A History." In *Working Paper Series*. Amherst, MA: Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2007.
- "Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States: 2006." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Institute, 2008.
- "Statistical Profiles of the Hispanic and Foreign-Born Populations in the U.S.: 2008." Washington, D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2010.
- Steinfels, Margaret O'Brien. "Contemporary Importance of John A. Ryan." In *Religion and Public Life: The Legacy of Monsignor John A. Ryan*, edited by Robert G. Kennedy, Mary Christine Athans, BVM, Bernard V. Brady, William C. McDonough and Michael J. Naughton, 291–98. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 2001.
- "Suicide in the U.S.: Statistics and Prevention." U.S. Department of Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/suicide-in-the-us-statistics-and-prevention/index.shtml> (accessed February 29, 2010).

- "Summary of Immigrant Eligibility Restrictions under Current Law, as of 2/25/2009." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009.
- "Summary of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America's Security and Prosperity Act (Cirasap) of 2009." Washington, D.C.: Immigration Policy Center of the American Immigration Council, 2009.
- "Table a-1: Reporting Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008." In *Voting and Registration: Historical Time Series Table*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau.
- "Teenagers—Births and Birth Rates by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1990 to 2007." In *The 2010 Statistical Abstract*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.
- "Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2005 - 2006." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
- "The 2009 HHS Poverty Guidelines." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2010.
- "The Index of Social Health." Institute for Innovation in Social Policy, Vassar University, <http://iisp.vassar.edu/ish.html> (accessed January 28, 2010).
- "The World Factbook: Field Listing: Literacy." Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2103.html> (accessed May 30, 2010).
- "U.N. Report Asks Governments to Improve Data Collection to Better Women's Lives." U.N. News Centre, 2006.
- "U.N.S.D. Environmental Indicators." United Nations Statistical Division, 2010.
- "U.S. Teenage Pregnancies, Births and Abortions: National and State Trends and Trends by Race and Ethnicity." Guttmacher Institute, 2010.
- "Unemployed Persons by Marital Status, Race, Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, Age and Sex." In *Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Study: 2006 Annual Averages - Household Data - Tables from Employment and Earnings*. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Labor Statistics, 2007.

United States Catholic Conference of Bishops and Conferencia del Episcopado Mexicano. "Strangers No Longer: Together on a Journey of Hope." United States Catholic Conference of Bishops 2003.

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on Migration. "Catholic Bishops' Call for Comprehensive Immigration Reform." In *Justice for Immigrants: A Journey of Hope, Parish Resource Kit*. Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006.

———. "Economics and Migration: The Facts." In *Justice for Immigrants: A Journey of Hope, Parish Resource Kit*. Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006.

———. "Enforcement of Immigration Laws: Important Principles." In *Justice for Immigrants: A Journey of Hope, Parish Resource Kit*. Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006.

———. "Justice for Immigrants: A Journey of Hope, Parish Resource Kit." Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Migration & Refugee Services, 2006.

"United States: Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths Per 1,000 Live Births) by Race/Ethnicity, Linked Files, 2004-2006." Kaiser Family Foundation Statehealthfacts.org.

"Uphill Battle over Unionization Bill Moves to House, Senate." *Workforce Management*, March 10, 2009.

Vatican Council II. "Gaudium Et Spes." Rome: The Vatican, 1965.

———. "Gaudium Et Spes." In *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage*, edited by David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, 164-237. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992.

Vaughan, Jessica. "Bar None: An Evaluation of the 3/10-Year Bar." Center for Immigration Studies, <http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1003.html>.

Vidal, John, Allegra Stratton, and Suzanne Goldenberg. "Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure." *Guardian.co.uk*, December 19, 2009 2009.

"Wage Theft." Chicago: Interfaith Worker Justice, 2010.

Walzer, Michael. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books, 1983.

- Ward Schofield, Janet, and Leslie R.M. Hausmann. "The Conundrum of School Desegregation: Positive Student Outcomes and Waning Support." *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 66, no. 1 (2004): 83-111.
- Wilper, Andrew P., Steffie Woolhandler, Karen E. Lasser, Danny McCormick, David H. Bor, and David U. Himmelstein. "Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults." *American Journal of Public Health* 99, no. 12 (2009): 2289-95.
- "Wisqars Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2006." United States Center for Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2009.
- "Wisqars Injury Mortality Reports, 1999 - 2007." United States Center for Disease Control: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2010.
- Wolfe, David A. *Child Abuse: Implications for Child Development and Psychopathology*. Second ed, Development Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Series. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1999.
- "World Report on Violence and Health." Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002.

VITA

Ana Bedard was born in Rhode Island and raised in South Florida. She received her B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania in 1988, and upon graduating she joined the Franciscan Service Program, a Catholic lay volunteer program run by the Sisters of St. Joseph, Third-Order Franciscans. Through that program, she was introduced to the fields of community organizing and radical Catholic social action and reflection. As a community organizer for fifteen years, she worked with many broad based organizations composed of diverse constituencies to change policies and practices for the benefit of local communities. Through her work with the Industrial Areas Foundation, she continued her practice of faith-based organizing and reflection.

In 2003 she began her graduate work, receiving a Masters in Theology from Loyola University Chicago in 2006 and continuing on to doctoral studies. While at Loyola, Ms. Bedard has served on the board of directors of the Academy of Catholic Hispanic Theologians of the United States (ACHTUS), was a student member of the Loyola University Graduate School Council, and participated in the Graduate Student Caucus of the Theology Department. In addition, she has won scholarships from the State of Illinois (Diversifying Faculty in Illinois program) and the prestigious Hispanic Theological Initiative. She has presented papers at several conferences, including the Society of Christian Ethics, and her work has been published in the Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics.

Currently, Ms. Bedard manages the Center for Non-profit Effectiveness at St. Augustine College. In this role, she oversees the development and deployment of professional skills training for non-profit employees and clients. She is pleased to have the opportunity through this work to continue living out her commitment to empowering marginalized communities.

